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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virg~a 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1995 
HELEN HARRIS kND HUFF HARRIS, Plaintiffs in 
Error, 
versus 
PRINCE I. WRIGHT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ES-
TATE OF CARL ALLEN WRIGHT, DECEASED, 
Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSEDEAS 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate J'ltstices of the 
81tpreme Court of AppeaJ,s of Virginia: 
Petitioners, Helen Harris and Huff Harris, respectfully 
represent that they are aggrieved by a final judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, entered on 
the 23rd day of February, 1938, in a certain action at law in 
which your petitioners were defendants, and Prince I. Wright, 
Administrator of the estate of Carl Allen Wright, deceased, 
was plaintiff. 
For brP-vity, the parties will be referred to as plaintiff and 
defendants, according to the positions occupied ·by them· in 
the trial court. · 
A transcript of the record, together with a map and several· 
photographs introduced in evidence, are presented herewith, 
as ·a part of this petition, and page references herein are to 
the pages of the transcript. 
~ 
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S'l'ATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This is an action instituted by Prince I. Wright, Adminis-
b·ntor of Carl Allen Wright, deceased, to recover damages for 
the wrongful death of the intestate in a collision between a 
child's wagon in which the intestate was riding, and an au-
tomobile owned by defendant, Huff Harris, and operated at 
the time by his daughter, defendant Hel~n Harris. · 
The accident occurred on Sunday afternoon, May 23~ 1937, 
on the Lawrenceville-Ebony road, in front of the residence 
of R. A. Wright. This road, which is a dirt road, is a part 
of the Virginia State Highway .System and is known as a 
secondary hig·hway. 
The road runs north a.nd south. The residence of R . .A. 
Wright is located on the west side of the road. Directly across 
from the Wright residence, and on the east side of the road, 
is an unoccupied abandoned house known as the ''Old Sam 
Wray house". Leading from the road to the Sam Wray 
house is a private entrance. This entrance, through long 
usage, has been worn, or cut down, and now slopes downward, 
from the yard of the ''Old Sam W ray house'' to the eastern 
edge of the road, a grade of two and one-half feet in a dis-
tance of thirty-three feet. 
The Lawrenceville-Ebony road at this immediate point 
curves to the east. Travelling south on this road, and going 
in the direction of Ebony, the gTade of the road is uphill. As 
one approaches the point opposite the entrance to the Old 
Sam W ray house, this grade is over twelve feet in a distance 
of 250 feet. The summit, or top of the hill, is reached op-
posite the said entrance. From the summit the grade of the 
road then slopes downhill at approximately the same grade. 
There extends along the east side of the road, and to the 
north of said entrance; a ditch bank which is three feet, three 
inches higher than, or above, the crown of the road. On this 
ditch bank, and into the triangle between the northeast inter-
SP.ction of the entrance and road is an ice-house, pine trees, 
oak trees, sweet gum trees, shrubs, weeds, grass, and a dense 
undergrowth. Travelling south on the said road, and ap-
proaching said entrance, there is no visibility through this 
1mdergrowth in the spring or summer, and very limited vision, 
if ::tny. in late autumn and winter. 
The road at the summit of the hill is twenty feet wide from 
ditch line to ditch line, by actual.measurement. The road has 
no shoulders. The R. A. Wright residence is 84 feet from the 
west side of the road. The grade of the yard from the west 
side of the road to the R. A. Wright residence slopes upward 
three feet. · 
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· . Plaintiff's intestate, Carl Allen Wright, resided in the 
home of his parents, Prince I. Wright and Elizabeth Link 
Wright, which home is located on the same Lawrenceville-
~}bony road about 500 yards south of the resi4ence of · R. A. 
Wright. 
At the time of the accident the decedent was 7 years, 3 
months old, had completed one year's schooling at the Ebony 
High Sehool, which he attended by way of school bus. 
On the day of the accident, decedent's parents had left him 
in the custody of his grandmother, Mrs. R . .A. Wright, who· is 
65 years of age. Residing with Mr. and Mrs. R . .A. Wright, 
at the time, was their daug·hter, Mrs. Esther Wright Culp, 
and her two children, Ida Valerie Culp, age 7 years, and John 
Julian eulp, age 6 years. The three children were playing 
with a child's wag·on in the yard of the old Sam W ray house, 
which is located on the east side of the road and across the 
road from the R. A. Wright residence. Their grandmother, the 
said Mrs. R. A .. Wright, came to the front of her residen~e 
and called the children to come home, meaning to cross the 
road to her house. Then she turned and started to the house. 
At about 2 o'clock p. m., on May 23,'1937, in company with 
her mother, Lavinia Harris, and her sister, Maude Harris, 
the defendant, IIelen Harris, left her home near Ebony, Vir-
ginia, in a 19R4 model Chevrolet Master Coach automobile, 
to take her said sister to Lawrenceville, .where the latter was 
to teach school on Monday, the following day.· The automo-
lJile used belonged to defendant Huff Harris, father of Helen 
Harris, who is a farmer residing near Ebony, Virginia. The 
ear 'vas equipped with four-wheel hrakes and was in good 
con'dition. The weather was fair. The road was dry and 
covered with loose gravel. 
The trip from Ebony to Lawrenceville over the said road 
was uneventful. · 
On the return trip from Lawrenceville to Ebony, Helen 
Harris, defendant, was accompanied only by her mothe~, her 
sisbn· having remained in Lawrenceville. The Wright resi-
dence is located about half way between Lawrenceville and 
Ebony. The defendant was then 'proceeding south on the 
Lawrenceville-Ebony road, and approached the hill and curve 
oppositP. the Wright residence, and likewise opposite the en-
trance to the Sam W ray house, at a speed of approximately 
30 miles an hour. The Lawrenceville-Ebony road, being a 
country dirt road, is known as a one-track road-that is, the 
travelling public follows the same path except when it is 
·.necessary to turn out to pass or meet other vehicles. Defend-
ant had been following the main track of the road until she 
approached the hill and curve, and then bore to the right for 
~U,f.-_· ,. ' 
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the reason that she could not see completely over the hill and 
around the curve, and for fear that there might be approach-
ing traffic from the south going north on the road. 
. Defendant was observing the highway closely for approach-
ing traffic. The plaintiff's intestate and his two companions, 
who were then coming down the entrance into the road in an-
swer• to the summons of .their grandmother, 'vere not within 
the range of her vision, and they could not be seen in the 
entrance through the ditch bank and dense undergrowth to 
the left and east of the defendant, as she approached the sum-
mit of the hill opposite the said entrance. 
When the Harris car had almost reached the entrance to the 
Sam Wray house, defendant and her mother observed for the 
first time plaintiff's intestate, and his two companions. Carl 
Allen Vi right was sitting in the front of the wagon guiding 
it by the tongue, which he held in his hand. J-ohn Julian Culp 
was sitting in the wagon behind Carl. The wagon was being 
pushed by Ida Vl:l1erie Culp and had just emerged from be-
hind the shrubs and undergrowth that grew along the north 
edge of said entrance down to the ditch line of the road. When 
the dP.fendant saw the wagon it was in the ditch line on the 
eastern edge of the road and was being pushed rapidly ("like 
a flash") across the road and immediately in front of de-
fendant's car. The wagon .was thP.n approximately 10 or 15 
feet from whP.re it was struck. Upon seeing the children on 
the eastern edge of the road, defendant attempted to apply 
her brakes and turn to the right to avoid hitting them, but 
did not havP. sufficient time to avoid the accident. 
The wagon was struck on its right side about midway be-
tween the front and rear wheels, by the left front wheel of 
the car. Oarl·Allen Wright received injuries from which he 
diAd on May 25, 1937. The other two children received only 
minor injuries. 
Prince I. Wright, father of Carl Allen Wright, qualified as 
administrator of the estate of 'Carl Allen Wright, deceased, 
and instituted tllis action during the month of October, 1937, 
and, in his declaration (R., p. 1), alleged the negligence of 
thA defendant, Helen Harris, in the operation of her car to be: 
"That the said Helen Harris wilfully an,d wantonly dis-
regarding her said duty, carelessly and recklessly, 1uithout 
keepin_q a 'Proper looko'ltt, in driving at an excessive rate of 
speed, in lookin.Q to her ri_qht at people gathered in front of 
the residence of R. A. Wright, in drivin.q to he·r left-hand side 
of the road, to the left of the center ef said highway, and other-· 
wise o.perating and driving her said automobile in a careless 
and reckless manner.'' (R., p. 3.) 
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To this declaratipn the defendants demurred (R., p. 4), 
filed their grounds of defense ( R., p. 5), a plea of not guilty 
(R., p. 6), a plea of contributory negligence (R., p. 13), and 
a special plea of contributory negligence (R., p. 14). 
The case was hea1·d before a jury and the Circuit Court for 
Brunswick County on December 3-4, 1937. At the conclusion 
of the plaintiff's testimony the defendants moved to strike the 
samA (R., p: 10). This motion ·was again renewed at the con-
. elusion of the defendants' testimony (R., pp. 11, 16, 18). The 
defendants further moved to strike certain evidence intro-
duced by plaintiff as to the distance in which automobiles 
can be stopped (R., p. 19). The jury returned a verdict 
ag-ainst the defendants in the amount of $5,000.00, and de-
fendants moved to set the verdict aside upon various grounds 
(R., p. 21). The court ovArrulAd this motion and entered 
judgment on the jury's verdict (R., p. 22), and it is of this 
judgment that defendants are complaining. 
PAtitioners respectfully direct the court's attention to the 
following summary of the evidence : 
William Brooke Price, a witness called by the plaintiff. 
Witness is county surveyor. He made a map of the road 
wbP.re the accident occurred, in November, 1937. Witness tes-
tified as to the various measurements, distances, etc., shown 
on the n1ap: he stated that the point designated as "Y" on 
thP. map is located in the middle of the Lawrenceville-Ebony 
road, and at the summit of the hill (R., p. 6-2); that this point 
is opposite the middle of the entrance to the old Sam Wray 
house, and opposite the south corner of the R. A. Wright 
residence; that the road is 20 feet wide (R., p. 72); that the 
road, as it approaches "Y'' from the north, is upgrade 12 
feet 2 inches within a distance of 250 feet; (R., p. 64) that 
the road slopes from '' Y'' south a grade of 3 feet within 50 
feet; that the entrance to the Sam W ray house slopes down 
to the eastern edge of the road 2 feet 6 inches in 33 feet; that 
to the east of the road and north of the entrance, there is a 
very dense copse or hedge, consisting of weeds, trees, bushes, 
oak trees and trees of 6 or 8 inches in diameter-10, 12, 15, 18 
and 20 feet high (R., p. 69) ; that this undergrowth is located 
on the east. or left, of the highway as one travels south on 
thP. road, and is on a bank, 'vhich bank is 3 feet 3 inches above 
the crown of the road. 
Helen Harris, one of the defendants, called by the plaintiff 
as an adverse witness. 
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'Vitness stated that she was the daugh.ter of Huff Harris, 
and that her profession was that of teaching school; that on 
the day of the accident she made the . trip to Lawrenceville 
to take her sister, 'vho taught school there; that on her re-
turn trip from Lawrenceville to Ebony she was accompanied 
only by her mother; that the day was clear, the road dry, and 
that they were in no hurry (R., pp. 80, 81); that she was driv-
ing a 1934 Chevrolet Master Coach automobile, which was 
equipped with four-wheel brakes, which were in good con-
dition (R., p. 81) ; that there was no traffic on the road at the 
point of the collision; that she was neither meeting nor pass-
ing anyone, and that her speed was around 30 miles an hour ; 
that she first saw the children when they emerged from be-
hind the bushes and shrubs to the left, comin~ out from a 
side entrance; that she was from 10 to 15 feet from the chil-
dren at the time (R., p. 82) ; that she was travelling ''as the 
road is'' (n1eaning in the track of the dirt road) probably a 
little to the right of the center (R., p. 83); that she cu.t to her 
ri.qht as soon as she saw the children a;nd applied her brakes 
as best she could 'Ulith the time that she had and with the chil-
dren c.omin.Q int.o the road (R., p. 85) ; that the point of im-
pact was a point 25 to 35 feet north of point "Y'' (R.2 p. 86); 
that after the accident she estimated that her car was stopped 
within approximately 30 feet (R., p. 87). 
The witness was not questioned at this point by counsel 
for the defendants. 
Hunter W rig·ht, a witness called by the plaintiff. 
Witness is an uncle of plaintiff's intestate. He stated that 
at thP. time of the collision he was watering some team at a 
well. which well is loca..ated on the south side of the R. A. 
Wright residence; that the three children were playing across 
the public road near the old Sam Wray house; that his mother, 
~frs. R. A. Wright, called the children to .come to the house ; 
that his mother then started back to the house; that when 
he last saw the children they were approaching the road, two 
of them in the wagon, and the little girl pushing; that they 
were then up in the entrance to the Sam Wray house and ap-
nroxima tely 42 feet from the east edge of the road; that he 
did not see the accident; and when he next looked the collision 
had occurred; that he did not know where the point of impact 
occur red ; but did observe some marks in the road ''along 
about the rough of the road" (R., p. 97). 
I 
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Ida Valerie Culp. Witness was called by counsel for plain-
tiff ''to testify for what it is worth" (using his words), there 
appnrently being some question in counsel's mind as to her 
COITlpch•ncy (R., p. 101). 
Witness is 7 years old and has attended school for one year. 
She testified that she, Carl Allen Wright, and her young 
brother, John Julian Culp, who is 6 years of age, were play-
ing together immediately prior to the accident; that they were 
playing with a wag-on; that Carl was sitting in the front of the 
wagon holding- the tongue of it; that her brother was sitting 
behind Carl; that she was ,pushing the wagon (R., p. 103); 
that they had been playing at the cowpen, 'vhich was located 
about 100 yards from the east side of the ~oad; that they 
started to the house because her grandmother (Mrs. R. A. 
Wright) called them, and Maxey (referring to their uncle) 
wanted them to get the cows; that as they started into the 
road theJJ were runnin,q at first, but after they got the back 
wheels in the ditch they started to walk (R., p. 105) ; that 
after she ,qot out where she CO'ltld see, she saw the oar (R., p. 
106) ; that after they saw the car they tried to get out of the 
'vay (R., p. 107). 
On cross examination, witness testified that ·Carl saw the 
car coming, too, but didn't say anything, beomtse he. didn't 
have time ( R... p. 108) ; that when she saw the car coming 
the~J were about half way in the road, where they CO'lf,ld see 
_qood (R., p. 109); that she and Carl were the same age, and 
had both attendP.d Ebony High School one year (R., p. 109) ; 
that they attended school on the school bus; that they had 
been warned about cars, and both always looked up and down 
the road when they came across; that they both knew it was 
dang·erous to go out in the road in front of automobiles (R., 
p. 110): that the wagon was coming towards the ·house when 
it was struck, and they were near abo'ltt the middle of the road 
(R., p. 113). Witness was required to stoop down and push 
the wagon, and the back of her head was ascertained, by 
actual measurP.ment, to be only 2 feet 8 inches from the floor 
(R., pp. 111-138). 
W. D. Oates, a witness called by the plaintiff. 
Witness testified that he was a highway patrolman-that 
is. a tractor or road machine operator; that the Lawrence-
villA-Ebony road is known as No. 644 Secondary, it being a 
dirt or feeder road; witness expressed it as just an ''ordinary 
kind" of a road (R., p. 115); that he was not a witness to 
tllP. accident, but went to the scene about 12 hours thereafter, 
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for the purpose of securing some data for the highway de-
partment (R., p. 116) ; that the only thing he observed in the 
road was a depression about an inch or more deep, which may 
have beP.n made by the wagon wheel (R., p. 117); that he no-
ticed some markings on the road which appeared to have 
been caused by the draggi.ng of brakes (R., pp. 121, 122) ; that 
thesP. marks began about 11 or 12 feet from where he noticed 
tbP. inch depression. Witness testified that the Sam Wray 
house was an old place, and that traffic going in and out had 
worn the entrance down to a long slope (R., p. 126); witness 
stated that there is an ice-house located to the east of the road 
as one approaches the Sam Wray entrance from the north, 
which he "reckoned" to be approximately 75 feet from the 
entrance (R., p. 133). 
J. Hunter Love. witness called by the plaintiff. 
Witness is a farmer and surveyor, who testified that on 
December 1, 1937, he went to the scene of the accident, at 
.the request of L. J. Hammack, counsel for the plaintiff, and, 
together with Mr. Hammack. M.r. Wright, and several other 
Wrig·hts, made certain observations; that W. D. Cates was 
present and showed him a nail that he (Cates) had driven in 
the road ; that this nail was driven 12 feet to the north of 
the summit of the hill, marked "Y", and 8 feet from the east 
ditch linP. of the road (R., p.134); that Mr. Cates showed him 
another nail which was 128.3 feet south of the nail first above 
mentioned (R .• 1?· 142). Subsequently, Mr. Love returned to 
the, stand and stated that he had made a mistake, and that the 
second nail, instead of being south of a point on the map 
designated as "8", 'vas, in fact, north of said point approxi-
mately 30 ~eet (R., p. 17 4). "\Vitness testified that the ice-
house was located ''somewhere from 60 to 100 feet" from the 
entrance, and about 15 feet to the east of the road (R., p. 
148). 
R. F. Ellis, a witness called by the plaintiff. 
On the morning of the trial, which was the 3rd day of De- · 
cember, 1937, witness was sent to the scene of the accident by 
counsel for the plaintiff, and there made certain braking tests 
with a 1935 Chevrolet 4-door Sedan. He stated that he made' 
his tests on the hill 90 feet from the entrance to the Sam 
Wray house; that at a speed of 27 miles an hour he stopped 
his car witlain.27 feet after he applied the brakes; that heap-
plied the brakes at a pre-determined point, and not on an 
unexpected signal from anybody; that he went out to the 
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scene for the purpose of applying the brakes (R., p. 156). 
· W. B. ~Ioseley, a witness called by t~e plaintiff. 
Witness testified as to an experiment made on the morning 
of the trial by R. F. Ellis and Raymond Wright to determine 
the number of feet they required in which to stop an automo-
bilP.. Witness further stated that he went to the scene of the 
accident on the afternoon of 1\fay 23, 1937; that he did no 
measuring, stepping, or anything (R., p. 162); that he saw 
where somP.thing had scraped on the surface of the road, but 
was unable to state what madP. the marks (R., .P· 163) ; that 
the marks weren't quite in thP. middle of the road, but he 
couldn't tell whether they were near the eastern side or the 
western side of the road (R., p. 163). 
A. B. Wright, a witnP.ss called .by the plaintiff. 
Witness is a second cousin of the plaintiff, and testified 
with reference to certain tests that were made on the morning 
of the trial by R. F. Ellis and Raymond Wright. Witness 
WP.nt to the scene of tlie accident on the night of May 23, 19~_7, 
and is supposed to have made certain observations in tbe 
road with a flashlight. He statP.d. that he found marks in 
the road which he concluded were made by the wagon at the 
timP it was hit by the automobile. Witness furth~r stated 
that defendant Huff Harris was present, and that although 
he went with ~Ir. Harris out in thP. road two or three times, 
l1P. did not show the marks to Mr. Harris, or direct his atten-
tion to any of the marks (R., p. 171). 
Prince I. Wright, the plaintiff. 
Witness testified that he was the administrator of Carl 
Allen Wright, deceased (R., p. 175); that Carl Allen was his 
son and was born on February 19, 1930 (R., p. 176); that the 
hoy diAd on May 25, 1937; that he was absent from home at 
the time of the accident and that the deceased was left by him 
in the custody of his n1other (Mrs. R. A. Wright) (R., p. 177); 
that he made certain observations on thP. road where the ac-
cidP.nt took place the morning aftP.r the accident, and could 
sen wber(l Romething had dragged a hole in the road, and 
wherP. brakes had been applied (R., p. 178). Witness stated 
that his son had completed one year's schooling at the time 
of. the accident (R., p. 179), and that he had always told his 
child not io play in the road bP.cause he would be run over 
(R .. , p. 180); that his son had always been careful to stay out 
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of the road and that he had never had any trouble with him 
before (R., pp. 180-181); that witness and his son resided 
right on the road (R., p. 181), meaning that his residence and 
place of business are located a few feet from the road; 
that Carl ..A.llP.n was a normal child and that he started to 
school before he was 7 (R., p. 182). 
"\V. S. Dameron, a witness called by the defendants. 
vVitncss is a state police officer stationed in Brunswick 
Count),.. He testi:fiP.d that, following the accident, he made 
tho routine investigation, went to the scene of the· accident, 
the hospital wllf~re the Wright child was confined, and inter-
vie·wed the witnesses ; that he preferred no charge of reck-
less or carelP.ss driving against the defendant, Helen Harris. 
~rhe witness identified a number of photographs taken at 
the scene of thP. accident during October, 1937. He testified 
that the shrubbery, bushes, grass, trees, etc., were much 
denser on May 2H, 1937, than as shown in the photographs, 
or as existed in NovP.mber, 1937, when W. B. Price made his 
map, or in December, 1937, at the time the trial was had; that 
thP.re was no visibility through thP.se shrubs, and that ''on 
J\llay 23, 1937, when I visited the scene of the accident, I drove 
up to that intersection b~fore I even knew it was there''; 
(R., p. 190); that thP. shrubbery grew along the north side of 
the P.ntrance to the Sam Wray house down to the ditch drain. 
He further testified that a car going 30 miles an hour can be 
stopped with properly adjusted brakes on a dry, level road, 
freP. from loose material, within, a distance of 56 feet after 
the brakes are applied,, and that, assuming the reaction time 
to bP. half a second, the car would ~;o a total distance of 78 
feet before it could be stopped; that the Lawrenceville..: Ebony 
road on 1\fay 23, 1937, was a dirt road, covered with loose 
gravel. and that under such circumstances the stopping dis-
tance would be incrP.asP.d by a third (R., p. 203). Subse-
quently, and over the objection of counsel for defendants, the 
court struck this evidence from the re,cord (R., p. 265). 
R. H. Grizzard, a witness called by the defendants. 
Wit11ess is a state. police officer stationP.d in the adjoining 
county of Greensville. HP. testified that he went to the scene 
of tbe nc-cident on DecembP.r 2, 1937; that even in December 
there were considerable shrubs, undergrowth, weeds and 
trees to the left of the Lawrenceville-Ebony road as one ap-
proaches the entrance to the Sam Wray house; that the road 
curves to the left, or east, as one travels south towards Ebony 
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from Lawrenceville, .and before the entrance in question is 
reached. He further testified that one travelling on the road 
would be within 25 feet of the entrance before he could tell 
that the P.ntrance was there (R., p. 212). The witness esti-
mated the dif?tance in which an automobile, operated at a 
speed of 30 miles an hour, could be stopped on a level road 
that was dry and reasonably free of gravel or loose material, 
:including reaction time, to be from 78 . to 100 fe~t. He fur-
ther testified that on a dirt road, covered with loose gravel~ 
thP. ~topping distance \vould be increased by a third (R., p. 
218) ' . . ... . .. - .. . . 
This testimony was likewise stricken from the record by the 
court (H., p. 265). ·· 
.Albert W. Abernathy, a witness called by the defendants~ 
"\Vitness, who is a garage mechanic, testified that on May 
8. 19R7. he made an inspection of the automobile. driven by , 
dt~fendant Harris, and that the car was in good condition 
(R., pp. 223-4). 
llc·len Harris, one of the defendants, having been examined 
by the plaintiff as an adverse witness, was recalled for di-
l'<~ct c~xamination. 
Witness stated that the road, at the point of the accident, 
'Curved to the left, and was uphill; that to her left was a line 
Qf ~hrubs. bushP.s, trees, etc., which completely obscured the 
rrhrate entrancP. to the Sam Wray house from her vision; 
that the line of shrubs grew down to the ditch line, and that 
on the day of the accident it was impossible to see a person 
or object in the entrance, and throug·h the shrubs (R., p. 175). 
ShP. further testified that she saw the children as soon as 
they emerged from behind the bushes, and which was as soon 
as she could have seen them (R., p. 175); that she was op-
erating her car at a speed of approximately 30 miles an hour 
at thP. time (R., p. 235); that she was observing the highway, 
as she approached the entrance, ''because as you go over 
this li ttlP. incline there you cannot see a car when you are 
g·oing from Lawrenceville towards Ebony unless you are 
watching that road closely. I, for that reason, was observ-
ing the road. not knowing that anything was coming out from 
the side until I glimpsed these children moving'' (R., p. 238); 
tl1at when she saw the children they were in th.P. east diteh 
line and to bAr left, and that she was from 10 to 15 feet from 
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tham at the time (R., p. 232); that the children were coming 
"lik:{} a flash" ( R., p. 178). 
As to what the defendant Helen Harris did when she saw 
the children. her testimony was as follows : 
'' Q. Did you apply your brakes before striking them Y 
''.A. I applied my brakes as soon as I saw them'' (R., p. 
83). 
And again: 
'' Q. You did not undertake to turn to the right after you 
had seen the children? 
''A .. All that I did was try to pull a little bit to the right, 
as best I could with the time that I had, and the children com~ . 
ing into thA road. 
'' Q. As a matter of fact, you cut to the right just about the 
time you struck the wagon, didn't you Y 
''A. Just as soon as I could'' (R., p. 85). 
And again, on direct examination: 
'' Q. Did they stop in the ditch line f Did the wagon ever 
stop and at what speed, if any, did it come out! 
''A. It didn't stop. If it had stopped, I suppose I would 
have had morA chance, but the wagon did not stop. It just 
camP. right down very near to the car'' (R., p. 234). 
And again: 
i'Q. When you saw the children, Miss Harris-you testified' 
you saw them about 10 or 15 feet away-what did you do? 
''A. I applied my brakes as soon as I had a chance, and 
I may have pulled to the right just a little bit, bu,t in that time, 
las close as the ch!ildren were, I didn't hooe much time fot: 
anything. 
"Q. W Pre they steadily coming into the road? 
''A. This cl1ild was pushing them and they were coming 
i'ltst like a flash,'' (R., p. 235). 
And again: 
"'Q. Did you pnli as much as you could7 
"A. As ~uck as I could in the time that I had'' (R., p. 238). 
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And . again : 
'' Q. And you did swerve to your right as much as you could 
after seeing the children 1 
"A.. I did" (R., p. 243). 
And in answer to the following question by the court: 
"Q. Did you do anything but apply your brakes? 
''A. Yes, I did swerve to the right as far as I had a chance 
to in the time'' (R., p. 244). · 
~{rs. Lavinia Courtney Harris, a 'vitness called by the de-
fendants. 
Witness was riding on the front seat of the Chevrolet au-
tomobile 'vhich 'vas being operated by her daughter, Helen 
Harris, at the time of the accident. Her testimony was sub-
stantially thP. same as that of her daug-hter, Helen Harris. 
Witness stated that the car was being operated at a speed 
of approximately 30 miles an hour (R., pp. 2~5-6); that to 
the left, or east, of the Lawrenceville-Ebony highway there 
was considerable foliage, trees and bushes, and there was 
no visibility through this foliage; that the foliage was much 
denser on ~lay 23, 1937, than as shown in the pictures which 
were taken in October, 1937, or ns existed in December, 1937, 
at the time the trial was had; that the foliage grew down 
to the edge of the highway or the ditch line; that the children, 
who were coming into the highway from the entrance, were 
completely obscured and concealed by the foliage; that she 
saw the children as soon as she could have seen them, and as 
they came out from behind the bushes near the ditch line 
(R ..• p. 249); that the children were approximately 15 feet 
away at that time (R., p. 246); as to what her daughter, Helen 
Harris, did upon seeing the children, the witness said: 
'' Q. What did your daughter do when the children ehierged 
from behind the bushes at the ditch line? 
''A. I think she applied the brakes as quick as she possibly 
could. 
'' Q. Did she do anything else Y 
''A. She turned, I think, a little to the right, as much as 
she had tirne to, but it 'Was all so quick she- didn't hOil)e time 
to ,qo very ntuch to the ri,qht. 
'' Q. She didn't have time to go? Do yon know whether 
she started turning to the right or not? 
. "A. Yes, a little bit. 
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''Q. Do yo.u know whether she applied her brakes o~ not! 
''A. Yes, she did. 
'' Q. Do you know whether or not the brakes had time to 
begin taking effect before she hit the children Y 
''A. I do not know but I know that she applied them as 
quick as she possibly could. 
. '' Q. The car did slide either at the time or after it hit the 
cl1ildren 7 
''A. Yes. 
"Q .. A.nd at that time you say she turned to the right as 
far as shP. eould or as far as she had time? 
"A. As fa1· as she had time" (R., pp. 250-l). 
Witness further testified that immediately upon striking 
the wagon her daug·hter broug·ht the car to a stop, and that 
she was the first one to reach the children after the collision 
(R., p. 251). She testified that the wagon in which plaintiff's 
intestate was riding came down the entranc_e, or incline, into 
the road without stopping or pausing, and that it was going 
fast; that the little girl, Ida Valerie Culp, was pushing the 
. wagon (R., p. 252); that the point of impact between the left 
front wheel of the car and the right side of the wagon, was a 
little to the ri~:ht of the center of the road (R., p. 249). 
Huff Harris, one of the defendants. 
WitnP.SS is the father of Helen Harris. He was not in the 
car at thP time of the accident. He testified that immediately 
upon hearing of the accident, he went to the scene, and that 
he saw no marks in the road to indicate the point of impact, 
although he looked for marks, in the presence of Mr. A. B. 
· Wrig·ht and a great number of people; that he did notice 
some skid marks following the point where the accident is' 
sttppof:led to have taken place; that these skid marks were to 
the right of the center of the highway (R., p. 257); that the 
Pntrance or roadway which leads from the highway to the 
old Sam Wray house has been worn or washed down; that to 
the east or left of the roadway, as Miss Harris was driving, 
is a dense growth of shrubs, weeds, bushes, etc., and that per-
sons approaching the entrance from the north, going south 
along tbP. highway, could not see the entrance through the 
undergrowth; that the foliage was not one-fourth as much 
in December as it was in May at the timP. of the accident (R., p. 
259). Witness further testi:fiP.d that the Lawrenceville-Ebony 
roarl was a onP.-track road, and did not have two well-defined 
Ian'~~ of travel (R., p. 262) ; that ninety per cent of the travel 
is in the middle of the road (R., p. 262); that the road is pulled 
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fro1n both sides to thP. center, and that to drive other than 
in the one lane of travel would' put an automobile in a slant-
in~ position (R., p. 263). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The Yerdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
2. Th~-3 court erred in granting instr·uction No. X, over the 
objection of the defendants. · 
3. The court errP.d in granting instruction No. Y, over the 
objection of the defendants. . 
4. The court erred in granting instruction No. 4, over tho 
objection of the defendants. 
5. The court erred in granting instruction No. 5, over the 
objection of the defendants. • 
6. The court erred in granting instruction No. 8, over th~ 
objection of the defendants. . 
7. The court erred in granting instruction No. 9, over the 
objection of the defendants. . 
8. The court erred in striking out the evidence of Officers 
Dameron and Grizzard; in refusing to strike out the evidence 
of W. B. MosP.ley and others; and in refusing to grant in-
struction No. L, asked· for by the defendants. 
A.RGUl\'IENT. 
Fi1·st Assign11nent of Error: The verdict is contrary to the 
law and the evidence. 
ThP. record will show that at the conclusion of the plain-
tiff's testimony the defendants moved the court to strike the 
sa.me, on the g-round that the evidence failed to show any case 
of pr·ima facie liability on the part of. the defendants (R., p.-
1 0). This motion was renewed at thP. conclusion of the evi-
dP.nce introduced on behalf of the defendants (R., p. 11) . 
.After the jury rendered its verdict, the defendants moved the 
eourt to set aside the verdict on the ground, among other 
g-rounds, that the same was contrary to the law and the evi-
dencP. (R., p. 21). 
During the· course of the trial numerous objections were 
made by counsel for defendants· to evidence introduced on 
bP.half of the plaintiffs, and a written motion was filed to 
strike out the evidencP. of certain witnesses (R., p. 19). The 
dP.fendants objected to each instruction granted by the court 
on bP.half of the plaintiffs, on the ground, among· other 
g"rounds, that there was no evidence in the record upon which 
to predicate the respec~ve instructions, and that the plain-
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tiff had failed to s:qow, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
any negligent act of omission or commission by Helen Harris, 
in the operation of the automobile that caused, or contributed 
to, the death of plaintiff's intestate (R., pp. 301-307). 
In discussing this assignment of error, we shall attempt to 
show that, the court en·ed in not gTanting the motions made 
by the defendants, and that the defendants were not g-uilty of 
any negligence. The main issue is whether or not the negli·-
gence of the defendant, Helen Harris, was proven. This 
question involvP.s a discussion of the testimony of the wit-
nesses. 
It will be recalled that there are only three eyewitnesses 
to the accident-the defendant Helen Harris, her mother, La-
vinia C. Harris, and the little girl, Ida Valerie Culp. The 
testimony of other witnesses concerned marks that were found 
iu the road, and the physical condition of the road and sur-
roundings at the scene of the accident. They knew nothing of 
thP. details of the accident, the speed of the car, its position on 
the highway, or the manner in which the plaintiff's intestate 
met his death. 
This evidence can be more briefly discussed by considering 
the various allegations of negligence contained in the plain-
tiff's declaration, the principal points of dispute in the case 
being the speed of the car, the position of the car in the high-
way, the distance of the car from the children's wagon when 
it :first entered the road, and whether or not the defendant, 
Helt~n Harris, failed to keep a proper lookout. 
Plaintiff alleged in his declaration that the Harris car was 
being "driven at an excessive rate of speed". He failed 
utterly to prove this alleg·ation, and did not ask for an in-
struction predicated upon the speed of the car. Miss Harris 
and l1er mother were the only witnesses who testified as to 
the speed of the car and their testimony was to the effect that 
the car was being operated at a speed of approximately 30 
miles an hour. The day was clear, the road was dry, and 
there was no traffic. The road ran through a sparsely settled 
portion of the county. Under these circumstances a speed 
of RO miles an hour could not be considered excessive. 
Following the accident, 1\!Iiss Harris immP.diately brought 
her automobile to a stop, and this so quickly that her mother 
was the first to reach the injured children, notwithstanding 
Mrs. R. A. Wright and Hunter Wright were in the yard and 
as nP.ar the scene. 
The plaintiff further alleged in his declaration that Miss 
Ilarris was ''looking· to her right at people gathered in front 
of the residence of R. A. Wright". Both 1\fiss Harris and her 
n1othP.r testified that they were looking down the highway and 
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were not looking to the right in the direction of the R. A. 
Wrig·ht residencP.. This evidencP. is uncontradicted. Fur-
thermore, there were no ''people'' in front of the residence 
of R. A. Wright. Mrs. R. A. Wright was the only person in 
front of the residence, and her back was turned to the high-
way. Hunter Wright was to the south of the residence and 
was not in view of the Harris car. It is further in evidence 
that neither Miss Harris nor Mrs. Harris were acquainted 
with the Wright family. 
The declaration further alleges that Miss Harris "drove to 
her left-hand side of the road, and to the left of the center 
of thq highway.'' There is,absolutely no evidence in the rec-
ord to sustain this allegation. The only two eyewitnesses 
'vho testified as to the position of the car were :1\Jiiss Harris 
and 1\h~s. Harris; they stated that the car was being operated 
to the right of the center of the road, for the reason that they 
were approaching· a left curve and a hill, and could not see 
around the curve and over the brow of the hill. No witness 
testified, or lmew, the exact point of impact except the de-
fendant, ·Helen Harris, and her mother. They both stated 
that the left front wheel of the car struck the wagon at a point 
which was to the right of the center of the highway. The wit-
nesses, W. D. Cates, A. B. Wrig·ht, H~nter Wright and W. 
B. Moseley found a mark in the ''rough'' of the road which 
was near the center of the hig·hway. They described the mark 
as an ''inch depression". It is submitted that such a mark 
in a dirt road, travelled by animals, equid have been made 
by an animal's hoof, and is a very insignificant mark in a 
dirt road of tl1e character of the Lawrenceville-Ebony road. 
The plaintiff's ·witness, Ida Valerie Culp, stated repeatedly 
in her testimony that the wag-on was in, or near, the middle 
of the road. If the testimony of this witness, introduced by 
the plaintiff, be true-and it is corroborated by the testimony 
of both Miss Harris and her mother-it would have been a 
physical impossibility for the car to have been on the left 
side of the road and have struck the ·wagon with its left wheel . 
. All the testimony shows that the automobile was travelling 
to the rig·ht of this narrow road, 'vhich is only 20 feet wide 
from ditch linP. to ditch line,o and that the wagon was struck 
hy the left front wheAl of the car near the center of the high-
way, probably a little to the right of the center. 
The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant, Helen 
Harris, ''failed to keep a proper lookout.'' There is no evi-
dence in the record that the defendant was not keeping a 
proper lookout, and did not have her car under proper control. 
The speed was reasonable; she was driving in the travelled 
part of the road, but bearing to the right thereof. The map 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
shows that at this point she was going up a rather steep grade, 
the evidence bP.ing that the grade was over 12 feet in a dis-
tance of 250 feet. The evidence is that the road at this par-
ticular point, and as she ascended the hill, curved to her left; 
shP. could not see approaching tra~c, if any, over the brow of 
the hill. For that reason, both the defendant and her mother 
testified that she was watching the road closely for approach-
ing traffic, as it was her duty to do under the circumstances. 
The fact that the defendant's view of the entrance to the 
.Sam Wray house was obstructed by a ditch bank, which was 
over R feet in height, and by trees, shrubs, grass, and other 
undergrowth on the ditch bank, cannot be denied. This was 
testified to by the defendant, her mother, Huff Harris, W. B. 
PricP., surveyor, and Officer Dameron, who made an investiga-
tion of the accident immediately following same. Mr. Dam-
eron testified that the shrubs and undergrowth grew pro-
fusely along the east, or left, side of the highway and along 
the north side of the entrance to the Sam W ray house. Mr. 
Dameron further stated that at the time this accident oc-
curred the undergrowth was much denser than it was in Oc-
tober when pictures were taken, or in December, ·when the case 
was tried. The court's attention is respectfully directed to 
the density of tl1e undergrowth as shown in the pictures, which 
were taken in October. 
The only othP.r witnessP.s 'vho testified with reference to 
the visibility through the bushes, were W. B. Price and J. 
Hunter Love. lVfr. Price made his observations in Novem-
ber, 1937·, and Mr. Love made his in December, 1937. The 
testimony is-and it is a matter of common knowledge-that 
the foliage in November and December was not one-fourth 
as dense as it was on May 23, when the accident occurred. 
Furthermore, the observations made by Love were made at 
the request of the Wright family and counsel for the plain-
tiff, in their presence. He admits that they were not made 
under the same circumstanc·es and conditions as existed on 
the day of the accident, and, therefore, are of little value. 
State Officer Dameron. who had no interest in the case, 
corroborated both 1\fiss Harris .and Mrs. Harris to the effect 
that the undergrowth was so dense on the day of the accident 
that there was no visibility through it, and that Miss Harris 
<~ould not have seen the children as they came down the en-
trance into the road. 
Und<=!r the circumstances, and as the conditions existed on 
the day of the accident, there was. absolutely nothing to put 
the dC:'ff~ndant, Helen Harris, on notice that the children were 
concealed behind the shrubs, and were approaching the high-
'\Vay fr01n the defendant's left and 'down the private entrance 
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to thP Sant 'Vrav house. There is no evidence that the de-
fendant knew the"' children or any member of the Wright fam-
ily. Even had she known that the children lived in this im-
mediate community, she would not have expected them at this 
particular point, as the plaintiff's intestate resided at the 
home of his father, Prince I. Wright, which is located approxi-
nlately 500 yards south of the R. A. Wright residence. 
Ou the day of the accident there was no ''gathering" at 
the Wright residence, and no automobiles· parked in or near 
the highway that would have placed defendant on notice that 
children or other persons might intrude upon the highway. 
The road was a public road, in good condition, and unob-
structed, until the children suddenly emerged from behind the 
bushes into the path of defendant's car. . 
The plaintiff's own witness, Ida Valerie Culp, testified that 
she had to get out into the highway before she could see. 
Surely, if thP. plaintiff's intestate and his companions could 
not sPe or hear the approaching Harris automobile, it is un-
reasonablP. to expect the defendant to see the child's wagon 
and the children, they being ·only 2 feet, 8 inches from the 
ground. 
This court has held repeatedly that the permissible speed 
of an automobile is no less, and the degree of care owed no 
gTeater, in a case in which a child is involved than in a case 
in which an adult is involved, until the driver of the vehicle 
sees, or ought to have seen, the child. In this case, the chil-
dren were seen as soon as possible, and as soon as they be-
came visible. They were then in the ditch line of the road 
and coming into the road "like a flash". The Harris car 
'was at that time bP.tween 10 and 15 feet awav. The defend-
ant could not. in the exercisA of the highest "'degree of care, 
have averted the accident under these circumstances. In the 
casP. of Stratton, et al. v. Ber.qman (Va. 1937), 192 S. E. 813, 
at page 815, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held 
that: ''It is a matter of common knowledgA that the driver 
of an automobile. unless forewarned of the danger, cannot 
apply the brakes co-instantaneously with his seeing the neces-
sity for doing so.'' It takes an interval of time before a per-
son's mind can react to a situation of peril, which interval 
varies from half a second to a second. If the Harris car were 
troing at a speed of 30 miles an hour, it would have travelled 
approximately 44 feet during this reaction time. It is like-
wise a. physical fact that the brakes of an automobile will not 
stop it co-instantaneously with the application thereof. The 
evidence of Officers Dameron and Bagley, which the court ex-
-cluded. is that an automobile being· operated at 30 miles an 
houl' will go a distanc·e of approximately 58 feet before it can 
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be stopped by the application of hrakes. It was further tes-
tified that on a road similar to the ·Lawrenceville-Ebony road, 
coverP.d with loose gravel and dirt, this stopping distance 
would be increasP.d by a third. 
From the abovP., it is manifest that to have averted this 
accident, the defendant would have had to do in 10 or 15 feet 
what the evidP.nce shows cannot be done in less than 100 feet. 
The evidP.nce of the defendant and her mother is to the 
effect that upon seeing the wagon, defendant tried to apply 
her brakes and pull to the right in thP. short time that she had 
in which to attempt to avert thP. accident . .She did not have 
sufficient time to do either. 
The only intimation in the record that the Harris automo-
bile was more than 10 or 15 feet from the wagon when it 
enterged from behind the bushes into the highway is the state· 
mm:it made by Ida Valerie Culp that when she came out into 
thP. road she thought the cf),r was at the ''ice-bouse". It is 
submitted that this statement, made by a witness whose com-
petency was questioned by counsel for the plaintiff, is in-
crediblP. when considered in the light of her other testimony. 
The plaintiff's intestate and Ida Valerie Culp were both 
children of tendP.r years. The little girl admitted that when 
thP. wagon started down the incline she was pushing it, and 
was running at thP. time. Had the children paused for one 
moment they could l1ave heard ,the Harris car approaching. 
HowevP.r, the children, in response to a childish impulse, and 
in answer to their grandmother's call, intent. only on cross-
ing .the road where their grandmother was, ran down the hill, 
and out into the highway, without looking or pausing. It is 
manifest that since the 'vagon was proceeding downhill, and 
being pushed by a running child, it gathered momentum, and 
that when it reachP.d the ditch line it shot out into the high-
way "like a flash", as was stated by Miss Harris. 
It is t<' bP. noted further that the girl testified that they 
wore in thP. road when she and plaintiff's intestate saw the 
car coming, but he did not say or do anything because he did 
not have time before tbP.y were struck by the car. Neither 
did ~fiss Harris havP. time to do or say anything. 
With reference to the ice-house, the same was never located 
by .any witness. WitnP.ss .:Cates "reckoned" that it was 75 
feot from the entrance ; witness Love ''guessed'' that it was 
between 60 and 100 feet from the entrance ; and witness Prince 
I. Wright "estimated" the distance at between 105 and 120 
feet. No measurements were made or taken, and the location 
of the ice-house was never dP.termined in the trial. The mid-
dle of the entrancP. to the Sam Wray bouse is designated on 
the map as point "Y" to "X'·'. The evidence is that the acci-
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dent took place at a point north of point ''Y" estimated at 
fron1 12 to 35 feet from the entrance. Therefore, even if we 
assunle the improbable-that the children and the wagon were 
standing still in the middle of the road when the ear was at 
the ice-housP.-and further assume that one of the guesses 
as to the distance of the ice-house from the entrance is correct, 
it would still leave the defendant less than 30 feet to avert 
the accidP.nt. and this would have been impossible under the 
circumstances. 
Thn mnnner and speed at which the child's wagon came into 
the highway can be gathered from the evidence of Hunter 
vYright, who was watering some mules at the well when the 
accidP.nt occurred. He testified that when he last saw the 
children they were in thP. wagon 43 feet from the eastern 
edge of the road, and up in the entrance. They were then 
preparin,g to come across the road in answer to their grand-
lnother 's summons. Hunter Wright looked away for an in-
stant. and when he nP.xt looked up the accident had happened. 
He did not see the accident. It is manifest from his testimony, 
and frmn the further fact that Mrs. R. A. Wright, who called 
the children, only had time, after calling them, to turn arid 
start toward the house, that the children must have come into 
the highway at a very rapid speed. Mrs. WriA·ht had not 
reached the house before the accident occurred. The interval 
that elapsed between calling the children, and the accident, 
can be measured in seconds, or fractions thereof. 
Your petitioners respectfully submit that it can be clearly 
seen from the above that the defendant, Helen Harris, was 
guilty of no negligence that contributed to, or caused, the 
accident. Her car was in good condition, and she was oper-
ating it at a reasonable rate of speed and maintaining a careful 
lookout at the time. There 'vas nothing in or near the road or 
surroundings that placed her on notice that children might 
suddenly intrude upon the highway. When the children did 
dart out into the highway in front of her car she was placed 
in a position of peril that was not of her own making. She 
·did all she could to avoid the accident, but did not have time to 
do so. 
The only explanation that can be offered for the verdict of 
the jury is the apparent willingness of juries to give verdicts 
in cases where they feel that the defendants will not them-
selves have to pay the money. ],urthermore, the instant case 
is one that commends itself particularly to the sympathy of a 
jury. The plaintiff's intestate was a twin, and naturally his 
death caused considerable pain and mental anguish to his 
family. 
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There was another incident in the trial which, no doubt, also 
contributed to the natural sympathy which a jury feels for a 
bereaved parent. After the jury- was sworn to try the case, 
counsel for the plaintiff had brought into the ·court room the 
little child's wagon in which plaintiff's intestate was riding 
at the time of his death. , The twisted, 'broken wagon was 
placed immediately in front of the jury and allowed to remain 
there throughout the first day of the trial. It was a constant 
reminder of the tragedy and its harrowing details. While 
counsel frequently referred to the wagon, the record will sho'v 
that it was never, in fact, offered in evidence as an exhibit. 
Counsel for defen4a.nts objected and excepted to the action 
of plaintiff in bringing this wagon into the court room, and 
this objection will be found on page 58 of the record. 
It is expressly submitted that the defendants' case was as 
prejudiced by the exhibition of this wagon as it would have 
been had counsel for the plaintiff introduced pictures of the 
mangled body of the plaintiff's intestate. The introduction 
of the wagon was for one purpose, and one purpose only-to 
prejudice the jury in favor .of plaintiff. There was no ques-
tion as to how the plaintiff's intestate met his death; it was 
not denied that he was killed while sitting in the child's 
wagon. 
In cases of this character, a sympathetic jury is too often 
looking for an opportunity to render a verdict in favor of the 
bereaved family, and at the expense, not of the local defend-
ants, but of an insurance company which they believe will be 
required to pa.y the judgment. 
The learned trial judge before whom this case was tried dis-
sented with the verdict of the jury and intimated, in no uncer-
tain terms, thathad he been trying·the case independently of 
the jury, he would not have found a verdict against the defend-
ants (R., p. 54). However, he did not feel that he should dis-
turb this verdict. 
In that, for the reasons heretofore given under this assign-
ment of error, and for numerous errors that were committed 
in the granting of the instructions to be hereinafter pointed 
out, we submit that the trial court was in error. 
Second Assignment of Error: The court erred in grOJnting 
instruction No. X, over the objection of the defenda;nts. 
Counsel for the plaintiff tendered to the court instructions 
2 (R., p. 292) and 3 (R., p. 293), which the court refused, but 
granted in lieu thereof, instruction "X" (R., p. 287), which 
reads as follows: 
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''The court further instructs the jury that the defendant, 
Helen Harris, i operating her car on the highway mentioned 
in the evidence, was charged with the duty to exercise reason-
able care and v gilance a:t all times, in order to discover the 
presence of chil re-n on the highway, or in such proximity to 
the highway, as 'might cause her to apprehend, in the exercise 
of reasonable c re, that S'MCh child, in obedience to the natural 
impulse charact ristic of children, might s~"ddenly e'll!ter the 
highway in adv tJ~ce of the approaahitJ~g OJUtomobile, and thus· 
subject itself to peril and danger; and if you believe from a 
preponderance f the evidence that the said defendant failed 
to use ordinary ca're reasonably to discover and avoid injury 
to the child, if e decedent were, in fact, on the highway as 
the defendant's ar approached, or, if the child were not upon 
the highway as he car approached ~he point of collision, but 
was in such pro "mity to th(!l highway as that its probable ap-. 
pearance on the highway might have been reasonably antici-
pated by the de endant in the exercise of ordinary case, that 
the said defend nt failed to provide for the safety of such 
child, should it e ter the high,vay, then if the failure of the de-
fendant, Helen arris, in her duty in either of these particu-
lars, operated as the proximate eause of the child's injury, and 
the child itself ere without contributory negligence on its 
part, you should nd for the plaintiff. 
•' The court f ther instructs the jury that the term 'ordi- · 
nary care' as us d in these instructions means such care as 
is commensurate with the circumstances disclosed in the evi-
dence, taking int consideration the apparent age of the child 
itself." (Italics supplied.) 
To this instru tion, counsel for defendants objected, and 
stated his objecti n to be as follows: 
''Counsel for efendants objects and excepts to the action 
of the court in ranting instruction X for the plaintiff of 
its own motion pon the grounds : that there is no evidence 
in the record up n which to base or predicate such an in-
struction; that the instruction is ambiguous, involved, and 
misleading, and tends to confuse the jury; that the court in 
this instruction uses the expression 'in order to discover the 
presence of cl;lildren ', which places a greater duty upon the 
operator of a car than the law places upon him; that the duty 
of the operator of a car is not to seek out or discover persons 
near a highway, but, in the exercise of ordinary care, to see 
them, if they are in a place where they can be seen; that that 
part of the instruction which deals with infants' proximity 
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to the highway, and the duty of the defendant to have reason-
ably anticipated infants' appearance on the highway, is ob-
jectionable for the reason that there is no evidence that plain-
tiff's intestate or his companions were visible, or any reason 
why plaintiff's intestate, or other children, should have been 
suspected of being on the highway at the place of the acci-
dent; that that part of said instruction X that provides 'that 
the said defendant failed to provide for the safety of such 
child' is objectionable when read and considered with the 
other provisions of the instruction, for the reason that it 
makes the operator of an automobile an insurer of a child-
it doesn't consider the possibility of the child's ·darting in 
front of the car-it makes it the duty of such operator to 
seek out and discover children near highways, and says, as a 
matter of law, that he must operate his car so that he can at 
all times stop or take such other action as will provide for the 
safety of the child; the law does not impose such duty upon 
drivers of automobiles. It does not make them insurers of 
children. It does not sa.y that the driver on the highway must 
constantly expect the road to be blocked by infants or other 
obstructions : 
''Upon the further ground that there is no casual connection 
between any act of the defendant, Helen Harris, in the oper-
ation of her car on the date of the accident, and the death of 
plaintiff's intestate.'' (R., pp. 301-303.) 
After counsel for defendants had stated his objection to 
said instruction the court made the following observation: 
''The court observes with reference to the objection taken 
to this instruction that as a practical matter, it is of opinion 
that when a person is driving on an open road in the country, 
he is charged with no particular duty to discover who might 
intrude upon the road from the side of the highway, unless 
there is some premonition in the attitude of such person, be 
he child or adult, to indicate that such an event might occur, 
but the court is satisfied that the law of Virginia is otherwise, 
and in this observation speaks only of the subject as one of 
merely practical concern.'' (R., p. 303.) 
We respectfully submit from the above statement of the 
court that instruction ''X" was granted upon a misapprehen-
sion of the law of the .state of Virginia with reference to the 
duty owed children under the circumstances. 
The purpose of instructions in any case is to enlighten the 
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jury as to the law controlling the case. .An instruction should 
not be so involved, ambiguous or tedious as to mislead or 
burden the jury. It is submitted that instruction ''X',. tends 
to confuse rather than enlighten the jury. 
The vice of instruction "X" is that it told the jury it was 
the duty of the defendant, Helen Harris, to DISCOVER the 
children who 'vere in proximity to the hig·hway, in that they 
were playing up in the entrance some 43 or 50 feet from the 
highway, and further told the jury that upon discovery of the 
children it became the duty of the defendant TO PROVIDE 
FOR THE SAFETY of such children. The instruction 
ignored the possibility, which was the uncontroverted evidence 
in the instant case, that such a child might suddenly dart 
out into the hig·hway in front of an automobile. The instruc-
tion ignored the doctrine of the Wash v. Holland case herein-
after discussed. 
"\Vith reference to the word "discover", the New Century 
Dictionary defines it as follows: 
''To uncover, disclose,. exhibit, make known; to catch sight 
of; gain sight or knowledge of something previously un-
seen or unknown.'' ~ 
·The word ''provide'' is defined by the same dictionary as 
follows: · 
· ''To bring about or insure by foresight.'' 
It is submitted that, aside from the question of whether or 
not there was any evidence in the instant case to justify such 
an instruction, if this instruction correctly states the law of 
the state of Virginia, then it is the duty of an automobile 
driver, in operating a car upon the highway, to "seek out" 
persons in proximity to the highway, and then to "insure'' 
their safety. If this be the duty of a motorist, then it would 
be impossible for such a motorist to fulfil the duties im-
posed upon him hy the traffic laws to watch the highway for 
approaching traffic, and to observe generally the condition of 
such road. · 
The duty of an automobile driver is not to "discover or 
seek out that whjch was previously unknown, or previously 
hidden", but, in the exercise of ordinary care, to see children, 
or other pedestrians, that are in the highway, or in proximity 
thereto, if, in the exercise of ordinary care, such persons can 
be seen. This duty J?lUSt further be considered together with 
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the duty of the motorist to ·watch for approaching traffic and 
observe the conditions of the highway itself. 
In fact,. there are times when it would be gross and wanton 
negligence for the driver of an automobile to take his eyes 
from the highway even for an instant. This is true where 
the road is congested and there is approaching traffic 'on the 
road, and is particularly true, as in the instant case, where 
the highway curves, or the vehicle is proceeding uphill and can-
not see over the brow of the hill. 
In the instant case the uncontradicted testimony is that 
the children could not be seen in the entrance to the Sam 
Wray house through the shrubs and trees which grew along 
the east edge of the highway and to the driver's left. The 
duty owed, therefore, was that of ordinary care, or, as stated 
in M essiok v. Ma-son., 156 Va. 193, 157 S. E. 578, by Judge Epes : 
"When the driver of an automobile on the public highway 
does not see children in or near the roadway * • * and there 
are no special facts or circumstances known to the driver 
• • '"' the driver is not chargeable. with negligence merely 
because he does not anticipate that the child will * * * run 
out into the road * * * and does not decrease his speed or in-
crease his vigilance and care accordingly. Until he sees or 
ought to have seen, the child his permissible speed is no less, 
and the degr-ee of care and vigilance owed by him is no greater 
in a case in which a child is involved than in a case in which 
an adult is involved.'' 
Or, as stated differently by Judge Spratley in Twyma;n v. 
Adkins, 191 S. E. 618 : 
''We are not disposed to hold that a driver upon a highway 
must constantly expect his path to be blocked by obstructions 
placed in its center, or even on the edge of the highway in such 
a manner as to impede reasonable travel." 
Instruction "X'', which told the jury that an automobile 
driver should "provide for the safety of such child" was the 
equivalent of telling the jury that an automobilist must at 
all times, where children are involved, operate his car in 
such manner that it can be stopped instantly, or such other 
action taken with reference to the operation of same, as may be 
necessary to save harmless or insure the life of such child. 
To fulfil this duty ''to provide for the safety of such child'', 
it would be necessary for such driver to· have his automobile 
under complete control. 
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In Gale v. Wilber, 163 Va. 211, 175 S. E. 739, at page 743, 
this court held : 
'' * * * We think this instruction is erroneous, first, be-
cause there is no evidence th~t Mrs. Gale did not keep her 
.automobile under proper control. In the second place, its 
provisions are impossible of performance. No human being 
ean keep his automobile in complete control while it is in 
motion. So many conditions may suddenly come into being, 
not capable of being foreseep, that complete control is impos-
sible of obtainment.;' 
The courts in this state have repeatedly held that the .driver 
-of an automobile on a highway is not an insurer of the safety 
of such a child. Such an instruction further ignores the pos-v 
sibility o£ a child suddenly darting in front of the car. Were 
the law that automobilists have to provide for the safety of 
children under any and all circumstances and conditions, the 
normal flow of traffic would cease. 
The court's attention is respectfully directed to the re-
,cent case of ll'ash v. Holland, 166 Va. 45, 183 S. E. 236. The 
court held that an instruction, very similar in form and sub-
stance to instruction X, was properly refused, and said: 
''It would have, in effect, made the defendant an absolute 
insurer so far as the child was concerned. Under it, the de-
fendant would have been liable even though the child had 
-darted immediately in front of the car, giving the defendant 
no opportunity to have avoided injuring her. lj1: * "' The in-
struction should have been qualified so as to have told the 
jury that they should :find for the plaintiff if the defendant 
.saw, or in the exercise of ordinary care, should ·have seen the 
<Child in time to have avoided her by the exercise of ordVna!ry 
·care.'' 
It is to be noted that the facts in the above case are very 
'Similar to the facts in the instant case. In both cases a small 
child is involved. The child in the instant case was a little 
over 7 years of age, and in the Wash v. Holland case was ·s 
years old. In that case the defendant testified that he was 
looking ahead for approaching traffic and, for that reason, did 
not see the child as she ran from the yard of her home out 
into the highway. He admitted that had he looked in the 
direction from which the child was running he would have 
-seen her, but there were no circumstances to put him on notice 
rof her presence., .and his attention was properly directed to 
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traffic ahead, a.nd not to either side of the road. In that case 
the record further shows that there were a number of school 
children standing along the road, and that the defendant 
was meeting a school bus. Surely if, under those circum-
stances, the defendant was not put on notice that a child might 
suddenly enter the road, then Helen Harris, the defendant in 
the instant case, could not have been expected to anticipate 
that the plaintiff's intestate, and his companions, would sud-
denly enter a lonely country road from a private side entrance. 
In the instant case it is to be further noted that Helen Harris 
testified that she was ascending a ·hill, along a road that curved 
to her left, and, like the driver in the Wash v. Holland case, 
was observing the road closely for approaching traffic. 
Assuming, for argument, that there \Vas sufficient evidence 
• upon which to base instruction X, and that the instruction 
was unobjectionable in that it told the jury that it was the duty 
of the defendant to discover the children in proximity to the 
highway and then provide for their sa.fety, this instruction 
should have been further modified, under the holding in the 
Wash v. H ollO!nd case, so as to have told the jury that they 
should :find for the plaintiff only if the defendant sa1.v, or, in 
the exercise of ordinary care, should have seen, plaintiff's 
intestate in tin~e to have avoided him by the exercise of ordi-
nary care. 
To reiterate what Judge Eggleston said: ''Only with such a 
similar qualification would it have been proper." 
Third Assignment of Error: The court erred in grooting 
instructio1~ No. Y, over the objection, of the defendants. 
In order not to encumber the record, instruction Y, which 
is lengthy, wiU not be copied in this petition. It wiU be found 
on page 289 of the record. The objection made by counsel 
for the defendants to the granting of this instruction \vill be 
found on page 303 of the record. 
It will be noted that instruction Y deals with the high duty 
owed by the driver of a vehicle where children are involved. 
This instruction told the jury that reasonable care of such . 
driver toward chiidren demands that he eonsider the age, 
maturity, and intelligence of a child, whenever the operation 
of such automobile involves the safety of such a child, as the 
age of ·such child may be apparent to, or "discoverable by", 
the operator of an automobile. It is submitted that the ex-
pression "discoverable" is objectionable for the reasons here-
tofore fully assigned in argument of the second assignment 
·of er!rer. T·he duty is not ''to discover and seek ·out'', blli..t 
Helen Harris, et al., v. Prince I. Wright, .Adm'r. 29 
to see that which can be een, or, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, should be seen. 
Counsel for defendant does not contend that the driver 
of an automobile should ot exercise a high degree of care 
where children a.re involv d. However, the instant case was 
not a proper case for s ch an instruction. The uncontra-
dicted evidence is that s the Harris car approached the 
entrance, the children we e playing in the yard of the aban-
doned Sam Wray house, a safe distance of approximately 
50 feet from the eastern e ge of the road. Had Miss Ifa.rris · 
been able to have seen th children through the ditch bank, 
ice-house, trees, shrubs, et ., to her left as she approached the 
entrance, she would haves en them playing at a safe distance 
from the road. 
The evidence is tha.t th children could not be seen. The 
little Culp girl testified t at she could not see the car until 
she got in the road, and, t erefore, for the same reason, l\Hss 
Harris could not see the ildren until they got in the road. 
When the children reached the road, according to Miss Harris' 
testimony, they were onl 10 or 15 feet from the point of 
impact. 
Even if we assume th t the Harris car 'vas at the ice-
house 'vhen the children c me out into the road, the distance 
between the car and the \ agon was still less than 35 feet. 
The duty owed by l\Iis Harris, under the circumstances, 
was to do everything she ould to a.void the accident. Tha.t 
duty would have been o"r d to au adult to the same extent 
and deg-ree as it was owec to a child. Therefore, there was 
no occasion for an instruct· on directing the jury's attention to 
the degree of care owed hildren. The circumstances were 
such tha.t the only duty o ed by Miss Harris was to· avoid 
the accident, if possible. s stated in the case of Messick 
v. Maso'l~, supra, p. 33, "n til he sees, or ought to have seen, 
the child, his permissible peed is no less, or the degree of 
care ordinarily owed by hi is no gTeater, in a case in which 
. a child is involved than i a case in which an adult is in-
volved''. 
It is, therefore, apparen that it was error to have given 
instruction Y in this case, as there was no __ evidence in the 
record upon 'vhich to predi ate same. It is further submitted 
that even though the evide ce had justified the giving of such 
an instruction, the instruction should have been qualified, 
under the holding of the court in Wash v. Holland, supra, 
so as to. have told the jury that they could only :find for the 
plaintiff if the defendant saw, or, in the exercise of ordinary 
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care, should have seen, the child in time to have avoided him 
by the exercise of ordinary care. ' 
Fottrth Assignment of ·Error: The court erred in grooting 
instruction 4,. over the objectiofJ!t of the defendants. 
At the request of the plaintiff, the court gTanted instruction 
4 (R., p. 269), to which counsel for the defendants excepted 
(R., p. 304). 
Instruction 4 is based upon the motor vehicle code of Vir-
ginia, section 2154 (109), and dealt with the duty of a person 
driving an automobile to have same under proper control at 
all tirnes. The statute provides that reckless driving shall 
be deemed to include driving a car when not under proper 
control. The phrase "at all times"· should not have been in-
serted in the instruction. There are times and under some 
circumstances, when the driver of an automobile cannot con-
trol his automobile, and this without fault or negligence on his 
part. To impose a duty to do so ''at all times and under all 
conditions" is imposing a duty like that of "complete con-
trol'', which is impossible of performance. So many condi-
tions may suddenly come into being, not capable of being fore-
seen. Ho,vever, aside from the above, it was error to have 
given such an instruction in the instant case. There is no 
evidence that the speed of the Harris car contributed in any 
way to the accident. In fact, plaintiff did not make such con-
tention and asked for no instruction with reference to the 
speed. 
The caption of section 2154 (109) of the code is, "Restric-
tions as to speed; Reckless driving". 
Judge Spratley, in the case of Twy1nan v. Adkins, deci~ed 
June, 1937, and reported in 191 S. E. 615, says, at page 618: 
''He contends, ho·wever, that the language of Virginia Code, 
1936, section 2154 (109} is broad enough to cover the proposi-
tion. A careful reading of that section, however, clearly indi-
cates that it relates to speed on the highway, having regard to 
traffic and other existing conditions." 
There is no evidence in the instant case of excessive or 
improper speed, and not one scintilla of evidence that the 
Harris ca·r was not under control. 
Furthermore, even if this were a case in which the ques-
tion of speed were involved, a breach of the statute does not 
become actionable negligence unless such breach is a proxi-
mate cause of the injury. The manner in which the Harris 
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car ·was being driven at the time of the accident could not 
have been the proximate cause, nor could it have in any way 
contributed to the dealli of plaintiff's intestate . 
. Oases holding it to be error to instruct as to the provisions 
of the motor vehicle code in cases similar to the instant case 
are too numerous to need citation. See Morris v. Dame's 
Exor., 161 ;va. 545, 171 S. E. 662, where Judge Epes said: 
" 
''For the general duty imposed by statute to become a 
particular duty owing to a particular person, 'he must be in 
a position which, under a reasonable construction and inter-
pretation of the statute, brings him within the particular class 
of persons for whose protection from injury these provisions 
of it were enacted. VVhen the general duty imposed by. the 
statute has become a. particular duty owing to a particular 
person, the failure to give the prescribed signal becomes 
actionable negligence as to him, provided (1) that the failure 
to comply with the statute is not excusable, and (2) that the 
f~ilure to give the required signal is the proxinw,te cause 
of an injurJJ to hinz which is one of the consequences con.-
templated by this 1Jrovi.';ion of th.e statute and that it was 
intended to pre'vent." 
In Gale v. Wilbe1·, 163 Va. 211, 175 S. E. 739, at page 742, 
Justice Browning cited with approval the case of Morris v. 
Dame's Exor., supra, and with reference to an instruction 
given in the case of Gale v. Wilber, said: 
"This instruction clearly defines 'reckless driving' in the 
terms of the statute, but it was error to give it in this case.'' 
It is further submitted that plaintiff's intestate, under the 
circumstances of this case, does not come within the particular 
class of persons for whose protection from injury section 
2154 (109) was enacted. 
Plaintiff's intestate and his companions were completely ob-
scured from view. The defendant was observing the high-
way for traffic, and there was nothing to· warn her that the 
plaintiff's intestate might suddenly dart into the road from a 
private entrance to the side thereof. 
. Defendant submits that all the evidence in the instant case 
shows that defendant had her car under proper control, and 
that she did exactly what she intended to do, and had an 
opportunity to do in the time that she ha.d. If she did not 
avail herself of the best oppor.tunity to avoid the accident, 
it must be remembered that she had been placed in a.perilous 
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situation by the sudden advent of the children into the road, 
and that any error she made was a result of ru;t error in judg-
ment under the peril of the situation, rather than a failure 
to have her car under control. 
The court's attention is further directed to the case of 
B~ssett v. Wood, 146 Va. 654, 132 S. E., at page 703, where 
Judge Christian said: 
''It is the settled law in Virginia that the violation of • • • 
statute does not make the violator guilty of negligence • • * 
unless the act was the proximate cause of the injury. • * * 
In order for the negligence of the party violating the ordi-
nance to be contributory or concurring, it must have some 
immediate causal connection or be the proximate cause of the 
injury; if, while one is neg·ligent another negligently employs 
an independent force, which, availing itself of the occasion 
afforded by the former's negligence, works a harm not its 
natural and probable consequence, but an independent harm, 
the first negligence is not contributory to the second.'' 
I 
The instant case was not one for an instruction on reckless 
driving, and it was error to have given it. 
Fifth Assign'lnent of Error: The court erred in gra;nting 
instruction 5, over the objection of the defendants. 
At the request of the plaintiff, the court granted instruction 
5 (R., p. 270), to which counsel for the defendants excepted 
(R., p. 299). 
This instruction is based upon section 2154 ( 112) of the 
Code of Virginia. However, the instruction fails to set forth 
correctly the statute upon ''rhich it is based. The instruction 
states as a matter of la'v that it is the duty of the operator 
of a car to proceed at all times upon the right half of the high-
way. The statute reads: 
'' * :fie • upon all highways of sufficient ·wridth, the driver of a 
vehicle shall drive the same upon the right half of the high-
way, unless it is irnpractical to drive on such side of the high-
way* s • ." 
In the instant case, the testimony is that the road on which 
the accident took place is a one-track, country dirt road, and 
that to travel on th~ right half. thereof 'vould mean traveling 
with the car in a leaning position, and out of the tracks used 
by all vehicles t~aveling said road. The evidence further 
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shows the road to be, by actual measurement, from ditch line 
to ditch line, only 20 feet wide at the point of the accident. 
To say as a matter of law that a person is required at all times 
to operate )lis car on the right half of such a road would not 
only place him out of the automobile tracks, and his car in a 
leaning position, but would also place the right wheels of the 
car in a part of the ditch line. 
In the instant case there was no occasion for any instruc-
tion based upon section 2154 (112) of the code. There was 
not one scintilla of evidence that the defendant, Helen Harris, 
was operating her car to the left of the center of the road. 
Both the defendant and her mother testified that the car was 
to the right of the center as it proceeded over the hill and 
around the curve. This evidence was not contradicted. Sev-
eral of the plaintiff's witnesses testified with reference to a 
mark, or inch depression, which was near the middle of the 
road. None could sa.y how this mark ·was made or give the 
. position of the wagon or automobile at the time of the acci-
dent. The mark may have been made by the wagon. When 
it was struck by the automobile it was, in all probability, 
knocked back to the left of the road, and probably did make 
one or more marks in the highway. Even if such be assumed, 
this could not be considered as evidence that the defendant 
was driving to the left of the center of the road, or be con-
sidered sufficient evidence to overcome the positive statement 
of the defendant and her mother as to her position in the 
highway. 
It is submitted that the position of the Harris car on the 
highway at the time of the accident could neither have been 
the proximate cause of, nor could it have in any way con-
tributed to, the death of plaintiff's intestate. Had the car 
been further to the right, or to the left, or been operated 
faster or slower at the time, the accident would just as surely 
have happened. Even if Miss Harris had been operating her 
car in the center of the road, or to the left, that would not have, 
of itself, constituted actionable negligence. The road was 
clear; there was no traffic approaching her or following her; 
there 'vere no vehicles parked along the side of the road, and 
she could see for a sufficient distance in front of her to season-
ably move over to the right had such movement been neces-
sary. There was no reason why she should have expected or 
anticipated the darting into the highway of the children from 
a private entrance which 'vas obscured from her vision. The 
entire highway was within the line of her vision, and the 
statute in question was designed to protect traffic on the high-
way, both pedestrian and vehicular. 
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The court's attention is respectfully directed to the au-
thorities cited in argument of the fourth assignment of error. 
It was error to have given instruction 5. 
Sixth Assignm1-ent of Error: The court erred in granting in-
struction No. 8, over the objection of the defe·ndants. 
At the request of the plaintiff, the court granted instruction 
8 (R., p. 273), to which counsel for the defendants excepted 
(R., p. 306). The instruction reads as follows: 
''The Co:urt instructs the jury that, even though they be-
lieve from the evidence in this case that the child, Ida Valerie 
Culp, was negligent in pushing the wagon on w·hich the said 
Carl All~n Wright, d~ceased, was riding, into the road, never-
theless, this in no wise relieves the defendant, Helen Harris, 
. from liability, should the jury believe from all of the evidence 
that the said defendant, Helen Harris, was guilty of negli- . 
gence. '' 
The trial court, having heard the testimony, ruled that the 
question of Carl Allen Wright's (Plaintiff's intestate) 
capacity for contributory negligence should be submitted to 
the jury, and it was so submitted in several instructions 
granted by the court. However, when the court granted in-
struction No. 8, it ignored entirely the contributory negligence 
of plaintiff's intestate, notwithstanding counsel for defend-
ants objected to the instruction and specifically called the 
court's attention to this omission. 
There was no evidence upon which to base the instruction, 
for, among other reasons, it was manifest that the negligence 
of plaintiff's intestate and Ida Valerie Culp was joint and 
inseparable. The children 'vere of the same age and physical 
and mental development; they had both completed one year's 
schooling at the Ebony High School. The evidence shows that 
Carl Allen Wright was a bright youngster and had started 
to school before he had reached the legal school age. It 
furth~r showed that the plaintiff's intestate attended school 
by wa.y of school bus; that he had resided all his life within 
a few feet of a public road. Plaintiff testified that his son 
had been warned of the danger of automobiles, and apparently 
appreciated that danger, as he had never had any trouble 
with him in regard to automobiles. On the day of the acci-
dent the plaintiff's intestate and Ida Valerie Culp were play-
ing together with a toy wagon. The little girl, in pushing 
the wagon do~rn the grade of the entrance into the public 
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road, was the motivating power. The wagon was being steered 
by, and was under the control of, plaintiff's intestate. If Ida 
Valerie Culp was negligent, then the little boy was negligent; 
if plaintiff's intestate was negligent, then Ida Valerie Culp 
was negligent. There is no evidence in the .record under 
which the jury could have possibly separated the negligence 
of the two children. The instruction should not have been 
given for that reason. 
The instruction is objectionable further for the reason that 
it tells the jury that the defendant was not relieved from 
liability if they believed that she was guilty of negligence. 
Instructions 4 and 5 had stated, as a matter of law, that it 
'\vas negligence to drive a car when it was not under proper 
control at all times, or to drive other than on the right half 
of the highway. 
Even assuming that instructions 4 .and 5 were correct, and 
there were no other objections to instruction 8,~ it should 
have at least told the jury that in order for plaintiff to re-
cover, the negligence of which Helen Harris was guilty must 
have proximately caused the death of plaintiff's intestate. 
Although it is too '\Veil known to do more than comment on 
the fact tha.t an infant between the ages of 7 and 14 years is 
presumed to be incapable of being guilty of contributory neg-
. ligence, that presumption is rebuttable upon a showing that 
it l1ad sufficient intelligence and experience to realize danger 
when confronted with it. This was done in the testimony of 
the plaintiff, Ida Valerie Culp, and other witnesses. 
In Carlton v. Martin, 160 Va. 149,168 S. E. 348, it was held 
that it was a jury question whether a 7 year old child was 
capable of contributory negligence, and this court assumed 
that if the child were capable of contributory negligence then 
recovery would be precluded when she ran across the road in 
front of an approaching automobile. 
In Stanley v. Ton~lin, 143 Va. 187, it was held a jury ques-
tion whether a 9 year old child could be guilty of contributory 
negligence. Cases from other jurisdictions holding that chil-
dren can be guilty of contributory negligence are: 
Lange v. Hoyt, 159 Atl. 575; 114 Conn. 590; 82 A. L. R. 
486 (8 years old). 
Pierson v. Limilng, 167 S. E. 131; 113 W.Va. 145 (6 years 
old). 
Routh v. Weakley, 154 Pac. 218 ; 97 Kans. 7 4 ( 8% years old). 
Curly v. Baldwin, 90 Atl. 1 (R. I.) (81;2 years old). 
Zulver v. Roberts, 161 Atl. 9; 162 Md. 636 (7 years old}. 
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Rinaldi v. Levgar Stru,ctural Co., 117 Atl. 42; 97 N.J. Law 
162 ( 6 years old). 
Davis v. Bailey, 19 Pac. 2, 147; 162 Okla. 86 (6 years old). 
Wash v. H olla;nd, 183 S. E. 237 ( 8 years old). This is a 
Virginia case. 
There can be no question but that the contributory neg·li-
gence of plaintiff's intestate was a matter to be submitted to 
the jury. The courts in this state have repeatedly held in 
cases 'vhere infants were between the ages of 7 and 14 years, 
and of a degree of intelligence and development less, or similar 
to that of plaintiff's intestate, it was a question to be properly 
submitted to a jury. 
It seems too clear to require further elaboration that the 
accident in the instant ca.se would not have occurred but for 
the children's sudden appearance in front of defendant's auto-
mobile without warning and apparently ignoring her ap-
proach, which action was certainly negligent, and must be 
decided against the unfortunate child and in favor of defend-
ants. 
The court, in granting instruction 8, took the question of 
contributory negligence from the jury and gave a sympathetic 
.jury an opportunity to enrich the family of plaintiff's intestate 
at the expense of defendants. 
It cannot be argued that because the capacity of plaintiff's 
intestate of being guilty of contributory negligence was sub-
mitted to the jury under other instructions granted in the 
case, its omission from instruction 8 is harmless error, for, 
as stated by Justice Epes in Chesapeake Terry Corwp01ny v. 
Hudgi;ns, 156 S. E. 429, at 440 (155 Va. 874): 
''A material error in an instruction, complete in itself, is 
not cured by a correct statement of the law in another in-
struction, as it is said that it cannot be told by which the jury 
w-ere controlled. Hence, in such case the verdict may be set 
aside. * * • Burks, J., in Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Galley, 
134 Va. 468-483; 114 S. E. 551-556." 
It was error for the court to ignore contributory negli-
gence in instruction 8. 
Seventh Assignrnent of Error: The court erred in gra;nt-
ing instruction 9, over the objection of the defendants. 
At the request of the plaintiff, the court granted instruction 
9 (R., p. 274) on the doctrine of the "last clear chance". To 
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this instruction counsel for the defendants made numerous ob-
jections (R., p. 307). The instruction reads as follows: 
''The Court instructs the jury that, should they believe from 
the evidence that .the defendant., Helen Fiarris, was negligent, 
and that the deceased child, Carl Allen Wright, was also neg-
ligent, nevertheless, if the jury should further believe from 
the evidence that the said Helen Harris saw, or should in 
the exercise of ordinary care, have seen, the deceased child, 
Carl Allen "\V right, in sufficient time to have given her an op-
portunity to have stopped her car, or turned to her right, 
so as, not to have struck the child, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, then the jury are instructed that the said defendant, 
Helen Harris, had a last clear chance to avoid striking and 
killing the child, and the jury should find for the plaintiff.'' 
Chief among the objections to the above instruction was 
the objection that the doctrine of the "last clear chance'' 
had no application to the facts in this case, and, further, that 
the instruction was not consistent with other instructions 
granted the plaintiff on pl'imary negligence, and with the in-
struction granted the defendant on the doctrine of sudden 
emergency. 
When this case was tried, the trial court was of opinion, 
as was counsel for the plaintiff, that the doctrine, if it had 
any application at all, could only be in connection with the tes-
timony of defendant, Helen !farris, and that of Ida Valerie 
Culp. The testimony of Ida Valerie Culp relied on was that 
when she first saw the automobile it was at the ice-house. It 
will be recalled that the ice-house was never located with any 
degree of certainty. Surveyor Love estimated it to be located 
between 60 and 100 feet from the entrance; witness Cates 
reckoned it to be 75 feet fron1 the entrance, and the plaintiff 
estimated it to be between 105 and 120 feet from the entrance. 
However, the testimony of Ida Valerie Culp must be con-
sidered along with other testimony she gave, and her youth 
and childish impulses must be taken into consideration. It is 
admitted that she was pushing the wagon down a 30-foot in-
cline, and was running. It is admitted that ~he children were 
intent on crossing the road in answer to their grandmother's 
summons. It will be recalled that Hunter Wright saw the chil-
dren up in the entrance, about 43 feet from the eastern edge 
of the road, as they started down the entrance. He looked 
away, and when he looked back a second or less later, the 
accident had happened. It will be further recalled that be-
tween the time the grandmother called the children and be-
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fore she could reach the house, the children had come down 
the incline of the entrance into the road and the accident 
had happened. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above conclusively 
shows the accident happened as outlined by the defendant and 
her n1other, and substantiates the testimony of Helen Harris 
and Mrs. Harris that the children were only 15 feet away 
from the car when they were first seen, and were coming into 
the road ''like a flash' '. · 
Petitioners submit that the evidence of Ida Valerie Culp 
in the above particular is obviously not sufficient to predicate 
an instruction on the doctrine of the "last clear chance". 
With reference to the testimony of Helen Harris, relied on 
to justify the instruction, it will be noted that she permitted 
herself the luxury of a discussion with counsel for the plaintiff 
as to certain traffic laws, and the duty of. a driver of an auto-_ 
mobile to stay in the road rather than drive out of it under 
some circumstances. The reason for this was that counsel 
for plaintiff endeavored to elicit from her a statement that she 
was driving to the left, or center, of the road. The state-
. ments made by Miss Harris as to staying in the road and 
maintaining the right of way, no doubt prejudiced the jury 
against her, as they also impressed themselves upon the trial 
court. However, it is submitted that the views of the defend- · 
ant, Helen Harris, and any statements she made as to lier 
knowledge or understanding of traffic laws, are immaterial. 
The question in issue is not what she thinks, but 'vhat she 
did when confronted with the children in the instant case. 
She repeatedly told the jury, in answer to questions by counsel 
and the court, that she endeavored to stop her car and pull 
to the right as best she could in the short time that she had, 
but did not have sufficient time to avoid the accident. 
Again, at the expense of encumbering the record, we re-
peat }.IIiss Harris' testim?ny in this particular: 
'' Q. Did you apply your brakes before striking them? 
''A. I applied my brakes as soon as I saw them.'' (R., p. 
83.) 
A.nd again: 
'' Q. You did not undertake to turn to the right after you 
had seen the children Y 
''A. All that I did was try to pull a little to the right, as 
best I could 'with the time that I had, and the children coming 
into the road. 
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'' Q. As a matter of fact, you cut to the right just about the 
time you struck the wagon, didn't you 7 
''A. Just as soon as I could.'' ( R., p. 85.) 
And again, on direct examination: 
'' Q. Did they stop in the ditch line? Did the wagon ever 
stop and at wha.t speed, if any, did it come out Y . 
''A. It didn't stop. If it had stopped, I suppose I .would 
have had more chance, but the wagon did not stop. It just 
came right down very near to the car." (R., p. 234.) 
And again: 
'' Q. When you saw the children, Miss Harris-you testi· 
fied you saw them about 10 or 15 feet away-what did you do Y 
''A. I applied my brakes as soon as I had a chance, and 
I n1ay have pulled to the right just a little bit, but in that 
time, as close a$ the children were, I didn't hcvve n~uch time 
for anything. . 
'' Q. Were they steadily coming into the road 7 . 
''A. This child was pushing them and they were coming 
just like a flash.'' (R., p. 23.5.) 
.And again : 
'' Q. Did you pull as much as you could, Y 
''A. As much as I could in the time that I had.'' (R., p. 
238.) 
And again: 
''Q. And you did swerve to your right as much as you could 
after seeing the children Y 
''A. I did.'' (R., p. 243.) 
And in answer to the following question by the court: 
'' Q. Did you do anything but apply your bJ;akes Y 
"A. Yes, I did swerve to the 'right as far as I had a chance 
to in the time." (R., p. 244.) 
Miss Harris was corroborated by her mother, wh? said: 
'' Q. What did your daughter do when the children emerged 
from behind the bushes at the ditch line Y . 
40 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
''A. I think she applied th~ brakes as quick as she possibly 
could. 
'' Q. Did she do anything else! 
''A. She turned, I think, a little to the right, as rnuch as she 
had time to, but it was all so quick she didn't have tirne to 
go very much to the right. 
''Q. She didn't have time to goY Do yon know whether she 
started turning to the right or not Y 
''A. Yes, a little bit. 
"'Q. Do· you know whether she applied her brakes or not! 
''A. Yes, she did. . 
'' Q. Do you know whether or not the brakes had time to 
begin taking effect before she hit the children? 
''A. I do not know but I know that she applied them as quick 
as she possibly could. . 
"Q~ The car did slide either at the time or after it hit the 
children! 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. And at that time. you say she turned to the right as far 
as she could or as fa.r as she had time Y 
''A: As far as she had time." (R., pp. 250-1.) ' 
Thus it can be clearly seen that the young lady did all that 
she possibly could do to avoid the accident in the little time 
that she had after the children emerged from behind the 
bushes and came into view. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia., on numerous 
occasions, has held that in order for the doctrine of the 
"last clear chance" to apply, the evidence on which the doc-
trine is based must show a clear chwnce. A possible, or even 
probable, clear chance is not sufficient. This doctrine is fre-
quently referred to as the ''humanitarian doctrine", and it 
is by virtue of the foregoing evidence that the plaintiff claims 
that this doctrine applies. 
In order for the doctrine to apply in this case, it is clear 
that the element of time is the very essence of the matter-
how long a time Helen Harris had to perceive the child, and 
how long a time she had after perceiving the child in which 
to avoid the accident. That the defendant could not see the 
children in the entrance and until they emerged in the rpad, 
is clear from the evidence. Even had she been able to see them 
200 or 300 yards before she reached the entrance, she would -
have seen them a distance of 50 feet from the road and in a 
piace of 'safety. The defendant could not see the children 
until they came into a position of danger, and they did not 
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get into a position. of danger until they suddenly ''shot out into 
the road like a flash' '. 
The only concrete evidence before the court as to the dis-
tance between defendant's car and the children at the time 
they emerged from the entrance into the .road is the testimony 
of Miss Harris and Mrs. Harris, who stated they were ap-
proximately 10 or 15 feet from the car. However, even if we 
presume that surveyor Love's ''estimate'' that the ice-house 
is 60 feet from point "Y" on the n1ap, that being the middle 
of the entrance, Miss Harris' evidence is that the accident 
happened from 25 to 35 feet north of '' Y' ', and near the 
ice-house. The plaintiff's testimony is that it happened ap-
proximately 12 feet north of "Y". In any event, the car 
could not have possibly been as much as 40 feet from the 
~children when they first came into view. 
The speed of the car is placed at 30 miles an hour. Both 
the distance and speed are admittedly approximations and 
cannot be vouched for as being mathematically accurate.. It 
is submitted that approxin1ations in a close situation could 
never establish a ''clear chance'', but even if the speed of 
30 miles an hour and the distance of 40 feet be accepted as 
positive facts rather than approximations, it clearly appears 
that Helen Harris on1v had less than one second to avoid 
this accident, for her autornobile would travel 44 feet a sec-
ond at a speed of 30 miles an hour. A second, or even hvo 
seconds, could hardly be said to be enough time in which to 
hold a defendant liahle for failure to appreciate the danger 
and act quickly enough to avoid an accident. 
In the case of Stratton, et als., v. Bergman, supra, this court 
recognized the fact that it takes an interval of time before a 
person's mind can react to a situation of peril, which interval, 
of necessity, varies with the person and circumstances. 
In the case of Barnes v. A.shworth, 154 Va. 251, 153 S. E. 
'711, this court held that one and one-half seconds are not suffi-
cient time to establish a clear chance, and the late Justice 
Epes, speaking for the coi1 rt, said : 
"At that time the car was traveling at from 18 to 25 miles 
an hour, placing the distance from where Ballentine discov-
ered that he could not pass to the left of Hagwood's car to 
where Hagw·ood was standing in the road at the maximum 
distance which the evidence will support, and Ballentine's 
speed at the minimum the evidence will support, the car driven 
by Batlentilne required only one and one-half .r;econds to tra-
verse the distance front where Ballentine was when he dis-
42 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
covered that he could not pass to the left of .Hagwood's car 
to where he str,uclc Ha,gwood." 
The last clear chance implies thoug·ht, appreciation, mental 
direction, and the lapse of sufficient time to effectively act 
upon the impulse to save another from injury. When it is 
borne in mind that Ballentine was himself ~n an emergency 
whieh had been created by Hagwood's negligence, we think 
that it cannot be fairly inferred from the facts proven that a 
sufficient time did elapse after Ballentine discovered that he 
could not pass to the right of Hagwood's car for him in the 
exercise of ordinary care to have avoided striking him. The 
most that can be said is that peradventure there might have 
been a possibility of -his so doing.'., (Italics supplied.) 
Within the past few days there has been reported in the 
South Eastern advance sheets the case of Hutcheson v. Misen-
heimer, 194 S. E. 665, decided by the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of ~Virginia, January 13, 1938. This case is directly in 
point, both in regard to the facts and the law, and we quote 
from Justice Gregory's able opinion, as follows: 
''The doctrine of the last clear cl1ance is one involving nice 
distinctions, often of a. technical nature, and courts should be 
wary in extending its application. Vam Sickler v. Washington 
&7 0. D. Ry., 142 Va. 857, 128 S. E. 367. 'The last clear chance 
implies thought, appreciation, mental direction, and the lapse 
of sufficient time to effectively act upon the impulse to save 
another from injury.' Barnes v. Ashworth, 154 Va. 218, 153 
S. E. 711, 720. 
''The doctrine presupposes time for effective action. It 
is not applicable where the emergency is so sudden that there 
is no time in which to avoid the accident. Unless there 
is an appreciable difference in time between the ·earlier 
negligence of the plaintiff and the later negligence of the de-
fendant and a last clear chance to ·avoid the accident afforded 
the defendant, which he fails to avail himself of, the doctrine 
does not apply. 
''The plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the doctrine 
upon mere peradventure. The burden is upon him to show 
affirmatively by a preponderance of the evidence that by the 
use of ordinary care after the peril was discovered the de-
fendant in fact had a last clear chance to avoid the injury. A 
mere possibility is not sufficient. TfT ashington & 0. D. Ry. v. 
Thompson, 136 Va. 597, 118 S. E. 76. 
"When we apply the foreg·oing rules to the particular facts 
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in this case, it is manifest that the evidence is insufficient 
to support a verdict predicated upon the doctrine of last 
clear chance. The defendant ha.d one second or less to save 
the plaintiff's decedent after his peril became known. The 
time was so short and the emergep.cy so sudden that the de-
fendant did not have time to place his foot upon the brake 
before the impact. He tried to avoid the accident by swerving 
sharply to his right but without avail. The plaintiff has failed, 
as a matter of law, to affirmatively prove that the defendant 
had a last clear chance to· save the decedent. 
''To apply the last clear chance to the facts here would 
in effect amount to the introduction of the comparative neg-
ligence doctrine, which, of course, has not been adopted in 
Virginia except in certain cases, and to wipe out as a defense 
contributory or concurring negligence.'' . 
In the following cases our court has passed ori the question 
of the time eleme:p.t in connection with the ''last clear chance'': 
Frazier v. 8tou,t, 165 Va. 68. 
Sou. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 152 Va. 548. 
Shuster v. Va. Ry. db P. Co., 144 Va. 387. 
N. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 122 Va. 302. 
Va. E. d!; P. Co. v. Vellines, 162 Va. 671. 
U. 8. Bpr'{we L. Co. v. Shumate, 118 Va. 471. 
Ashby v. Virginian Ry. & Pow,er Co., 138 Va. 310 . 
. . Ohes. Western Ry. v. Shiflett, 118 Va. 63. 
The instruction is inconsistent with other instructions 
granted the plaintiff on primary negligence, and with the in-
struction granted the defendant on the doctrine of sudden 
emergency. 
Assuming that there was sufficient evidence to have taken 
the case to the jury, that evidence presented a case of pri-
mary and contributory negligence for the decision of the jury 
under proper instructions. 
The doctrine of last clear chance presupposes that there has 
been negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. Unless there is evidence that the plaintiff has been 
guilty of contributory negligence, it has no application to the 
case. Therefore, to justify an instruction on last clear chance 
in the instant case, the plaintiff must concede that Carl Allen 
Wright is capable of contributory negligence and was negli-
gent in emerging suddenly into the road at an improper time 
or place, and in front of the approaching Harris car. If 
this be conceded, it must be a further concessum that such 
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negligence continued up until the time of the accident. That 
is the theory of the defendant, and her testimony was that 
the children emerged suddenly from behind bushes into the 
road when she was about 15 feet away, and that she did not 
have time to. stop or avoid them. 
An instruction in almost the identical language of instruc-
tion 9, was given in the case of Green v. Rttffin, 141 Va. 628, 
125 S. E. 742, at page 747. The giving of this instruction 
was held erroneous, and the court said: 
"It must be observed that the instruction is an abstract 
statement of the la,v, does not point out to the jury when 
and where her peril should have been discovered by the de-
fendant, nor when she was guilty of contributory negligence.'' 
In the said case, the court further held that in order to war-
rant such instruction the plaintiff had to concede negligence, 
and that if so, it was her duty to have looked and stopped 
when such act would have been effective; that she had the same 
last .clear chance to protect herself as the defendant had to 
protect her, for the doctrine is a duty imposed by. law on both 
the plaintiff and the defendant. . 
In Gree1~ v. Rujfi'l~, S'l(,p1·a, the court further said: 
"The foundation of the doctrine is that the parties are 
guilty of concurring negligence and there must be some con-
-dition, circumstances, or super-added fact, which one of the 
parties saw, or, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have 
seen, that made it his duty to endeavor to avoid injury to the 
negligent party, and the obligation of discovering the last 
clear chance is mutual.'' 
Instruction 9 in the instant case fails to point out this con-
dition, circumstance, or super-added fact, and is likewise 
erroneous. 
In Barnes v. Ash'lvorth, S1tpra, this court, speaking through 
the late Justice Epes, held that the giving of an instruction, 
very similar to the instruction given in the instant case, was 
erroneous, and said : 
''The language of the instruction is so broad that under the 
facts in this case it may readily have led the jury into a 
misconception· of the law of the case.'' 
So, aside from the fact that the instructions in the instant 
case upon primary negligence and the doctrine of last clear 
chance were contradictory, instruction 9 does not point out to 
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the jury when or where the peril of plaintiff's intestate should 
have been discovered by the defendant in time to have avoided 
. the accident, and its language is likewise too broad. 
It is submitted that the instruction could not have done 
that because the evidence sho,vs that the defendant had no 
opportunity to avoid the accident, and had no last clear chance, 
or even a chance, to avoid striking the wagon in which plain-
tiff's intestate was riding. It is further submitted under the 
.facts in the case that the instruction dealing ·with last clear 
chance is inconsistent with the instruction (R., p. 281), which 
told the jury that the defendant upon being placed in the 
perilous situation in which she was placed, did not have to 
exercise her best judgment in order to escape. 
This is not a proper case to apply the doctrine of the last 
clear chance. , 
Eighth ..A.ssign1nent of l?rror: The Oo~trt erred in striking 
out the evidence of Officers Dam.eron and Grizzard; in re-
.fusing to strike out the evidence of fV. B. Moseley and others; 
and in refusing to grant lnstnt-ction L, asked for by the de-
fendants. · 
This assignment of error goes to the question of whether 
or not the court should have permitted certain witnesses to 
testify as to the distan~e in which an automobile can be 
stopped. . 
It will be recalled that on the day of the trial, counsel for 
the plaintiff sent certain witnesses-R. F. Ellis, W. B. ~lose­
ley and W. B. Wrig·ht-who had been summoned on behalf of 
the plaintiff, to the scene of the accident, for the purpose 
of making some braking tests. When this evidence was of-
fered, counsel for the defendants objected (R., p. 154), and, 
further, at the conclusion of the evidence, moved the court to 
strike out the testimony of these witnesses as to distances 
in which automobiles can be stopped (R., p. 19). 
R. F. Ellis was the first witness called by the plaintiff, 
who testified with reference to these tests. The experiments 
made by Ellis were made on the day of the trial-December 
3, 1937,-with a 1935 Chevrolet sedan. He testified that he 
made the tests 90 feet north of the entrance to the Sam W ray 
house (R., p. 157), and is supposed to have stopped his au-· 
tomobile within 27 feet, going at a speed of 27 miles an hour. 
This evidence \vas plainly inadmissible as the conditions un-
·der which the tests were made were not even substantially 
the same as existed on the day of the accident. In the first 
place Ellis had already been sworn as a witness for the plain-
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tiff. He was sent to the scene of the accident to stop his 
automobile as quickly as possible, and then instructed to come 
back into court and testify (R., p. 156). He was operating 
an automobile of a different model from that operated by the 
defendant at the time of the accident. On May 23, 1937, 
Officer Dameron testified that the Lawrenceville-Ebony road 
was dry and covered with loose gravel. In December, the 
road is hard and packed and not dry like it is in the summer 
months. Furthermore, the evidence is that the accident hap-
pened from 12 to 35 feet no1~th of "Y'' and near the summit' 
of the hill. \Vhen the brakes of l\iiss Harris' car took effect 
she was going downgrade. Ellis made his tests 90 feet north 
of the entrance and going upgrade. l\Hss Harris was con-
fronted with a situation of peril. Ellis admitted that he be-
gan the application of his brakes at a predetermined point 
(R., p. 156). . 
It will thus be seen that none of the conditions that con-
fronted ~Iiss Harris on the day of the accident existed when 
Ellis made his tests. 
It appears that a 1v[r. Raymond Wrig·ht also made tests 
with his automobile, but was not called as a witness. The 
court permitted W. B. 1\'[oseley to testify how quickly Ellis 
and Raymond \Vright stopped their automobiles, going at 
various speeds. l\Ioseley w~s not in either the Ellis or the 
Wright car when the tests were made, and testified only from 
what these parties told him. This was plainly inadmissible. 
The court further permitted A. B. Wright to testify as 
to what Ellis and Rayn10nd Wrig·ht said with reference to 
the distances in which they stopped their respective cars. 
A. B. Wright did not ride in either of the cars and, there-
fore, had to rely upon what Ellis and Raymond Wright told 
him. All tests were made in December and on the upgrade 
of the hill and not at its summit or downg-rade. 
All this testimony was objected to by counsel for defend-
ants (R., p. 154). The objection was again renewed in the 
form of a written motion (R., p. 19), and the court was asked 
't.O strike out the evidence for reasons fully assigned therein, 
'vhich motion the court overruled. After the court had per-
mitted plaintiff to introduce this evidence, counsel for de-
fendants called State Officers Dameron and Grizzard to the 
stand and asked them as to the distances in which a Chevro-
let automobile, similar to the Harris car, equipped with law-
ful brakes, could be stopped. Both these witnesses testified 
that they were familiar ,vith all types and kinds of automo-
biles, and had made numerous braking tests. That is a part 
of their duties as officers of the Motor Vehicle Department. 
Officer Dameron testified that an automobile operated at 
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30 miles an hour would travel a distance of approximately 22 
feet before the driver's mind would react to a situation, and' 
that on a dry, level road, free of gravel or loose material, a 
car equipped with proper brakes could be stopped in 56 
feet after the application of brakes. Officer Grizzard testified 
that the reaction time might vary from half a second to a 
second, and he thought a car operated at a speed of 30 miles 
an hour would go a distance of from 78 to 100 feet before it 
could be stopped. Both officers were of opinion that on a 
dirt road covered with loose gravel, as was the Lawrenceville-
Ebony road. on ~Iay 23, 1937, this stopping distance would 
be increased by at least a third. 
After all the evidence 'vas in the court, of its own motion, 
instructed the jury to disregard the testimony of witnesses 
Dameron and Grizzard in this particular, and to this the de-
fendant excepted (R., p. 265). · 
The purpose .of the plaintiff in introducing testimony as 
to the time in which automobiles could be stopped was neve·r 
made clear .. No witness testified as to the speed of the Harris 
car except defendant and her mother, and their testimony was 
that it was going at a speed of 30 miles an hour. Following 
the accident, to use the 'language of Judge Holt, in Fagg v. 
Canz.ey, 165 S. E. 421: ''There "ras no occasion for any emer-
gency stop; the accident had already happened." However, 
}\lfiss Harris and her mother testified that they were of opin-
ion that the car was broug·ht to a stop within approximately 
30 feet after the brakes were applied. 
vV e will assume, for argument, that the inch depression 
found in the road was the point of impact. Witness Cates 
testified that he drove a nail in the ground at this point. 
Witness Love testified that this point was 12 feet north of 
"Y", the summit of the hill. Witness Cates further testified 
that, when he arrived at the scene of the' accident 12 hours 
after it had happened, he noticed some marks in the road, 
'vhich he assumed to be marks made by the wheels of the Har-
ris car after the application of brakes. He stated these marks 
began approximately 12 feet fron1 where the depression was 
found in the road, and continued to a point where he placed 
another nail. J. Hunter Love, surveyor, is.supposed to have 
been shown these t'vo nails. His testimony is that the nails 
were approximately 98 feet apart (R., pp. 142, 174). 
From this testimony it can be seen that Officers Dameron 
and Grizzard were correct in their testimony that the stopping 
distance of a car, which could be stopped within 56 feet after 
application of brakes, would be increased by more than a third 
on a dirt road covered with gravel and loose material. The 
application of brakes beg·an, according to the plaintiff's tes-· 
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timony, at the summit of the hill, 12 feet south of the first 
nail, and, therefore, the car was going downgrade. Even un-
der these conditions the car was stopped within 86 feet. 
This testimony further corroborates the testimony of Miss 
Harris and ~{rs. Harris as to the number of feet the child's 
wagon was from the car when it emerged into the road from 
behind the bushes. Miss Harris stated that the car was 10 
or 15 feet away at the time. It, therefore, appears that the 
car traveled 10 or 15 feet to the point of in1pact, and then 
12 feet from the point of impact before the brakes began to 
take effect, making a total of approximately 22 ·feet the car 
traveled during the reaction time, and before ::1\Hss Harris 
could react to the peril of the situation. · 
Even if we discard the positive testimony of the defend-
ant and her mother as to the distance, the plaintiff has him-
self, by his own measurements and witnesses, shown that the 
distance between the car and the wagon when the latter came 
into view and into the road was only 15 feet. 
It, therefore, appears that if the testimony of w-itnesses 
Ellis, Moseley and A. B. ·wright was introduced to show ex-
cessive speed of the Harris car, it failed utterly, and, on the 
contrary, confirmed the speed at 30 miles an hour. 
If the plaintiff introduced this testimony in an effort to 
show that the Harris car was not properly equipped with 
brakes, we direct the court's attention to the testimony of 
witness Abernathy (R., pp. 223, 224), ,vho inspected the brakes 
two weeks prior to the accident, and found them to be in 
proper working order. However, in view of the fact that the 
court had permitted this improper testimony, counsel for the 
defendants felt it the duty of the court to instruct the jury 
as to the statute of the state of Virginia on what constitutes 
adequate, lawful brakes, and the distance in which a brake 
should be capable of stopping a motor vehicle (Section 2154 
(146) of the Code of Virginia). For that reason, Instruction 
L was offered (R., p. 295), and refused. Counsel for the de-
fendants excepted to the action of the court in refusing this 
instruction, for reasons fully assigned (R., p. 308). 
We, therefore, submit from the above, that the instant case 
was not a proper. case for any testimony as to experiments. 
While the testimony of the defendant as to the speed of the 
car was uncontradicted, had its speed been twice as great, it 
still would not have been a factor in the instant case. The 
speed did. not contribute to, or cause, the accident, and coun-
sel for the plaintiff so recognized this fact when he did not 
ask for an instruction based thereon. · 
There can be no question but that the brakes of the automo-
bile were in proper condition. 
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It is further submitted that even thoug·h this had been a 
proper case for the admission of evidence as to experiments, 
the court should not have permitted the testhnony of wit-
nesses Ellis, Moseley and A. B. Wright. Notwithstanding· this, 
the court permitted these witnesses to testify, and struck out 
the evidence, introduced by the defendants, of two officers who 
are familiar with experiments of that kind, and whose busi-
ness it is to know about such things. 
The evidence of witnesses Ellis, Moseley and Wright fails 
to meet the test laid down in the case of R. F. Trant, Inc., v. 
Upton, 159 ·va. 355, 165 S. E. 404, where Justice Browning 
quoted from Blash:field Cyc. of Automobile Law, Vol. 2, 1691, 
Section 71, as follows : 
"The result of experiments made at the scene of an acci-
dent for purposes of verifying or disproving particular the-
ories as to ho'v the accident occurred, may be admissible 
if the conditions under which the experiments are conducted 
correspond substantially to those surrounding· the accident.'' 
None of the conditions that confronted Miss Harris on 
May 23, 1937, when the accident occurred, were present when 
R. F. Ellis and his companions made their experiments on the 
morning of the trial. 
The evidence of Ellis, :M:oseley and .A. B. Wright was in-
admissible. The court should not have allowed it, and, there-
fore, should have granted the defendants' motion to instruct 
the jury to disregard it. However, having admitted this tes-
timony, the court should have allowed the defendants to in-
trodJice the testimony of the officers, who were experts on 
such experiments, and should have granted Instruction L, 
offered by the d~fendants. 
THE. TRIAL COURT'S OPINION. 
The decision in the instant case appears to have given the 
trial court no end of trouble, as is apparent from the fact 
that his opinion consumes 29 pages of the record. In con-
clusion, he intin1ated that he considered the verdict of the 
jury an improper one, and that, had he tried the case hide-
pendently of a jury, he would have found a different verdict. 
It is submitted that had the errors, heretofore pointed out 
in numerous instructions, not been committed, the jury might 
not have found the verdict they did. In any event there 'vas 
no evidence upon which to predicate same, and it is plainly 
contrary to the law and the evidence. 
It is obvious from observations made by the trial court 
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(R.; p. 303), with reference to exceptions noted by counsel 
for the defendants to Instruction X, that the court was labor-
ing under a misapprehension of the la\v controlling that in-
struction. 
We will not attempt to comment at length upon the court's 
memorandum of opinion. However, it does appear therefrom 
that the learned trial judg-e either did not have a transcript 
of the record before hiin when he prepared his opinion, or did 
not recall the evidence. We respectfully direct the court's 
attention to the following: 
The opinion refers to the highway as curving to the south 
(R., p. 25) ; the highway runs north and south, and the curve 
was to the east. 
The opinion states that the road passes through the cur-
tilage of the Prince I. Wright place, and that l\1:r. Wright 
uses the premises of the Sam W ray place to stable his cattle 
(R., p. 26). Prince I. Wright, in fact, resides a quarter of 
a mile south of the scene of the accident, according to his 
own testimony. The opinion refers· to the Sam Wray place 
as an old settlement marked by a growth of trees, several out-
building·s and an old ice-house (R., p. 26). The evidence is 
that immediately across from the residence of R. A.. Wright, 
in front of \vhose house the accident occurred, is an aban-
doned house which, it will be observed from the pictures, is · 
more of a shack than a dwelling house. There is also an tm-
used ice-house on the same side of the road, and opposite the 
R. A.. Wright residence. There are trees, shrubs, weeds, etc., 
but no other outbuildings, and there is no evidence as to 
how the prentises on the eastern side of the road are used, ex-
cept that there is a cowpen on that side of the road. 
The trial judge refers to the necessity of. constant passage 
across the road (R., p. 26). There is no evidence of that in 
the record. Mr. R. A. Wright probably crosses the road once 
or twice a day to attend to his cows. 
The trial court refers to constant passage between the 
house of Mr. Wright where the children dwell (R., p. 26), 
and the Sam W ray house. In that . he is mistaken, as the 
plaintiff's intestate, Carl Allen Wright, resided with his 
father and mother, a quarter of a mile from the scene of the 
accident and the residence of R. A. Wright. 
The opinion places the distance of the ice-house from the 
place where the children ''debouched'' with the wagon at 100 
to 160 feet away (R., p. 26}. Where he got these distances 
is unknown. Only three \vitnesses estimated the distance be-
tween the ice-house and the entrance. Love ''guessed'' it was 
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between 60 and 100 feet, Cates "reckoned" it was 75 feet, and 
Prince I. Wright ''estimated'' it was from 105 to 120 feet. 
The opinion states that the plaintiff contended the children 
were struck before they ventured out on the road, and while 
they were in the entrance on the edge of the highway (R., p. 
28). This the plaintiff did not contend. He could not do so, 
as Ida Valerie Culp repeatedly testified that they were in the 
middle of the road when they were struck. 
The trial judge remarked that it was not in the evidence 
that the road was unfamiliar to Miss ·Harris, and that the 
children were in the habit of using the premises of the Sam 
Wray place (R., p. 30). There is no eyidence upon which to 
base this statement. The positive, uncontradicted testimony 
of ~Iiss Harris and 1\Irs. Harris was that they did not know 
the Wright family. There is no evidence in the reco~d as 
to the habit of the children in using the premises of the Sam 
Wray place. Carl .Allen Wright resided with his parents 
some distance from the R. A. Wright residence and the Sam 
W ray place. Had Miss Harris been under a legal duty to 
anticipate the presence of plaintiff's intestate in this vicinity, 
she would not have expected him at the residence of R. A. 
Wright, but at the residence of his own father and mother, 
'vhere he lived. The testimony is that the child was tem~ 
})Orarily left in the care of his grandmother, and only for 
Sunday, May 23, 1937. 
The trial court says that the description of this road as 
a one-track road finds no countenance in the statute law of 
Virginia pertaining to highways (R., p. 28). This we deny. 
There is nothing unusual in this type of road. Three-fourths 
of all the highways of this state are still dirt roads, and are 
one-track country roads, familiar to all persons who reside 
in the country. 
In commenting· on Instructions X andY given by the court, 
and the objections noted thereto, the trial judge gives his 
definitidn of the expressions "to discover", and "to provide 
for" (R., pp. 33, 34, 35). These definitions vary from the 
commonly a~epted definitions given in dictionaries. The jury 
did not have the benefit of the learned trial judge's defini~ 
tions when they considered the instructions. They probably 
int~rpreted the expressions in accordance 'vith the usual defini-
tions thereof, which will be found on page 31 of this peti-
tion~ In connection with these expressions found in the two 
Instructions X and Y, the court made the following very 
pertinent observation: 
"'Provide for' means no more than to take measures look~ 
ing to a certain end. This phrase is, in t~e instruction quali-
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fied, by limiting such measures thus to be employed to those 
that might have been employed in the exercise of ordinary 
ca-re, if such, of co~trse, were available.'' (R., p. 35.) 
There 'vill be found one of the main objections to the in-
structions. The instructions did not use the expression, ''if 
such, of course, were ava·ilahle". Had the court placed that 
phrase in the instructions, it would have been a limited com· 
pliance with the doctrine of lY ash v. Hollctn,d, .. s~tpra, as it 
'vould have, in a vague sort of way it is true, told the jury 
that it was the duty of the defend~nt, etc., if she, in the exer-
cise of ordinary care saw, or should have seen, the child in 
time to have a-voided hi'ln by the exe·rcise of ordina·ry care. 
The trouble is that the trial judge did not qualify the in-
struction g·iven to the jury, as he did when he explained it 
in his opinion. He makes no effort to distinguish the instant 
case from the case of Wash v. Holland. 
With reference to the court's comments on Instructions 4 
and 5, and his discussion of the cases of Gale, et al., v. 1Vilb·er, 
and Nlorris v. Dame, supra, we frankly admit that we are un-
able to follow the court's reasoning. We submit that the 
court's remarks on these two instructions do not meet or 
answer the objections to the instruction raised by counsel for 
the defendants (R., pp. 37-49). 
In his discussion of Instruction 8, the trial court makes no 
effort to point out how the negligence of the plaintiff's in-
testate and that of Ida Valerie Culp could be separated (R., 
pp. 49-50). He states that the instruction intended simply to 
exonerate the deceased from the negligence of Ida Valerie 
Culp. That may haye been the intention of the instruction, 
but it went much further than that. It took from the jury 
the question of the contributory negligence of plaintiff's in-
testate. The trial judge says that the "saving'' in the in-
struction as to the negligence of ~Hss Harris was superfluous 
(R., p. 50). That may be true, but in this particular, and 
read in connection with Instructions 4 and 5, it was objection-
able for reasons heretofore assigned under our discussion of 
assignment of error No. · 6. 
In discussing Instruction 9, the trial judge makes no refer-
ence to the decided cases of this state on the doctrine of 
last clear chance, and does not attempt to point out when or 
where the peril of the plaintiff's intestate should have been 
discovered by defendant, and what clear chance the defend-
ant had to avoid the accident. The trial judge quoted certain 
testimony of the defendant, Helen Harris, which he evidently 
considered prejudicial to her. However, even in the testi-
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mony that he selected and quoted, we find the following ques-
tions and answers : 
'' Q. You did not undertake to turn to the right after you 
had ·seen the children' 
''A. .All that I did 'vas try to pull a little bit to the right 
as best I could with the ti·me that I had and the children com-
ing into the road. 
'' Q. As a matter of fact, you cut to the right just about the 
time you struck the wagon, didn't you? 
''A. Just as soon as I could. 
'' Q. Could you swerve to the right¥ Did you .have time 
to swerve to the right 1 
''A. If I had swerved to the right any more I would have 
been over in this yard. I think I pulled a little to the right. 
'' Q. Did you pull as much as you could? 
''A. As much as I could in the time that I had.'' 
"Q. What would have been the objection to going into his 
yard? 
''A. Well, for the simple reason that every time I have 
been driving I have always been told to try to stay to ·the 
right side of the road and for that reason I was trying to stay 
to the right side. I was siverving as much as I had time to 
'Iniss the children.'' 
It will be recalled (this petition, s.~tpra, pages 13, 14, 15, 
50, 51; 52) that the defendant Helen IIat.:ris and her mother re-
peatedly testified that she endeavored to stop, and pulled 
to the right as far as she could, in the time that she had. 
Another error in the opinion is the trial court's reference 
to cross examination of ~{iss Harris by defendants' counsel. 
The record will, of course, show that the cross examination 
was conducted by counsel for the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion it is submitted that the evidence in this case 
shows that the defendant, Helen Harris, was guilty of no 
negligence in the operation of her car that caused, or con-
tributed to, the death of plaintiff's intestate. On the con-
trary, the evidence is that she 'vas operating same at a rea-
sonable speed, in a careful manner, and had her car under 
proper control. She 'vas not approaching any intersection, 
village or settlement. She was simply proceeding· along a 
dry, country road that was free of traf·:fic at the time. Her 
vision to her left was completely obscured by a dense growth 
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of trees, shrubs and undergrowth. At the point on the ro~d 
where the accident occurred the road curves to the left, and 
goes over the bro·w of a hill. Her uncontradicted testimony is 
that she was proceeding up this hill, observing the road closely 
for approaching· traffic over the hill and around the curve. 
I She was driving in the main track of the road, but a little to 
the right thereof, because of the hill and curve. When the 
children emerged from the entrance, and behind the shrubs 
and bushes, they came into the highway ''like a flash". At 
that time the defendant's car was only a few feet from them. 
She tried to avoid the accident by stopping and pulling to 
the right, but did not have a chance to do either. 
We submit that the sole proximate cause of the accident 
was the sudden and unexpected entrance into the highway of 
the children, and that the defendant· did not see, and could 
not have seen, them until it was too late to avojd the acci-
dent. 
For reasons heretofore given in argument of the various 
assignments of error, it is submitted that the verdict of the 
jury was without evidenCe to support it, and the court erred 
in refusing to set it aside and enter judgment for the de-
fendants. 
It is. further submitted that the court erred in granting in-
structions numbers X, Y, 4, 5, 8 and 9; in refusing to strike 
out the evidence of R. F. Ellis, W. B. Moseley and A. B. 
Wright as to certain experiments made by them; in striking 
out the evidence of officers Dameron and Grizzard, as to cer-
tain experiments made by them ; in refusing to grant Instruc-
tion L, offered by the defendants ; and in permitting the plain-
tiff to place on exhibition the child's wrecked wagon in which 
plaintiff's intestate rnet his death. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment com-
plained of in the foregoing petition should be reviewed and 
reversed and a final judgment rendered for the defendants 
(plaintiffs in error). 
A copy of this petition for a writ of error and supersedeas 
was delivered to counsel for defendant in error on the 16th 
day of April, 1938. 
This petition is adopted by petitioners as their brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. S. HARRI~ON, JR., 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
HELEN HARRIS, 
HUFF HARRIS, 
Petitioners, 
By Counsel. 
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I, A. S. Harrison, Jr., an attorney practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my 
opinion there is sufficient matter of error in the record ac-
companying this petition to render it proper that the judg-
ment complained of be reviewed and reyersed. 
A. S. HARRISON, JR. 
Received 4/23/38. 
E. W. H. 
April29, 1938. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $6,500. . 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the Countv of Bruns~ 
wick, at the Courthouse thereof, on the 23:rd day of Feb-
ruary, 1938. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: At Rules for 
the Circuit Court ·of the said County of Brunswick on the First · 
Monday in October, 1937, came Prince I. Wright, Administra-
tor of the Estate of Carl Allen W ~ight, deceased, and filed his 
Declaration against Helen Harris and Huff Harris, of Tres-
pass on the Case, which Declaration is in the following words 
and figures, to-wit: 
DECLARATION. 
Prince I. Wright, Administrator of the estate of Carl Allen 
Wright, deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Helen Harris & Huff Harris, Defendants. 
The said Prince I. Wright, as administrator of the estate 
of Carl Allen Wright, deceased, complains of the said Helen 
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Harris and Huff Harris of a plea of trespass on the case for 
this, to-wit: 
That prior to and at the time of the injuries hereinafter 
more specifically alleged, the said Huff Harris was the owner 
of a Chevrolet automobile, owned and maintained by him for 
- the general use of himself and family; that on the 23rd day 
of May, 1937, said defendant, llelen Harris, who is a daugh-
ter of said Huff Harris and a member of his family, 
page 2 ~ with the permission, authority, and consent of said 
Huff Harris, and acting in furtherance of .the pur-
poses for which said automobile was maintained by Huff 
Harris for himself and family, was driving said automobile 
in a southerly direction along hig·hway No. 644 in the County 
of Brunswick, Virginia, at a point on said highway between 
Merchant Post-office and White Plains Post-office, at which 
time said Helen Harris, in driving said automobile as afore-
said, was acting ·within the scope of the general family purpose 
for which .the machine was owned and maintained, and within 
the scope of the agency created by her relationship, under 
the circumstances, as the daughter of Huff Harris. 
Whereupon it became and was the duty of said Helen 
Harris so to operate the said automobile as not to injure 
or imperil other traffic on said highway, or pedestrians there-
on, and especially not to injure plaintiff's decedent, who was 
at the time a child seven years of age, and who, in com-
pany with other children, one younger, and the other older, 
than himself, was attempting to cross the highway upon 
which the defendant, Helen Harris, 'vas driving, from the 
eastern side thereof \vhere the said children had been play-
ing, in order to go to the home of his grandfather, R. A. 
Wright, who! lives adjacent to said highway, and on the 
western side thereof; and in doing so plaintiff's decedent 'vas 
riding upon a child's wagon, holding in his hands the tongue 
thereof, which said wagon was being pushed by 
page 3 ~ the other children, the said children and wagon then 
and there being on the eastern side of said high-
way and on the left-hand side of said highway, with reference 
to the direction in \Vhich the defendant, said Helen Harris, 
was travelling, the said children and wagon being in full and 
unobstructed view; but tha.t said Helen Harris wilfully and 
wantonly disregarding her said duty, carelessly and reck-
lessly, without keeping a proper lookout; in driving at an 
excessive rate of speed; in looking to her right at people gath-
ered in front of the residence of R. A. Wright; in driving 
on her left-hand side of the road to the left of the center of 
( 
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said highway, and otherwise operating and driving her said 
automobile in a careless and negligent manner, she drove said 
automobile upon the body of plaintiff's decedent, thereby 
crushing, maiming, disfiguring, and otherwise severely injur-
ing plai:p.tiff's decedent, from which said injuries the said Carl 
Allen Wright, plaintiff's decedent, thereafter, to-wit, on the 
morning of ~Iay 25th, 1937, died. 
That by reason of the death of plaintiff's decedent, which 
was directly a.nd proximately caused by defendant Helen 
Harris' wilful, wanton, and negligent acts aforesaid, said 
decedent's estate has sustained great and serious damages, 
and, therefore, the plaintiff, as•the duly qualified administra-
tor of the estate of said decedent, brings this action of tres-
pass on the case, in accordance with the statllte in such cases 
made and provided, for the sum of $10,000.00. 
page 4 ~ PRINCE I. WRIGHT, 
Administrator of the estate of Carl Allen 
Wright, deceased. 
By Counsel. 
L. J. HAMl\fACK, p. q. 
DEMURRER FILED AT 2ND OCTOBER RULES, 1937. 
The said defendants, Helen Harris and Huff Harris, say 
that the declaration, in this action filed, is not sufficient in 
law, and state the grounds of demurrer relied on to be as 
follows: 
(1) That the declaration fails to allege and specify with 
reasonable certainty the main or primary act of omission or 
commission, doing the damage and injury complained of in 
said declaration ; 
(2} The allegations in said declaration of any breach of 
legal duty on the part of the said defendants are vague, un-
certain, and indefinite, and constitute conclusions of the 
pleader; · 
(3) The allegations of duties upon the said defendants men-
tioned in the said declaration do not state the legal duties 
imposed by law upon the defendants under the circumstances 
of the case as set forth in said declaration, and any breach 
thereof would not, and does not constitute negligence for which 
the said defendants would be answerable Jin this 
page 5 ~ action; the declaration does not set forth any state-
ment of fact that constitutes a breach of said alleged 
duties; 
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( 4) The declaration does not· allege or set forth any cir-
cumstances of facts which show, or from which it could be 
reasonably inferred, that the death of Carl Allen Wright was 
the proximate result of any negligent act, or omission on the 
part of the said defendants; . 
( 5) The said declar~tion does not allege the commission 
of any negligent act on the part of the defendants, and tl}-ere 
is no allegation in said declaration of any negligent omission 
to perform any legal duty on the part of the said defendants. 
A. S. HARRISON, JR., p. d. 
IfELEN HARRIS, 
HUFF HARRIS, 
By Counsel. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendants, Helen Harris and Huff Harris, upon a 
trial of this case, will rely upon the following defenses: 
(1) The defendants rely upon their plea of gener3;l issue 
:filed, and all defenses which· may be made thereunder ; 
(2) The defendants put in issue each and every allegation 
contained in the plaintiff's declaration; 
(3) The defendants deny that Helen Harris, in the operation 
of the automobile mentioned in said declaration, 
page 6 ~ was guilty of any negligence whatsoever that proxi-
mately caused, or contributed to, the death of Carl 
Allen Wright; 
( 4) Defendants rely upon the fact that at the time of the 
accident mentioned in the decl~ration, Helen Harris, who 
was operating the Chevrolet automobile described in said dec-
laration, was driving said vehicle on the highway mentioned in 
said declaration at a careful speed, not greater than, nor less 
than, was reasonable and proper at the time, and with due re-
gard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway, and of 
any ~ther conditions then existing; · 
(5) That the sole proximate cause of the accident and death 
of plaintiff's intestate, Carl Allen Wright, was the fact that 
plaintiff's intestate, who was then and. there riding in a child's 
wagon, was suddenly pushed, by his companions, from a side 
road, into the highway on which defendant was driving, and 
immediately in front of the left wheel of defendant's car. 
I 
A. S. HARRISON, JR., p. d. 
HELEN HARRIS, 
HUFF HARRIS, 
By Counsel. 
0 
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PLEA OF NOT G.UILTY. 
The said defendants, Helen Harris and Huff Harris, by their 
attorney, come and say that they are not guilty of 
page 7 } the premises in this action, laid to their charge, or 
any part thereof, in the manner and form as the 
pl~intiff hath complained. And of this the said defendants 
put themselves upon the country. \ 
A. S. HARRISON, Jn., p. d. 
HELEN HARRIS, 
HUFF HARRIS, 
By CounseL 
page 8} And at another day, to-wit-On the 3rd day of 
December, 1937, the following order was entered: 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys; And, there-
upon, it appearing to the Court that the defendants herein, 
by their attorney, at the Second October Rules, in the Clerk's 
Office of this Court, tendered and filed their certain demurrer 
to the declaration in this action, thereupon, the plaintiff 
having, by his attorney, this day, ore te'WUs, joined in the said 
demurrer, it is considered by the Court that the said demurrer 
be, and the same is hereby, overruled; 
And, it appearing further to the Court that, at the said 
Second October Rules, the said defendants, by their attorney, 
tendered and :filed, in the Clerk's Office of this Court, their cer~ 
tain plea of "not guilty" to the plaintiff's declaration here-
in; thereupon, the plaintiff, by his attorney, having this day 
ore tenus tendered his replication in due form to the said 
plea, issue is thereupon joined between the said parties in the 
premises of the said plea; 
And, it further -appearing to the Court that the said defend-
ants, at the said Rules, tendered and :filed in the Clerk's Office 
of this Court their certain Statement of their ''Grounds of 
Defense'' to the plaintiff's action, this day the said defendants, 
by their attorney, also tendered and filed their certain special 
plea to the plaintiff's declaration, and also their certain plea 
of the "Contributory Negligence'' of the plaintiff's 
page 9 ~ intestate, Carl Allen Wright. Whereupon, the plain-
tiff, by his attorney, having, by his attorney, ore 
tenus, tendered his replication in due form to the defendants' 
said Statement of their Grounds of Defense, to the defendants' 
said special plea, and to the defendants.' said plea of ''Con-
tributory Negligence'', issue is thereupon accordingly joined 
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between the parties, in the premises 6f the said pleas and the 
said Statement; 
And, thereupon, of the persons summoned and in attendance 
on Court, pursuant to that certain writ of venire facias here-
tofore issued on the motion of the said plaintiff, by his attor-
ney, as directed by the order of this Court entered on the 
29th day of November, 1937, commanding the Sheriff of this 
County to summon to appear in Court on this day certain per-
sons, as therein de signa ted by the Judge of this Court, ~ 
order to the selection of a special jury for the trial of this 
case, a panel of twenty persons, free from exceptions and 
qualified in all respects to serve as jurors, is accordingly con-
stituted, from which said panel sixteen persons having been 
duly chosen by lot, as provided by the statute in such cases 
made and provided, and, thereupon, from the said sixteen 
persons remaining, the plaintiff and the defendant, having 
each stricken two persons, in due alternation, the remaining 
twelve persons compose the jury for the trial of this case, to-
wit: IIarvey Flinn, H. B. Jones, Rosser Epperson, 
page 10 ~ R. L. Daniel, Ton1 S. House, Lee Barrow, A. W. 
· Abernathy, Rennie Howerton, Sidney Neblett, B. C. 
Elmore, J. M. Taylor, and W. P. Rogers, who were thereupon 
duly sworn to try the issues joined, as aforesaid; Whereupon, 
the defendants, by their attorneys, directed the Court's at-
tention to a certain child's toy wagon which had been pro-
duced in Court by the plaintiff, apparently with the purpose 
of its subsequent introduction by the plaintiff in the testi-
mony in the course of the trial, and objected to the production 
of the said wagon, as aforesaid, before the jury on the trial, 
and to its subsequent introduction in the evidence, as in the 
event was done, on the ground that the same was immaterial 
to the purpose of the issues in the case and tended to prejudice 
of the defendants in this action; which motion the Court doth 
overn1le, and the defendants, by their attorney, excepted; 
And, thereupon, the jury heard the evidence introduced on 
behalf of the plaintiff; whereupon the defendants, by their 
attorney, moved the Court to strike the evidence introduced 
on behalf of the plaintiff, on the ground that the same fails 
to show any case of pri1na facie liability on the part of the 
defendants, or either of them; which motion the Court doth 
.overrule, and the defendants, by their attorney, again ex-
cepted; 
And, thereupon, the jury heard the evidence introduced 
on behalf of the defendants, and all the evidence 
page 11 r introduced in the trial of this case ; Whereupon, the 
defendants, by their attorney, renewetl. their motion 
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heretofore made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, 
and accordingly again moved the Court to strike out the evi-
dence of the plaintiff in this case, and enter a judgment for 
the defendants, upon certain grounds which are explicitly 
set forth in extenso in that certain written motion of the de-
fendants this day hereby :filed and made a part of the record 
of this case as ~lotion ''A'' ; 
And the defendants, by their attorney, also expressly moved 
the Court to strike out, and instruct the jury to disregard, 
all testimony of witnesses R. F. Ellis, vV. B. I\:foseley, and 
A. B. Wright introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, with 
reference to the distance in w~ich they stopped certain auto-
mobiles on the Lawrenceville-Ebony Road, where the acci-
dent in this case occurred, the introduction of which said 
testimony was heretofore allo\ved by the Court, notwithstand-
ing the objection of the defendants, by their attorney, on cer-
tain grounds which are explicitly and in extenso set forth in 
the defendants' certain written motion, this day hereby :filed, 
and made a part of the record in this case, as J\iotion '' B ''; 
Each of which n1otions the Court doth overrule, and the 
defendants, by their attorney, in each instance, again ex-
cepted; 
page 12 ~ ·whereupon the plaintiff, by his attorney, moved 
the Court to allow the Jury a view of the scene 
of the accident mentioned in the declaration and the evidence, 
in which said motion the defendants, by their attorney, con-
curred; Whereupon, it is accordingly ordered that the Jury, 
in the custody of the Sheriff, do tomorrow morning, after 
having appeared in Court at 9:30 o'clock, and been duly polled, 
proceed to the said scene of the collision mentioned in the 
declaration and the evidence, and have a view of the premises, 
in the• custody of the Shedff, and, thereupon, in the custody 
of the Sheriff, the said view having been accomplished, re-
turn again into Court; 
And, accordingly, the jury were. thereupon adjourned over 
until tomorrow morning a.t 9 :30 o'clock. 
And, thereupon, further proceedings in this case are con-
tinued until tomorro\v morning at 9 :30 o'clock. 
page 13 ~ PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The said defendants, without admitting, but expressly deny-
ing that they were guilty of any negligence which caused or 
contributed to the death of plaintiff's intestate, pursuant to the 
statutes in such cases made and provided, gives notice that 
in addition to all defenses provable under the general issue, 
I 
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they intend to rely upon . the contributory negligence of Carl 
Allen Wright in the following particulars: 
That the said Carl Allen W1ight was of sufficient age and 
· mental and physical development to appreciate the danger 
of pla~ing in or near a traveled highway, and did appreciate 
this danger, and · 
That the said Carl Allen vVright on May 23, 1937, was 
guilty of negligence in playing on and near the public highway 
in which defendant, Helen Harris, was operating her auto-
mobile and was negligent iu·a.ttempting to cross said highway 
in front of defendants' automobile, and was negligent in not 
looking, hearing, and seeing the automobile of defendant as 
it approached the point of accident. 
All of which negligence o~ said Carl Allen Wright, which 
will be shown by plaintiff's own testimony was the proximate 
cause of the death of plaintiff's intestate, and, therefore, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover of the def~ndants damages 
in this action. · 
A. S. HARRISON, JR., p. a. 
page 14 ~ SPECIAL PLEA-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE. 
The said defendants, without admitting, but expressly deny-
ing, that they were guilty of any negligence which caused or 
contributed to the death of plaintiff's intestate, pursuant to 
the statutes in such cases made and provided, gives notice 
that in addition to all defenses provable under the ·general 
issue they intend to rely upon the contributory negligence 
of Prince I. Wright and Pattie Wright in the following par-
ticulars: 
That it is the duty of a parent to exercise reasonable or 
ordinary care in the control, management, direction, and pro-
tection of a child non sui j-uris. 
That the said Prince I. Wright and Pattie Wright failed to 
exercise such reasonable and ordinary care in the control, man-
agement, direction, or protection of Carl Allen Wright, (plain-
tiff's intestate, and their infant child) on May 23, 1937, and 
such want of care was the proximate cause of the death of 
the said child ; 
That the said parents of said child, or the person intrusted 
with the care of said child by said parents, was charged with 
the d11;ty of keeping said .child out of a position of danger, 
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and, therefore, were negligent in permitting the child to play, 
or be, on or near a public highway, and that, but for the neg-
ligence of the said p~rents, or their agent then and there hav-
. ing the care and custody of said child, the death 
page 15 ~ of said child would not have occurred. 
All of which negligence of said parents, which 
'viii be shown by plaintiff's own testimony, was the proximate 
cause of the death of plaintiff's intestate, and, therefore, 
neither of said parents are entitled to recover any damages 
of or from said defendants. 
A. S. HARRISON, JR., p. d. 
page 16 ~ MOTION "A.". 
Counsel for defendants renews his motion heretofore made 
at the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, and again move& 
the court to strike the evidence of the plaintiff in this case, 
and enter up judgment for the defendants on the folloWing 
grounds: · 
(1) That the evidence fails to show any act of negligence 
on the part of Helen Harris in the operation of her auto~ 
mobile on May 23, 1937, at the time and place of the accident, 
that proximately caused or contributed to the death of plain-
tiff's intestate; 
(2) That the evidence shows that the plaintiff's intestate 
was a young boy 7 years of age, who had attended school for 
one entire session, normal in all respects, of average intelli-
gence, who had resided within a few feet of the said !Jaw-
renceville-Ebony highway all of his life, and 'vho realized and . 
appreciated the danger of playing in or near the said high-
way, which is extensively traveled, and who had been repeat-
edly warned and cautioned by his parents, and other members 
of his family, to stay out of the. highway, and be careful in 
crossing said highway, and who, notwithstanding said .warn-
ings and his understanding and appreciation of the danger in-
volved, negligently and carelessly permitted himself to be 
pushed out into said highway immediately in front of de-
fendant's automobile by his young companion, and tha.t the 
contributory negligence of Carl Allen Wright, and 
page 17 ~ his companion, as aforesaid, contributed to and was 
.. the sole cause of his death, and that such contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff's intestate is a 
complete bar to any recovery by the plaintiff in this case; 
(3) That the evidence of the plaintiff conclusively shows 
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that the sole proximate cause of the death of pia.intiff's in-
testate was the fact that he 'vas suddenly pushed by his com-
panion from a side road into the highway, on which defend-
ant was driving, and immediately in front of the left wheel 
of defendant's car, and that the defendant, Helen :Harris, 
was without negligence in the premises ; 
( 4) That there is a variation between tl1e allegations, as 
contained in the declaration, and the evidence as ofrered by 
the plaintiff, in that the cause o~ action as set forth in the 
declaration charges that Helen Harris, (a) willfully and wan-
tonly operated her car without keeping a proper lookout; 
(b) drove at an excessive rate of speed; (c) looked to her 
right at people gathered in front of the residence of R. A. 
Wright; and (d) drove on her left-hand side of the road, to 
the left of the center of said highway; 
And whereas, there is no evidence in the record that the 
plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout, or rlid not s9e the 
plaintiff's intestate, and his co1npanions as soon as the said 
children could be seen, and were not obscured by bushes to 
the left of the road; that there is no evidence that 
page 18 ~ the said Helen I-Iarris was driving· at an excessive 
rate of speed; that there is no evidence that the 
said Helen Harris looked to her right at people gathered in 
front of the residence of R. A. Wright, or in any other re-
spects ·was failing to observe the condition of the highway at 
the time, and that there is no evidence that the said I-Ielen 
Har1is was driving on the left side of the road to the left 
of the center of the highway. 
page 19 ~ ~lOTION ''B ". 
Counsel for defendants moves the court to strike out, and 
instruct the jury to disregard, all testimony of R. F. Ellis, 
W. B. Moseley, and A. B. Wright with reference to the distance 
in which they stopped certain automobiles on the Lawrence-
ville-Ebony road ·where the accident in this case occurred, 
which· evidence was introduced and allowed, notwithstanding 
objection by counsel for defendants, on the grounds; 
(1) That the tests, 'vhich were made on December 3, 1937, 
were not made with automobiles of the same make, model, 
character, or brakes as a 1934 Chevrolet coach automobile; 
and on the further ground that the condition of the highway 
at this time is not similar, or in the same condition, as the 
said highway was on Ivfay 23, 1937; 
( 2) And on the further ground that the said accident did 
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not take place at the point where tests were made on De-
cember 3, 1937, it having been testified by all witnesses that 
the said accident took place on the bro·w of the hill where the 
ground was practically level, and the tests having been made 
north of the point of tl1e accident on a hill that ascends over 
12 feet within a distance of 200 feet; 
(3) And on the further ground that the drivers, of said 
automobiles, making said tests, did not approach or take into 
consideration the ''reaction time ' ', that is, the distance in 
which an automobile travels from the time the driver realizes · 
the necessity of applying brakes, and the point wnere the 
brakes actually begin to take effect, all of said parties mak-
ing said tests having testified that they went out there for 
the express purpose of making the tests, and seeing how 
quickly they could stop their automobile, and that they ap-
plied their brakes at a pre-determined point; 
( 4) And on the further ground that the ~evidence of said 
_witnesses 'vas introduced for the purpose of showing that 
defendants' automobile was not properly equipped with 
brakes and should have been stopped within.lO to 27 feet, and 
therefore the plaintiff attempts to set up a standard contrary 
to, and different from, the provisions of the statute law of the 
State of Virginia with reference to what constitutes lawful 
brakes and the distance in which a car equipped with la,v-
ful brakes can be brought to a stop. 
page 20 ~ And at another day, to-wit: On the 4th day of 
December, 1937, the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys ; and 
the jury sworn on yesterday again appeared in Court pur-
suant to their adjournment on yesterday, to-wit: Harvey 
Flinn, H. B. Jones, Rosser Epperson, R. L. Daniel, Tom S. 
House, Lee Barrow, A. ''r· Abernathy, Rennie Howerton, Sid-
ney Neblett, B. C. Elmore, J. Ati. Taylor and W. P. Rogers; 
Whereupon, in accordance with the order of the Court en-
tered on yesterday, the jury, in the custody of the sheriff; 
proceeded to the scene of the collision mentioned in the 
declaration and in the evidence, and had a view of the 
premises, in the custody of the sheriff, and, thereupon, the 
said view having been accomplished, again appeared in Court, 
in the custody of the sheriff; 
Whereupon, the jury having, on yesterday, heard the evi-
dence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, and the evidence 
introduced on yesterday on behalf of the defendants, and all 
the evidence introduced on the trial of this case, and having 
this day heard the instructions of the Court, and the argu-
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ment of counsel, retired to their room, and after some time 
again appeared in Court and reported their verdict, as fol-
lows, to-wit: "We, the jury, upon the issues joined, find for 
the plaintiff, and assess the damages at Five Thousand. Dol-
lars ($5,000.00), B. C. Elmore, Foreman." 
And, thereupon, the defendants, by their attor-
page ·21 ~ ney, moved the Court to set aside the said ver-
dict and grant them a ne·w trial on the ground that 
the said verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence; 
on the ground that the Court erred in granting certain in-
structions requested by the plaintiff and in granting certain 
instructions of its own n1otion in lieu, and amendment, of cer- · 
tain instructions requested by the plaintiff, and in rejecting 
certain instructions requested by the defendants, and in grant-
ing certain instructions of its o'vn motion, in .lieu, and in 
amendment of, certain instructions requested by the defend-
ants; on the ground of the improper admission of testimony 
and of the exclusion of proper testimony, and on such further 
grounds as may be hereafter assigned, as the defendants may 
be advised; 
The hearing and disposition of which said motion is con-
tinued until some future and convenient day; 
And further proceeding·s herein are accordingly continued. 
page 22 ~ And at another day, to-wit: On the 23rd day of 
February, 1938, the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys; 
And, thereupon, the defendants, by their attorney, renewed 
their motion heretofore made on the 4th day of December, 
1937, at this the October Term, 1937, of this Court, to ~et 
aside the verdict of the jury rendered herein on the said day, 
and tQ award them a new trial, on the grounds then assigned, 
including the refusal of the Court, at the conclusion of the tes. 
timony introduced on· behalf of the plaintiff on the trial ~f 
this case, on the 3rd day of December, 1937, to strike out the 
said evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, on the 
ground that the same failed to show any prima facie case of 
liability on the part of the defendants, or either of them, in-
cluding, also, the refusal of the Court, at the conclusion of 
the testimony introduced on behalf of both parties, to strike 
out all the evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, 
on the trial of this c.ase, on the ground that the evidence 
failed to show any prima facie case of liability on the part 
of the defendants, or either of them, and, including particu-
larly the refusal of the Court to strike out the evidence of 
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the witnesses, R. F. Ellis, W. B. Moseley and A. B. Wright, 
introduced on behalf of the plaintiff; which motion, having 
been duly argued by counsel, the Court, for reasons set forth 
in a memorandum opinion this day filed and here-
page 23 r by made a part of the record of this case, doth 
overrule ; to which action of the Court, in over-
ruling the defendants' said motion to set aside the said ver-
dict, and award them a new trial, as aforesaid, the defendants, 
by their attorney, again excepted; 
Thereupon, it is considered by the Court, accordingly, that 
the plaintiff recover of the defendants the sum of $5,000.00, 
with interest thereon from the 4th day of December, 1937, at 
the rate of six per cent per .annum, until paid, and his costs 
by him in this behalf expended, including the costs of the 
panel for the special jury, and of the special jury, heretofore 
ordered herein; and, thereupon, it is further considered by 
the Court that the said sum of $5,000.00 be, after the payment 
of the incidental costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee, shall 
be distributed by the said plaintiff, in equal portions to Prince 
I. Wright and to Pattie Link Wright, the father and moth~r 
respectively, of Carl Allen Wright, deceased; 
And, it being further suggested to the Court that the defend-
ants desire to present a: petition to the Supreme Court of Ap- · 
peals of Virginia for a writ of error and supersedeas to the 
judgment aforesaid, it is ordered that execution of the judg-
ment aforesaid be suspended for a period of ninety days from 
the date hereof, and thereafter, until such petition is acted 
on by the said Supreme Court of Appeals, if such 
page 24 r petition is actually filed ·within the said specified 
time ; provided that the said defendants, or some-
one for them, shall, within fifteen days after the date hereof, 
execute before the Clerk of this Court a bond, with surety 
to be approveP, by the said Clerk, in the penalty of $5,500.00, 
with a condition reciting the judgment aforesaid, and the in-
tention of the said persons to present such petition, and pro-
viding for the payment of all such damages as may accrue 
to any persons by reason of said suspension hi case a super-
sedeas to such judgment be not petitioned for within said 
time, or, if so petitioned for, should not be allowed and be 
effectual within the time so specified. 
68 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
page 25 ~ MEl\fOR.A.NDUM. 
Opinion of the Court on the defendant's motion for a ne~w 
trial. 
The decision of the question arising upon the defendant's 
motion for a ne'v trial obliges us to refer to the evidence, 
and to such parts of the evidence as may be tulcontroverted, 
and thus have established the facts of the case. 
On the late afternoon of l\{ay 23rd, 1937, the plaintiff's 
intestate, Carl Allen Wright, was killed in a collision between 
an automobile driven by the defendant, :Helen Harris, and a 
child's toy wagon in which he and a younger brother were 
riding, and which was propelled by a third child, Ida Valeria 
Culp, of about the same age, who was pushing the wagon. 
Carl Allen Wright was at the time of his death seven years 
and three months' old. He held the tongue of the wagon 
and had been steering it as it proceeded out of the premises 
known, as the Sam W ray place on his way to the residence of 
his grandmother and father, 'vhich was sit:uated across the 
highway some 75 or 80 feet from the road. The children 
were on their way home in response to. a summons from their 
grandmother and were about to cross the road, or in the act 
of crossing the road, when the automobile came upon them. 
The· highway at the point of the accident curves toward the 
South. The Sam "\Vray place where the children had been 
playing until they were summoned to come home by 
page 26 ~ their grandmother, is in the concavity of the curve. 
_ The peculiar situation of the premises is such that 
the road may be said, in effect, to pass throu2'h the curtilage of 
the Prince I. Wlight place. Mr. vVright used the premises of 
the Sam Wray place, which was owned by his father, as a place 
. to stable his cattle. This location is apparently one of the 
oldest settlements in Brunswick County. It is marked by a 
grove of trees, several outbuildings, and an old icehouse. 
The witnesses fix the distance of the icehouse from the place 
where the children debouched with the wagon into the road 
at 100 to 160 feet to the North and in the direction from which 
the automobile 'vas approaching. There was of necessity a 
constant passage between the home of Mr. Wright where his 
children dwelt and the s-am Wray place, which was, in fact, 
in use as an appurtenance of the premises of 1\tir. Wright. 
Leading from the Sam Wray place, as might be expected, was 
a roadway some 9 feet wide, not to be Inore specific, which 
descended by a very gentle slope to the highway. Along 
·this roadway the children had proceeded with the wagon 
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until they came to the highway, where, within a few seconds 
after their arrival at the road, or on the road, the wagon was 
struck and the plaintiff's intestate met his death. 
From this roadway, which led out of the Sam vV ray place, 
and on which the children had been moving, there is towards 
the North at the side of the highway a low growth of bushes, 
grass, and such like shrubbery, which, the defend-
page 27 ~ ant contends rendered the children invisible to the 
owner of the car until it was in their immediate 
presence. The roadway itself was perpendicular to the high-
'vay. 
The defendant, Miss Helen Harris, who was driving the ill-
fated automobile, was returning from Lawrenceville south-
bound to her home at Ebony, Virginia, sonw nine (9) miles 
distant from the pojnt of the accident. Neither the Sam 
Wray place, nor the hon1e of Mr. Wright is enclosed by a 
fence. The yard of the vV right home slopes very gently to-
ward the public road. There are no ditches, properly speak-
ing, on either side of the highway. The highway is a part of 
the secondary road system of Brunswick County, and was a 
soil road in a good state of ,improvement. The· evidence is 
that it was twenty (20) feet 'vide from drain to drain, for 
the watercourse on either side of the roadway may properly 
be described as a drain rather than as a ditch. The only 
witnesses of the occurrence were the defendant, Miss Harris, 
and her mother, who was riding 'vith her, and the two children 
who survived the collision. 
More particularly referring to the highway and its con-
dition at the time, it may be said that the road was slightly 
arched, or crowned, and 'vas at the time covered with some 
loose soil, which is the usual .accompaniment of a traveled 
road. Miss Harris in approaching the scene was 
page 28 }- ascending a slight grade 'vhich began about a hun-
dred yards north of the place of the collision. The 
contention is made by the defendant that the road in itself was 
"a one-way road", and that traffic proceeded along the crest of 
the road rather than on the sides. A description of a road 
as of this character finds no countenance in the statute law 
of the State, pertaining to highways. It is a traveled, ilnproved 
highway, and the statute law applies to roads of this type 
as to the other roads so fa.r as the duties of users of such high-
ways are concen1ed. They must proceed along the right half 
of the road. There is no evidence in the case that the right 
half of the road was impracticable for travel. There is no 
evidence that Miss Harris, ceteris paribus, was driving a.t an 
excessive rate of speed. She estimates her speed at about 
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twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, and there is no witness 
to contradict this statement. 
The plaintiff contends, in reliance upon the testimony of Ida 
Valeria Culp, that the wagon containing the deceased was 
struck before it had ventured out on the road, and while 
it was yet on the edge of the highway where the roadway 
from the Sam Wray place entered the highway. She said 
that she was walking when the wagon reached this point as 
she shoved the wagon along. The plaintiff· founds his case 
upon the contention that Miss llarris was traveling on the 
wrong ~ide of the road and approached the entrance to the 
Sam vVray place on the concave, or inner, side of 
page 29 r the curve, that is, on the left-hand side of the 
curve, that is, on the left-hand side of the 
highway. He contends that the movements of the chil-
dren might have been, with due attention, visible in the 
yard, or open space, in the Sam W ray place where they were 
at play as they started towards the highway and descended the 
slope of the roadway. He contends that there was adequate 
space after }.fiss Harris discovered the presence of the chil-
dren at the highway, or at the edge of the highway, to have 
stopped the car, or else to have veered to her right and, if 
necessary, as· there was no obstruction to the m<;>vement, to 
have turned into the yard of the Wright home on her right-
hand side. The car proceeded some forty ( 40) feet, perhaps, 
after the collision when all possibie assistance was rendered to 
the children, particularly by the mother of Miss Harris, who, 
herself, removed the stricken child to the home of his parents. 
The defendant, o~ her part, submits that she .stopped 
her car as promptly as possible after seeing the children in 
the highway, for she contends. that they were in the highway 
and in the act of crossing the highway, moving suddenly across 
the highway in the path of the automobile on their way to 
the other side of the road. When questioned by counsel in 
the case touching her reasons for not veering to the ·right 
side of the road and into the yard of the Wright home, she 
strangely persisted in maintaining that she thought 
page 30 r that she was restricted to the ro'ad and was not 
at liberty to leave its precincts. 
1\fiss Harris' testimony places the children in front of her, 
in the middle of the road, and within fifteen or twenty feet 
of her ·when they :first appeared. Her contention, in this par-
ticular, is that they made a sudden irruption into the road, 
which could not have been anticipated by her and which per-
mitted her to discover them only when it was too late for her 
to avert the collision with the child's wagon. 
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There is no evidence in the record that the children had 
passed the center of the road and gotten to the right-hand 
side of the road. Some witnesses. have tried to identify the 
possible place of the impact by a scuffed place in the road, 
such as might have been made by a wheel of the child's 
wagon. This was a very uncertain relic of the incident, if 
such it was, and, even this mark does not place the wagon 
on the plaintiff's right-hand side of the road. 
It is not in evidence that the road was unfamiliar to Miss 
Harris. On the other hand, the children were in the habit 
of using the premises of the Sam W ray place as they were 
o~ the evening· of this ca~astrophe, going back and forth from 
their home to the Sam Wray settlement, which, at this time 
was unoccupied by any residents. 
All instructions that were granted on behalf of the plain· 
tiff are assailed by the defendants. 'l have care-
page 31 ~ fully examined these instructions in the light of the 
authorities and shall deal with them very briefly. 
The witness, Ida .Valeria Culp, testified she saw Miss Harris 
when she was as remote from the scene as the icehouse, when 
has been mentioned, coming on the way down the road. This, 
if true, would have made the children visible to Miss Harris 
when she. had reached the point opposite the icehouse, un-
less she were, in fact, driving on the left-hand side of the 
road and her vision on the left-hand side of the car was 
obstructed by the undergrowth which hedged the road, as has 
been, related. . 
Miss Harris' testimony, to be most specific, is that ''she ma.y 
have pulled to the right just a little bit, but, at that time, as 
close as the children were didn't have much time for any-
thing". 
'' Q. Were they steadily coming into the road? 
''A. This child was pushing them and they were coming 
just lilce a flash. 
• 'Q. Did you pull as much ·as you could Y 
''A. As much as I couli& in the time that I had.'' 
And, on cross examination: 
"Q. What would have been the objection to going into 
his yard? (The yard of the Wright home.) 
"A. Well, for the simple reason that every time I have 
been driving r have always been told to. try to stay 
page 32 } to the right side of the road and for that reason 
I was trying to stay to the right side, and I was 
swerving as much as I had time to miss the children.'' 
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'' * * • Q. Did you swerve to your right as much as you 
could after seeing the children Y · 
"A. I did. " 
She, again under examination by counsel for the defendant, 
reiterates her apparent conviction that, at all events, she was 
obliged to stay in the road and was not at liberty to· drive into 
the Wright yard. This testimony the jury 'vere entitled to 
consider for what its significance may have been. The jury 
were also allowed a vie'v of the premises. 
The little girl, Ida Valeria Culp, testified as follows: 
'' Q. How fast were you children going 1 
''A. We were running at first, but when we got our back 
wheels in the ditch line we started to 'valk." 
'' * • • Q. Did you see anything then, Ida.' 
''A. After I got out where I could see, I saw the car. 
'' Q. Where were you then f 
''A. About half wa;y i11. the road 'Where I could see good .. 
"Q. And that is when yon sa'v the car coming! 
' "A. Yes." 
'' * * * Q. About two lengths of the wagon you 
page 33 ~ had gotten into the road f 
"A. Yes." 
She testified that when the children saw the car that they 
"tried to get out of the ·way." 
''Q. What did Carl Allen do, if anythingf 
"A. He turned the wheels in this way .. 
' ' Q. To the left side f 
"A. Yes." 
Th9 clP.f.endant, Helen Harris, testified that, '' .. * * I would 
say tllP. car (automobile) was a little to the right of the center, 
just a little to the right of the center of the road. 
''Q. You mean the· ]eft front 'vheel was? 
''il. Yns, sir. 
'' Q. The left front wheP.l of your car was a little to the 
right of the cP.nter Y 
''A. Yes, sir .. ' ' 
Instructions "X" and "Y'' given by the Court in substance 
charge the defendant with the duty of exercising reasonable 
care to discover the presence of children on the highway, o1· 
in such proximity thereto, as might have caused her to appre-
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herid in the ex~rcise of such care that they mig·ht in obedience 
to some natural impulse suddenly emerge into the highway. 
It recognizes, in other words, the duty of the driver 
page 34 ~ of an automobile to exercise ordinary care to dis-
cover and avoid injury to a child on the highway, 
or in such proximity to the highway, as to make its appear-
ance on the highway not improbable and, therefore, to be ap-
prehended by the defendant in the exercise of such ordinary 
care. The instruction, in effect, tells the jury that under sur.h 
circumstances, it was the duty of the defendant on this occa-
sion when such child was seen on the highway by her, or in 
such proximity to the highway, as that the defendant in the ex-
P.rcise of ordinary care might reasonably have apprehended 
its appearance on the highway in advance of the car to ex-
P.rcise ordinary care ''to provide for'' the safety of such 
child. 
The instruction does no more than charge the defendant 
with the duty of exercising ordinary care for its safety upon 
discovering a child on the highway, if it be on the highway, 
or if in such proximity to the highway, as to make its irrup-
tion into the hig·hway a thing to be apprehended. 
Counsel for the defendant objects to the use of the word 
"discover", and urges that this makes the driver of an au-
tomobile an insurer of the safety of children. "Discover'' 
mP.ans no more than to discern, detect, descry, see. In the 
statute law of Virg·inia, all drivers are charged with the duty 
of keepin,q a proper lookout, regardless of the age of the 
party affected. I 
page 35 ~ Counsel for the defendant also objects to the ex-
pression "provide for". ''Provide for" means 
uo more than to take measures looking to a certain end. This 
phrasP. is in the instruction qualifiP.d by limiting such meas-
ures thus to be employed to those that might have been em-
ployP.d in the exercise of ordinary care, if such, of course, 
were available. 
I find no tm1able objections to Instruction No. 1. 
Instruction ''Y'' relates to the duty of the driver of an 
automobile on the highway to children who may be affected 
by the operation of his automobile to the apparent degree of 
intelligence and capability of the child who is brought within 
tl1e zone of danger. It tells the jury, in fine, that children 
of tender years are commended to a person whose conduct 
n1ay affect their safety according to their apparent age and 
discretion. I see no objection to this construction. 
The instructions, which have ·been the subject of comment, 
are, in 1ny opinion, in respect to their tenor, sustained by the 
following cases: 
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Price v. Burton, 154 S. E., p. 499. 
Ball v. Witten, 154 S. E, p. 547. 
Thresh v. Hackler, 154 S. E., p. 502. 
R. F. T1·ant Co., Inc. v. Upton, 165 S. E., p. 404~ 
Irvine v. Carr, 177 S. E., p. 208. 
lVash v. Holla;nd, 1R5 S. E., p. 2R6. 
I may observe at this. point tha.t th~ Appellate 
page 36 } Court of this State appears to have steadily grown 
more strict in the application of the rules regulat-
ing the operation of automobiles on the highways of the Com-
monwealth with reference to children. These duties may 
entail a marked degree of care and precaution on the part of 
the drivers of automobiles, but they have their basis in a 
solicitude for the welfare of those who are not competent to 
take pains for their own protection. The automobile, so it. 
would seem, is a necessity of modern life, but it is not to be 
permitted to bP.come a J\lloloch to whom weak and helpless 
innocence is to be sacrificed. Not everything must yield to 
consideration of dispatch and haste. Pedestrians, and even 
children, have a right to the use of the highways, and these 
rights approximate the rights of the motion vehicle. 
The roads are for the automobile .. They are made straight 
and smooth for the automobile, but they are made also for the 
convenience of pedestrian traffic, including children who may 
nncessarily have to use them. 
In the remarks which I have made on these instructions, 
I have no desire to reflect upon the sensibility of the excellent 
young lady who was driving· the automobile on this occasion. 
I have in mind only the purpose of pointing out the danger 
of relaxing- the rule of ordinary care which charges the driver 
with the duty of provision in making his way through a settled 
country by the innumerable homes which front 
page 37 } upon the road, and the obligation to be constantly 
vigilant to avoid injury to children in particular. 
Instruction .No. 4 in the familiar instruction, which requires 
the operator of an automobile at all times to keep his car 
under proper control. This is predicated upon the statute. 
It involves a question and applies a principle which is a fac-
toT' in almost every case of automobile collision that may be 
imagined. I see no objection to it. 
Instruction No. 5 charges the jury that the quty of the op-
erator of an automobile is to drive his automobile on the right-
hand side of the road, the right half of the· highway, and that 
f:;.ilure to observe this requirement would be reckless driving, 
if the jury should :find the driver in default. Of course, the 
jury to find against the defendant must find that there was 
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some casual connection behveen her omission to· drive on 
the right-hand side of the highway, if such were the case, and 
the injury to the deceased. 
The point is made against this Instruction by the defend-
ants' counsel that this is a traffic regulation, and that reck-
Jess driving is to be distinguished from mere tortious con-
duct. This is, of course, truP., but it is also true th~t the 
failure to observe any requirement of law as it may operate 
as the proximate cause of an injury to another without con-
tributory negligence is actionable. 
But the query rises: What is traffic and who 
page 38 ~ may have a ·right to assume that traffic regulations 
will be obsP.rved by the driver of an automobile? 
I have said that pedestrians are entitled to the use of the 
hig·hways. No authority need be cited in support of this 
proposition, but is not passage across a road, as well as pas-
sage along a road, traffic? Rqads must be crossed as well as 
traversed. A person whose view is obscured by a curve in 
the road and is thus prevented from seeing the approach of an 
automobile advancing towards him, has a right, I take it, to 
assume that any car coming from the direction not· open to 
his view would be on its proper side of the road. If a per. 
son about to cross a road can see to his left, but the view to 
the left is a view along the right-hand side of a road with re-
spect to vehicular traffic, may he not assume that an automo-
bile proceedin~ in the opposite direction will pass him upon 
the opposite side of the road and leave him in a place of safety 
in observance of this traffic regulation? There would seem 
t0 be no· question upon this point. And, there would further-
more seem to be no question that children at least would be 
entitled to the l;>ene:fit of this presumption of law. 
Two cases havP. been particularly urged upon my attention 
by the defendants' counsel with respect to this Instruction 
and in support of his contention. One in the case of Gale et al. 
v. Wilber, Virginia 175 S. E. 739, where the opinion of Brown-
ing .. T ustice, has to do with an accident which oc-
I>age 39 } curred when an automobile driven by Ethell\ti. Gale 
came into collision with the car driven by Ernest 
Lyons, a youth. Mrs. WHber, the plaintiff, was riding in the 
car at the invitation of 1\Irs. Gale. The opinion of the Court 
evidently regarded Mrs. Wilber as a guest and, therefore, ren-
dered Mrs. Wilber liable only for willfu,l, wcvnton, or reckles.~ 
conduct in the operation of her car. ThP- collision occurred 
wl1en Mrs. GalP. had crossed a sixteen foot portion of the 
boulevard where it was struck on the extreme rear of the left-
hand fender of the Chevrolet automobile driven by the boy. 
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The qircumstances of the accident are not precisely apparent, 
for the Court observes that, 
"* * • the P.Xact position of Mrs. Gale's car when it was. 
struck, the speed of ·the Chevrolet, and whether its driver had 
sufficiP.nt room to turn to his right, out Simpson Street, and 
avoid injury, or whethP.r there was sufficient street room for 
him to have· passP.d ~Irs. Gale's car without striking it, is 
quite conflicting. A significant part of the testimony te-ndered 
to confirm the contentions of the defendants in the admission 
of the boy that his car was skidding * • ·)!<.'' 
The Court gave an Instruction as follo,vs: 
'' ThP. Cmu~t further instructs the jury that under the law 
it is reckless driving· to drive to the left of the cen-
pagP. 40 ~ ter of the street and if you ·believe from the evi-
dence of thP. defendant * * * drove to the left of 
the center of the street, then she was guilty of negligence and 
if you believe that such negligence was a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injury then you should find for the plaintiff * * * 
but this instruction n1ust be read in connection with instruc-
tions 1 and 2.'' 
''This instruction'', says the opinion, ''correctly defines 
'rP.ckless driving' in the terms of the statute, but it 'vas error 
to give it in this case." 
In the case of Morris v. Dame, 161 V. 545, 171 S. E. 662, 
671, it was said: 
''But 'reckless driving', as used in that act "' * * is not used 
with referencP. to the law of torts. 'Whether an act or omis-
sion which is in violation of this statute constitutes reckless-
ness (in the sense of wantonness) within the purview of the 
law of torts depends upon the facts· and circumstances of the 
case, and not upon its classification in this statute under the 
class denominated 'reckless driving'.'' 
In Morris v. Dame to which the learned Justice referred, 
thP. opinion of. the Court was characterized by the usual dili-
gence and acumen of the late lamented Justice 
pa,ge 41 ~ Epes. · The learned Justice elaborates on the dis-
tinction to which 1\{r. Justice Browning merely re-
fers. In Morris v. Da1ne the plaintiff was driviil.g in an au-
tomobile belonging to one, Dame, whose operator it seems 
had no authority from Dame to take up hitch-hikers. 1\forris 
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and his companion 'vere hitch-hikers. This car proc~eding 
along the Lee highway 'vas encountered on the Lee Highway 
near a semi-public road where it communicated with the high-
way by a truck operated by the town of Christiansburg, which 
entered the highway at this point evidently without the ap-
propriate signal of the movement. The plaintiff and his com-
panion, cadets of V. P. I., were held by the Court to have been 
n1ere trespassers in the Dame truck since they were riding 
without authority of the owner, but, if not trespassers, were, 
at most, mere guests to whom the proprietor, Dame, was not 
liable, unless his driver were guilty of ''gross negligence. or 
'vantonly or willfully injuring the plaintiff". The case then 
turned on the question as to the liability of the town of Chris-
tiansburg, co-defendant with Dame. The decision is of in-
t~rest to us here for its discussion of Instruction No. 1 given 
at the instance of the town of Christiansburg: 
''The court instructs the jury that although the law of Vir-
ginia provides that all motor vehicles entering a State high-
way from the side thereof must do so at a speed not in excess 
of five miles per hour, yet the Court tells the jury 
page 42 ~ that they must give a reasonable application to said 
law and that a motor vehicle entering a State high-
way from the road mentioned in the evidence is not required 
to stop and wait for vehicles traveling on said highway, but 
only to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent person 
would use under the circumstances existing at the time of 
entering said highway for their own safety and for the safety 
of others ; and so the court tells the jury if you believe from 
the evidence that an ordinarily prudent person would under 
thP. circumstances have belifwed he could safely enter and 
cross the said highway to the right side thereof without giv-
ing signals and without danger to himself or others, and that 
the driver of the Christiansburg truck in entering and cross-
ing said hi~·hway used such care as an ordinarily prudent 
person woufd have used under the circumstances, then, under 
the circumstances the driver of the Christiansburg truck is 
not guilty of neglig·ence and the jury should find in favor of 
the defendant, the town of Christiansburg.'' 
It seems tl1at the Court had already given an instruction 
for the jury in the following terms: 
page 43 } "The Court instructs the jury that the statute 
law of Virginia defines reckless driving to tnean: 
"(1) The operation of a vehicle in a manner potentially 
offering harm or.injury or damage to any person, property, 
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or thing as a result of the act itself or in combination with 
circumstances, conditions and acts of others: or * * • 
" ( 4) l\faking· a left turn without passing the center point 
of the intersection, whether marked or not, and without first 
signaling his intention so to turn; 
''In this connootion the court tells the jury that if they 
believe from the evidence that the defendant, the to'vn of 
Christiansburg, violated any of the foregoing provisions of 
the statute, then such defendant was g11ilty of reckless driv-
ing; and if they believe such reckless driving proximately 
caused or effectively contributed to cause the plaintiff's in-
juries and damage complained of in his notice of motion for 
judgment, then they should find their verdict against the de-
fendant, the town of Christiansburg.'' 
Mr. Justice Epes held that to bring a person within the 
benefit of the provisions of the statutes regulating traffic, he 
must bring himself within the category of one to 
page 44 } whom the defendant owes a particular duty as 
affected by the failure of the defendant to observe 
the statutory requirements. It was held in the case that the 
court erred in giving the instruction No. 1 requested by the 
town of Christiansburg, because the plaintiff did not appear 
to be a person to whom the defendant's driver owed such a 
particular duty. 
The opinion says : 
)W' j 
''Under a reasonable construction of a statutory provision 
such as those here under consideration, when no. practicable 
or reasonable degree of care and diligence for the safety of 
another would call for the performance of an act required 
thereby, no duty to do the act arises to him as an individual 
• • * Or to state it another way, when a .person is in a posi-
tion Ruch that no praet.icable or reasonable degree of care 
ancl diligence for his safety would call for the performance 
of an act" prescribed by the statute, he is not in the particular 
class of persons for whose protection from injury the pro-
vision of the statute requiring the act was enacted.'' 
For instance, I may observe, if a solitary traveler is pro-
ceeding- on a highway where his view is on every hand bounded 
only hy the horizon, the duty of giving a signal of his inten-
tion to turn from the highway wl}en no person is in range 
to be affected by his act would be nugatory,-a 
page 45 ~ mere idle gesture. This is not to say that a person 
should not always give such requisite signals, ·but 
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it is to say that such signal is to no purpose unless some person 
is to be affected by it. The failure to give such a signal un-
der these circumstances, while a technical violation of the 
statute, would not be in any. sense reckless driving. 
I have referred to the peculiar situation of the Wright 
home and of the barn-yard lot across the highway appurtenant 
to it. I have indicated the fact that the old settlement, known 
as the Sam Wray place is in the concavity of the curve, the 
approach to which from the direction from ·which the auto-
mobile driven by the defendant was making its way in the 
present instance, was, on her O\vn admission, obscured by a 
hedge. I have indicated that the road in reality, while a pub-
lic road, -passed through, or divided, what may be said to be 
the curtilage of the Wright home where the children resided 
with their father and grandmother, and to which the de-
ceased was going· at the time when the automobile struck the 
wagon. Under -these circumstances, I do not think that it 
may be said that these children should be properly excluded 
from the particular class which the traffic 1 regulation requir-
ing the operator of an automobile to usc the right-hand side 
of the highway contemplated. The accident did not occur on 
the right-hand side of the highway, according to the evidence 
introduced on behalf of the defendants ; it may 
page 46 } have occurred just as the toy wagon reached the 
middle of the highway. She testified with refer-
ence to the position of her car at the time of the collision as 
follows: 
"Well, I would say the car was a little on the right of the 
center, just a little to the right of the center of the road. 
'' Q. You mean your left front wheel was Y 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. The left front wheel of your car was a little on the 
right of the center 7 
' 'A. Yes, sir." 
This would, of course, put her car on the right-hand side 
of the hig·hway, but this testimony is somewhat inconsistent 
with the contention of the defendants' counsel that the road 
was a one-way road, so to speak on which travel in the center 
was permissible to all users of the highway. 
~fiss Harris further testified as follows : 
"I would think that I was ten to fifteen feet from them 
(children) at the time when they emerged from behind the 
bushes.'' 
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She says again in answer upon examination ·by her coun-
sel: 
'' Q. W'ere they steadily coming into the road Y 
''A. This child was pushing them and they were coming 
just like a flash. 
page 47 ~ "Q. You mean they came down this little grade 
· here which is desig-nated on the picture W. S.D. 3' 
into the road 7 
''A. Yes, down near that undergrowth." 
The witness, Ida Valeria Culp testified: 
'' Q. When you started toward the road (that is down the 
slope of the roadway leading from the .Sam W ray place) you 
were pushing, I believe Y 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. How fast were you going f 
(.By the Court) 
'' Q. Were you walking or running? 
"A. We were running at first, but when we got our back 
whP.els in the ditch WP. started to walk. 
'' Q. Is there any ditch between the road and the place 
where you go up to Mr. Sam Wray's house¥ 
"A. No, sir. ~ 
"Q. WhP.n you say your wheels got into the ditch, what 
ditch were you talking about? 
''A. In the ditch that comes just out to the road." 
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFEND-
ANT 
Continued 
'' Q. After you had gotten your wheels in the ditch of the 
road, you say you stopped f 
"A. Yes, sir. 
page 48 } '' Q. Did you see anything then, Ida? 
''A. .After I got out where I could see, I saw the 
car. 
'' Q. Which way was the car coming from? 
"A. From Lawrenceville way. 
"Q. Where was the car when yon first saw itf 
"A. It was at the ice house. 
'' Q. On which side of the road was the car then traveling 1 
''A. On this side. 
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'' Q. That is the side of the road you children were on Y 
"A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Was that on the right-hand or left-hand side of the 
·car1 -
"A. Left-hand side of the car. 
'' Q. What did you children do then Y 
''A. Tried to get out of the way. 
'' Q·. ·You tried to get out of the way Y 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. What did Carl Allen do, if anything? 
".A.. He turned the wheels in this 'vay. 
'' Q. Which side of the road did he turn the wheels in Y 
''A. This side. '' 
(By the Court) 
· '' Q. To the left-hand side Y 
"A. Yes." 
page 49 ~ (By Mr. Hammack) 
'' Q. Did the car keep coming Y 
''A. Yes. 
·' Q. Did it keep coming on its left side~ 
''A. Yes. 
(By the Oourt: '' Doil 't lead her".) 
"Q. What happened then? 
''A. The car ran over us. 
Here is direct conflict to the testimony. The child testi-
fied intelligently and clearly that the car driven by the de-
fendant was on the left-hand side of the road where the chil-
dren had paused before proceeding out upon the highway, 
and that the approach of the car 'vas visible when it was ~t 
the ice house. All these points on the W ray place were fa-
miliar to the children for they were constant users of the 
premises. 
In conclusion, upon this question, as to the propriety of 
this Instruction, I am of opinion that the deceased was en-
titled to benefit of the traffic regulation requiring the defend-
ant to adhere to the right-hand side of the highway, as fall-
ing- within the particular class to which Mr. Justice Epes 
refers. 
Instruction No. 8, which the defendant complains of, in-
tends simply to exonerate the deceased from the negligence 
of his companion, Ida Valeria Culp, if such there 
page 50 ~ were, should the jury believe from all the evidence 
that the defendant, Helen Harris, was herself, 
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guilty of negligence. The saving as to the negligence of Miss 
Harris was, indeed, superfluous, and was added out of abun-
dance of caution. I see no objection to the Instruction, ex-
cept that the last clause was unnecessary and unimportant. 
Instruction No. 9 is objected to by the defendant on the 
ground that there is no evidence here upon which to predicate 
an instruction on the last clear chance. In this connection, 
I must recur to the peculiar testimony of J\.Iiss Harris to 
which I have already alluded. 
As has been mentioned the yard of the Wright home slopes 
gently to the highway. There is no barrier, or any sign for-
. bidding access from the road to the yard, no fence and no 
ditch of any consequence. No hedge or bushes intervene at 
the point of the collision. .She 'vas called as an adverse wit-
ness by the pll),intiff and on this point testified: 
'' Q. Is the yard level there Y 
"A. No, it slopes up to the house a little. 
''Q .. As a matter of fact for some distance adjacent to the 
road, .it is practically level with the road, isn't it? 
"A. Well, I wouldn't say it was exactly level. Of course 
you can drive up to it from the road. 
"Q. Any obstructions or anything in the yard? 
"A. vVhat do you mean f 
page 51 } '' Q. I mean, are there any trees, or anything of 
that nature to keep anybody from driving into 
the yard had they seen fit to turn to the right Y 
''A. There are no trees there. 
'' Q. You did not undertake to turn to your right Y 
''A. Not to go up into the yard. 
'' Q. You did not undertake to turn to the right after you 
hnd seen the children Y 
''A. All that I did was try to pull a little bit to the right, 
as bP.st I could with the time that I had and the children com-
ing into thP. road. 
''Q. As a matter of fact you cut to the right just about the 
time you struck the wagon, didn't you? 
''A. Just as soon as I could. 
"Q. Could you swerve to the right? Did you have time to 
swP.rVP. to the right? 
''A. If I had swerved to the right any more I would have 
bP.en over in this yard. I think I pulled a little to the right. 
'' Q. Did you pull as much as you could Y 
''A. As much as I could in the time that I had. 
On cross examination by defe:ndants' counsel, the defendant, 
1\Hss Harris, testified as follows : 
Helen Harris, et al., v. Prince I. Wright, Adm'r. 83 
page 52 ~ '' Q. :Miss Helen, I just understood you to say 
that you could havP. swerved more to your right, 
but in doing· &o you would have gone into Mr. Wright's yardf 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. What would have been the objection to going into his 
yard? 
''A. Well, for the simple reason that every time I have 
been driving I have always been told to try to .stay to the right 
side of the road and for that reason I was trying to stay to 
thP. rig·ht side. I was swerving as much as I had time to miss 
the children. . 
"Q. You figure then that you have always been told to stay 
to the right-hand side of the road and so long as you are on 
the right-hand side of the road you are within your rights!'' 
Objection to question. 
Question ruled proper. 
''Q. That is true, is it not Miss Relent 
. ''A. Yes stay in the road to my right. 
"Q. And on the right-hand side? 
"A. Yes, on the right-hand side of the road. 
'' Q. And notwithstanding the fact that children are in the 
path of your car you would hold your place on the 
page 53 } right-hand side of the road ratl1er than to turn 
into a yard adjacent to the road Y 
''A. I would try to stop as quickly as I could if they were 
on my right side at that time. Yes I would stay in the road. 
''Q. ·You would thinlt then you were complying with the 
law by being on your right-hand side of the road. That is 
eorrect, isn't it? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And that, then, is the reason you .did not drive into 
lVfr. Wright's yard~ 
''A. I would have beP.n off of the hip,·hway then. 
'' Q. And you figure that when a person is driving a car 
he oug·ht to drive it only on the highway, even though, an 
emergency should occur, don't you 7 
''A. Well, I was driving-yes, I would say drive to the 
right side of the road in preference to leaving the road under 
those conditions that existed. · 
"Q. Absolutely. That is your answer to the question asked 
you. Now, you say that when you first saw these children, 
they had ju~t gotten into the ditch on the eastern side of the 
road. That is correct, isn't it? 
page 54~ "A. Yes." , 
Instructi9n No. 1 granted for the plaintiff is an instruction 
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in ordinary form submitting to the jury the question whether 
or not the plaintiff's intestate was of an age to be capable 
of contributory negligence. I see no objection to it. 
The defendants' instructions speak for tl}.emselves, and 
I have no comment to make upon them, except to say that I 
think that the defense to the action was fairly submitted to 
the jury· as it had been fairly reserved in the instructions 
granted by the court and the instructions tendered by the 
plaintiff. 
The case is not without difficulty. Perhaps, if there had 
been a trial of the case independently of a. jury, I might not 
have found the verdict for the plaintiff, but, the jury tried 
thP. case under the instructions of the Court, and, although, 
the Court may dissent from their conclusion, it is without 
power to intervene unless there be some palpable, manifest 
error or law in their verdict. 
I think that, on the whole, the jury were properly instructed 
with reference to the evidence, and that I am without power 
to alter the vPrdict of the jury, who, themselves, had a vie·w 
of the premises and interpreted the· evidence in the form of 
the verdict for the plaintiff. 
A motion for a new trial will be overruled. 
page 55 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court for the County of Brunswick:. 
PrincP. I. Wright, Administrator of :Carl Allen Wright, de-
ceased 
'V. 
Helen Harris and Huff Harris 
In Case. 
The undersigned, M. R. Peterson, Judge of the Circuit 
Court for the County of Brunswick, Virginia, do certify, af-
ter due and legal notice to the parties, by their attorneys, 
that the following-. as hereafter subscribed by me, is a copy 
and report of the testimony and the other incidents of the 
trial of the action of trespass on the case, wherein Prince 
·I. Wrig·ht, as Administrator of Carl Allen Wright, deceased, 
is the plaintiff, and Helen Harris and Huff Harris are the 
defendants, including the instructions granted on the trial 
of tl1e said case in said Court, and the instructions denied by 
the Court, as tendered by the parties, respectively, and also 
including the motions made by the respective parties, during· 
the coursP. of the trial aforesaid, and including the excep-
tions of the parties, respectively, to the instructions denied, 
as prayed for by the respective parties to the case, and of the 
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objections of the parties, respectively, to the instructions 
granted by the C?urt, ?r al?ended by t~e Cour~, as. herein-
after denoted, whiCh said tr1al occurred In the Cu·cu1t 1Court 
for the County of Brunswick, Virginia, on the 3rd and 4th days 
of December, 1937, at the October Term, 1937, of 
page 56 ~ the said Court; a final judgment being· entered 
therein on the 23rd day of February, 1938, at the 
February Term, 193~, of the said Court, to-wit: 
page 57 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Brunswick County. 
Prince I. Wright, Administrator of the Estate of Carl Allen 
~right, deceased 
v. 
Helen Harris and Huff Harris. 
Testimony and other incidents of the trial ,of the above en-
titled cause which was heard at Lawrenceville, Virginia, on 
December 3rd and 4th. 1937, before lion. ].£arshall R. Peter-
son and a .T ury. · 
Present: L. J. Hammack, Esq., Counsel for plaintiff. 
A. S. Harrison, Jr., Esq., Counsel for defendants . 
... 1\fter the .Jury was sworn to try the issue joined, counsel 
for defendants moved the Court that the plaintiff's witnesses 
be sworn and excluded. Thereupon the plaintiff's witnesses 
were callP.d, sworn and excluded and the defend-
page 58 ~ ants' witnesses were sworn. 
Mr. Harrison: (Out of the presence of the Jury) I note 
that thP. plaintiff has just broug·ht into the Court room and 
placed immediately in front of the Jury and by the chair 
occupied by counsel for the plaintiff, a toy wagon in which 
plaintiff's intP.state was riding at the time he was killed. 
There is no question about how the plaintiff's inte.state met 
his death. It is not denied that he was killed while riding 
in a wagon on a hi~:hway. Tho sole purpose of bringing the 
wag-on into Court is to create sympathy in favor of the plain-
tiff and is objectionable. Counsel for defendants moves the 
Court to P.Xclude the 'vagon from the courtroom and that the 
plaintiff be not permitted to introduce it in evidence as it will 
tend to prejudice, bias and influence the Jury. 
ThP. Court: The Court cannot, if counsel f.or defendants 
is correct is his anticipation of what the evidence will be in 
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this case with reference of the remnant of the wagon pro-
duced in evidence, undertake to divest the case of the fact that 
the plaintiff's intestate was ldl~ed in the wagon and that the 
wag·on was injured. I do not think this is a circumstance to 
affect the case prejudicially to the plaintiff any more than 
thP. fact of the killing itself would be a~1d the fact of killing 
is not the issue in the case but the circumstances under which 
the killing occurred. The 1notion is overruled. 
page 59 ~ 1\IIr. Harrison: Counsel for defendants excepts 
for the rP.asons statP.d in the motion. 
Thereupon opening statements were made to the Jury by 
counsel for plaintiff and defendants. 
WILLIAM B. PRICE, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
ExaminP.d by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. You are a surveyor, I believe, 1\-fr. Price? 
A. Yes, so-called. · 
Q. PlP.ase state whether or not you made a survey or draw-
ing of a road, a portion of R.oute No. 644, in front of the resi-
dence of :Mr. R. A. W rig·ht, some time ago? 
A. I did, sir. 
Q. When was that survey made, l\ir. Price? 
A. I think thP. date is on the rna p, l\IIr. Hammack. I think 
you have it before you. 
Q. It is dated November, 1937. 
A. Around about the :first, something around the first. 
Q. At whose request, Mr. Price, did you make this sur-
vey? 
A. Joint request of counsel in the case. 
Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you make the sur-
page 60 ~ vey at the request of Mr. Harrison? 
· A. Yes, sir, with your cooperation. 
Q. Then after thP. survey had been made isn't. it a fact that 
I requested you to furnish me with a copy of the map? 
A. EithP.r just before or just after. I couldn't just ex-
actly say which. 
Q. Do you recall my having seen you one day on the street 
and told you that l\Ir. Prince Wrig·ht told me that you were 
n1aking the survev over there Y 
A. Yes, something like that. 
Q. I had said nothing to you about it up until that time Y 
Helen Harris, et al., v. Prince I. Wright, Adm'r. 87 
William B. Price. 
A. That is not very clear. The occasion is not very clear 
in my n1ind. 
Q. I asked you to make me a copy of your :findings 7 
A. That is right 
Q. That road is known as number what? 
.A. I couldn't tell you right offhand. 
Q. :Commonly known as the road from Lawrenceville to 
Ebony7 
A. The Ebony road we usually speak of it. 
Q. It leads by Mr. Floyd Temple's storeY 
A. Yes, sir, and to White Plains. 
Q. And then on to White Plains Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 61 } By the Court: 
Q. Is that the road from Diamond Grove to 
Bowers' Corner t 
A. Yes. 
l3v Mr. Ifammack: 
··Q. Mr. Wrig·ht's residence is between Floyd Temple's store 
and White Plains? 
A. I think so. 
Q. The road runs practically north and south, I believe t 
A. North and South. · 
Q. Going toward Ebony would be going south 7 
A. South. 
Bv the Court! 
·Q. Is this the map you made, Mr. PriceY 
A.. Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you offer it in evidence Y . 
1Ir. Hammack: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Mark it Exhibit No. 1. 
. 
Note : The map was filed and marked Exhibit No. 1. 
Bv ~f. r. Hammack: 
··o. Of course, ].fr. Price, you know nothing about how the 
accident took place 7 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Or even where it happened Y 
page 62 ~ A . .A.ny. more than generally. 
. Q. What is the distance, Mr. Price, from the 
point marked X to the point marked Y on your map! 
A. 43 feet. 
Q. T~e distance from X to Y is 43 feet! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At what point on the road is Y supposed to be located t 
A. Supposed to be on the crown of the road, near the center 
of the entrance to the old Sam W ray place. 
Q. Y then is supposed to be at the summit or crest of the 
hillY 
A. Yes, sir, p·ractically at the crest of the hill .. 
Q. And at the center of the road Y 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state, Mr. Price, whether or not proceeding from 
Lawrenceville to the point marked Y there is an upgrade for 
some distance before reaching there t 
A. Considerable upgrade. 
Q. For about what distance wquld you say t 
A. About 150 feet. 
Bv the Court: 
· Q. Toward the south? 
A. ·Yes, and it rises about 12 feet in the 150 feet. 
Q. Where does it start upgrade Y 
page 63 ~ A. It starts-
Q. Going toward Ebony? 
A. I am wrong-250 feet instead of 150. 
Q. Where does it start as you come toward the south go-
ing from Lawrenceville toward Ebony f As you proceed from 
Lawrenceville toward Ebony whe!:e does thP. ridge start? 
A. About 250 feet from this entrance. It starts right here 
at this point (indicating). 
Q. This is toward Ebony? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
-- .. -
By Mr. ·Hammack: 
Q. Then for a distance of 250 feet coming· from Lawrence-
ville toward Ebony, before you reach the point Y, there is a 
considerable upgrade Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the· Court: 
Q. What do you mean by a considerable upgra-de? Do you 
know what the grade is Y 
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·A. At the point of the accident it is 12.2 feet. 
Q. Rise? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In 250 feet' 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 64 ~ By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Then thP.re is a 12.2 foot rise within a dis-
tance of 250 feet? 
A. Approximately, yes. 
Q. Please state, Mr. Price, the furthest distance fron1 
'vhich the eye, five feet from the ground, could see an object 
three feet from the g'l'ound at the point X? 
A. 118 feet I think it is marked, this point here. Three 
feet abovP. the ground can be seen by the eye five feet above 
the crown of the road 11.8 feet distant. This point is 7.2 feet 
below Y. · 
Q. As I understand your evidence, a person down the road 
toward Lawrenceville 118 feet from Y can see an object three 
feet high at X which is 43 feet from Y? 
A. Yes, sir, providing they 'vere looking directly at that 
point. ThP.y had to be looking there. 
Q. Answer my questions, ~:fr. Price. 
The Oourt: He has a right-
A. I have a rig·ht to give it that way. 
By 1\fr. Hammack: 
~ Q. Answer the question again then-if a person were look-
ing, hP. could see an object to his left 118 feet, even though 
that object were 43 fP.et from the center of the road to the 
left? 
A. Yes, sir, but he would have to be looking 
page 65 } closely for it. 
Q. Now, J\tir. Price, please state, if you can, how 
far down the road to,vard :LawrP.nceville an object could be 
seen, say, twenty feet from YY 
A. I expect you would havP- to be within fifty or sixty feet 
of it. 
Q. One second. 
1\fr. Harrison: That is his anwer. 
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Bv Mr. Hammack: 
~ Q. How far down the road toward Lawrenceville would a 
person have to be to see an object twenty feet east-
A. Twenty feet west. 
Q. No, twenty feet east of Y if he could see that same ob-
ject a distance of 118 feet 43 feet east. of Y? 
A. He would have to be at least within fifty feet of it on 
account of downhill and projecting bluff because the point 
that you designate there is lower than X. 
Q. How far could a person coming· from Lawrenceville, go-
ing south, see an object on the western side of the highway? 
The Court: Eastern or western? 
Mr. Hammack: Western, immediately opposite Y. 
::Mr. Harrison: Eastern, you mean? 
Mr. Hammack: Eastern, yes, sir. 
A. Let me get this plain. In other words, the object stand-
ing here, you would like to know how far it would 
page 66 ~ be down this road before you could see it at this 
point? 
By the Court: 
Q. At what distance would it first come in view? 
A .. I couldn't say. It would be considerable, though. 
Bv 1\{r. Hammack: 
~ Q. You could see, it, though? 
Mr. Harrison: I object to the statement made by Mr. Ham-
mack. 
By ~fr. Hammack: 
Q. You could see it a considerable distance? 
ThP. Court: Let Mr. Price answer the question. 
A. I told him it would be a considerable distance. I couldn't 
be definite. 
Bv tl1e Court: 
· Q. You couldn't define ''considerable'' Y 
A. No, sir. 
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Bv ~Ir. Hammack: 
. ., Q. Mr. Price, will you· state what is the condition of the 
yard in front of Mr. Wright's residence up to that point of 
the hig·hwayT 
.l\ .. I didn't exactly obtain that but just as a gentle incline 
for possibly 35 or 40 feet from the road and then it flattens 
- out-no vegetation. 
page 67 ~ Q. No vegetation? 
A. At the date I was there in November. 
Q. The yard for some distance,is practically level with the 
roadY 
A. No, it is a little, slight upgrade. It rises three feet in 
fifty. 
Bv the Court: 
~Q. You have on this map a legend here ''Old Sam Wray 
HousP.. '' What do you mean by that? 
A. It is the old Sam Wray house. · I put it on there for 
identification. · 
Q. On the other hand, you have got another figure, more 
or less irregular, denominated ''Mr. Wright's residence." 
What is that? 
.A.. That is a house. That is 94 feet from the road. These 
were put on there purely £or identification. 
By a Juror: 
0. Those children were coming back toward the house: 
A. I don't know anything about that. 
Q. They were on this side of the road Y 
The Court: He doesn't know anything about that. He 
just made the survey. 
page 68 ~ CROSS EXAl\1INATION. 
Bv ].{r. Harrison: 
· Q. Mr. Price. 'viii you state for the benefit of the Jury the 
location of the Wright house on this map? 
A. The south end of the Wright house is approximately 
P.xactlv opposite the center of the drive. If you gentlemen 
will allow me to say this-I don't know whether I ought to 
f:lay it-where I 'vas told the children were-
. ·The Court: That is not proper. 
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By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Opposite Y? 
A. Opposite Y then. 
By the Court: 
Q. You have a space in there· in which two sides converge 
from the east to the road, the extent of which is indicated by 
X and Y. What is that space in there 1 · 
A. That is the driveway to the old Sam W ray house. 
Bv Mr. Harrison: 
~ Q. Is that space or driveway a road or an entrance Y 
A. It is an entrance road. 
Q. Is it a public road 1 
A. You are asking me something else. 
Q. Is it a private road 1 
A. I expect it is a private road. 
page 69 } Q. What is the distance fron1 the Wright house 
which lies to the east of the Lawrenceville-Ebonv 
road, from the highway Y .. 
A. 94 feet. 
Q. Does you map show-
A. That is the center of the· roa¢1, 94 feet. 
Q. Does your map show an ice-house located near the prem-
ises? · 
A. No, I don 7t see anything of an ice-house. 
Q. Will you state on your map about where this ice-house 
is located Y 
A. I couldn't because I didn't notice that. If I had I woulcl 
have put it on there. 
Q. Will you state whether or. not there are any trees lying 
to the east of the highway as you approach' 
A. Yes, sir, a very dense copse or hedge-row. 
Q. Will you state what this hedge-ro'v consists of, the type 
of weeds or trees 1 
A. Weeds-bushes. 
Q. Any trees there Y 
A. Yes, sir, different kinds-oaks. 
Q. Any large trees 1 
A. Well. relatively speaking, some are six or eight inches 
in diameter, ten, twelve, fifteen, eighteen or twentv feet 
high. ~ 
page 70 ~ Q. With reference to your map, where does tl1is 
dense undergrowth begin 1 
A. It begins at a point approximately 190 feet from ·Y. 
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Q. Is all of this undergrowth located to the east or left of 
the highway as one drives south on the road 1 
A. To the left. It is on a bank between three and four feet 
above the road. 
By the ·Court: 
Q. How is it indicated on the map' . 
A. It is indicated ·on the rna p by a small circle of bushes 
and the bank is indicated by a solid bank, the slope of the 
banlt. 
Q. In that shaded portion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By l\1r. Harrison: 
Q. I see on your map to the left or east of the highway at 
a point 100 feet from the entrance the words ''High Bank.'' 
Is that the bank you are referring· toY 
A. Yes, sir, the ground is 3.3 feet above the cro\vn of the 
road. 
Q. That bank is R3 feet above the road itselfY 
A. Approximately about this high (indicating). 
Q. Your survey was made from what point to Y, that is the 
distance north of Y 7 
pag·e 71 } A. What distance north of Y Y 
Q. What distance north of Y did you make a 
survey? 
A. 650 feet. 
Q. You 1nade a survey 650 north of the point Y Y 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. Will you state the elevation of a point designated on 
your ·map as Point 2 which is 450 feet from pointY; that is, 
state that elevation with reference to point Y. 
A. 12.2 fP.et below. 
By the Court: 
Q. What do you mean by ''below''? 
A. Below this point. 
Q. That is indicated as belo\v Y, marked on this plat 12.2 
feP.t below YY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Whe'n you say "this" or "that" it doesn't mean any-
thing- in the record until you identify it. 
Bv :1\{r. Harrison: 
··Q. Will you state the elevation of a point designated on 
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·your map as Point 4 'vhich is approximately 200 feet from 
YY Ph~ase state that elevation with reference to Point Y. 
A. About 12.2 feet below it. 
Q. Then I understand that the road is level from point 2 
to Point Yf 
page 72 ~ A.. Approximately so. 
Q. I mean from Point 2 to Point 4 and that from 
Point 4 on your map to Point Y there is. a rise upgrade of 12 
feet 2 inchP.s? 
A. 12.2 feet. 
By the Court: 
Q~ Is the width of the road there uniform Y 
A.. Practically so, Judge. 
Q. Is it a hard surfaced road Y 
A. No, sir, dirt surface. 
Q. Improved roadway' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Any ditches on the side at the pointY~ 
A. I should call them gutters more than ditches. 
Q. You mean something like drains Y 
A. Yes, sir, because you can drive into them and drive out. 
Q. \Vhat did you say the 'vidth of the road was? 
A. About 20 feet. 
Q. I notice from ocular appearances here on this plat-
A. This seems to be the narrowest point between the ditches 
at the pointY- about a foot. 
Q. I notice from ocular appearances of the plat here there 
sP.ems to be a curve of which apparently Y is the utmost 
point of convexity? 
A. It is 50 feet from Y to where the curve 
page 73 } ends. 
Bv a Juror: 
., Q. Was this road level where the child was struck? 
A. No, sir, right up on the apex of a hill like my finger is. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. liere is the crest of the hill? 
A. Point Y ·was the crest of the hill. 
By the Court: 
Q. Mr. Price, the Sam Wray residence appears to be on 
the concave side of the curve of this road; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir, on the inside. 
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Q. The Point Y appears to be about at the point of utmost 
convexity there; is that right? 
A. No, sir, it is about 50 feet south of the middle of the 
-curve. 
Q. 50 feet south of the utmost point of convexityY All 
right. That is where the bend begins to break, about 50 feet 
south? · 
A. Yes, sir, and straightens out again. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. With reference to Point 5 on your map that you indi-
cated to those gentlemen, could you state the ele-
page 7 4 ~ vation there as compared with Point Y, that being 
a distance of 150 feet from Y Y 
A. That point is 7.2 feet below Y. 
Q. 7.2 feet below Y7 
A. Below Y. 
Q. Will you state whether or not at that point an object 
three feet above the ground at a point which you have desig-
nated on your map as Point X is visible 150 feet distance, 
that is at Point 5? 
A. An object visible fiv:e feet from the ground, it is not. 
Q. I understood from your testimony that an object three 
feet above the ground at Point X was visible to the. eye, at 
the time you made this map, at a point 118 feet north of Y. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the first point that such an object becomes vis-
ible? 
A. If you were looking for it. A casual observation I don't 
think you would notice it. 
Q. ·What experiment did you make, Mr. Price? How did 
you designate the object at Point X? 
A. I took the center of this driveway at the summit of 
the slope in the road, right in the middle of the driveway. I 
stuck a red and white striped rod up there, what 
page 75 ~ we call our transit rod which has alternate red and 
white marks, one foot. I had a large bandamia 
handkerchief, one of the most visible objects that I suppose 
've can have to see. I tied that around the rod and I kept on 
walking up the road with my eye on the rod looking for it 
and 118 feet was the first glimpse I caught of it and I just 
then could see the top of it, not over the grass but through 
the grass. 
Q. I understand that your· testimony is that you stuck 
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your surveyor's rod in the ground ·with a red bandanna hand-
kerchief on top of it at Point X! 
A. Yes. 
Q. That you then went north on the highway f 
A. Correct. 
Q. And came back south? 
A. Started at l50. 
Q. Looking for this red handkerchief on top of a red and 
white pole! 
A. 1res, sir. · 
Q. And the :first time that became visible while you were 
looking for it was at a point 118 feet from Point 1[; is that 
true! 
A. 1[ es, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. Is that road flat or crowned t 
· A. It is crowned. 
page 76 ~ Q. At Point Y? 
A. It is crowned about seven inches. 
Q. What is the relation in point of elevation of Point X 
to Point Y on that plat 1 
A. I think it is three feet. 
Q. Wl:tich is the higher point t 
A. X. 
By Mr. Harrison: . 
Q. Point X t6 PointY is 43 feetf 
A. I think it is nmrked 43 feet. 
Q. Point Y was taken in the center of the entrance to the 
east_ of the highway Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. PointY is the center of the highway itself? 
A. Yes, sir, X is higher than Y andY is lower than X. 
By the Court: 
Q. What is the width at the side of the road of tlfe so-called 
di·iveway, about the center of whicl1 you placed Y ~ 
A. The distance between the ditches is 21 feet. 
Q. Is there a ditch on each side of that? 
A. What I call the edge of the road, 'vhere the crown of 
the road starts up. 
Q. Do you catch 1ny Ineaning·? You have got a space there 
which you call a drivew·ay. ~{r. Harrison has re-
page 77 ~ ferred to it. He says it is not exactly a road-an 
entrance, and in that entrance you have got two 
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points designated, one at the center of the road marked Y 
and the other in the interior marked X. You state there is a 
difference in elevation between X andY. What is the width 
at the side of the road of that driveway, if you call it a drive-
way? 
_ A. Taken in the flare, the utmost width of the flare, it is 
approximately 50 feet but this little entrance itself at the 
Point X is only about eleven feet wide. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Will you state whether or not a person approaching the -
brow of the hill, designated as Y, can see, over that hill, an-
other car as it comes up the hill to Y from the south Y 
A. I am rather inclined to think he might glimpse the top 
of' it. 
Q. At what point on the map, how many feet down the 
road? 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you kno\v, l\1r. Price? 
A. He would have to be some 300 or 400 feet. If he was 
close on to it, possibly right down where the hill starts up, 
it would be questionable \vhether he could see it. 
By ~{r. Harrison: 
Q. ~Ir. H~mmack asked you who asked you to 
page 78 ~ make this map. I requested you to go out and 
make the survey Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did I go out there with you? 
A. No one went with me. 
Q. Did I send anyone out with you Y 
A. No, and, besides, I "rish to make this statement: I 
would like to make it in justice to all parties concerned. ~{r. 
Harrison, when he asked me to go out and make the map, 
'vhen I went over to find out \vhat the row was about, he 
started to g·ive me some facts in the case and I said, "Mr. 
Harrison, I don't want to know anything at all. I just want 
to kno'v where you want this map made. I would rather not 
know these points at all". 
Q. 1N either l\rir~ Hammack nor I was there Y 
A. No. 
Q. Was 1\.fr. Huff Harris there! 
A. No. 
Q. Was :Miss Helen Harris there 1 
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A. No.· I did encounter Mr. vVright and I think that gen-
tleman bAhind Mr. Hammack. I don't even know his name. 
They really answered what questions I asked. 
Q. Mr. Wright! 
A. And there was no more said. lie had a little boy with 
him and I did ask him was the little child in the accident and 
he said "Yes". That is about the really only per-
page 79 ~ tinent facts I asked him about. I didn't even ask 
him where the child was struck. I didn't even want 
to know. I am doing that in justice to the two gentlemen 
. here. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Hammack: 
Q. You have been very fair in stating that you know noth-
ing about the facts of the case at all. 
A. No. 
Q. You made this diagram or drawing of the roadway Y 
A. At your all's request, for your information. 
Q. You say you did see some of the Wrights Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They passed by there Y 
A. No, they came out to where I \vas. 
Q. It was right in front of ~fr. Wright's? 
A. Right in front of the house. 
Q. They took no part in it at alU · 
A. None at all. 
Q. Merely answered questions! 
A. "Good Morning", and "Good Evening", and I did ask 
was the little child-I commented on the little child and I 
did ask him was this one of the little children in the accident 
and he said "yes". 
page 80 ~ Mr. Hammack: I call Miss Helen Harris, under 
the statute, as an adverse witness. 
HELEN HARRIS, 
one of the defendants, called as a witness by the plaintiff, and 
b~ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Exan1ined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. You are the daughter of Mr. Huff Harris Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You teach school, I believe, at Ebony'l 
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.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were driving your father's car the day of this ac-
cident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was with his permission, of course? 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. Where had you been, Miss Harris? 
.A.. I had been to Lawrenceville. 
Q. For what purpose did you come to Lawrenceville? 
A. To bring my sister ~ho teaches here in school. 
Q. Who else was \\ith you, Miss Harris 1 
A. My mother. ' 
Q. Was the day clear 7 
A. Yes. 
page 81 r 
Q. Was the road dry 7 
A. Yes. , 
Q. You were not in a hurry? 
A. No. 
Q. What type of car was this that you were drivingY 
A. You mean the Chevrolet Y 
Q. Yes; what model? 
A. '34. 
Q. Was it a coach or sedan 7 
A. Coach. 
Q. 1\'Iaster. or standard Y 
A. I guess you would call it a Master. 
By the Court: . 
Q. Was it the big one or little one Y 
A. I guess you call it the Master, "the one with the knee 
action. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Equipped with four-wheel brakes Y 
A. :Yes, sir. 
Q. The brakes were in good working order, I assume 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. The car had just been adjusted a short time before that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say you were not in a hurry going 
page. 82 } back? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there any traffic on the road at the point of the 
collision, :Miss Helen Y 
A. No. 
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Q. You weren't meeting anyone! 
A. No. 
Q. You hadn't passed anybody! 
A. Not at that point. I don't know when I had passed 
anyone. 
Q. And nobody had passed you immediately before then f 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. It is right much of an upgrade for a distance of about 
250 feet before you get to the crest of the hill or to the point 
of impact, isn't it, lVIiss Helen Y 
A. Yes, there is an upgrade. 
Q. How fast wottld you say you were going at that time f 
·A. Between twenty-five and thirty miles an hour. 
Q. Between twenty-five and thirty miles .an hour~ 
A. Yes, I 'vill say around thirty miles an hour. 
Q. When did you first see these children¥ 
A. When they emerged from behind these bushes to the 
left, coming out of this little side entrance there. 
Q. How far were you from them at that time? 
A. Well, I would say approximately 15 feet, 10 
page 83 ~ or 15 feet. ' 
Q. Had your mother seen them before that time f 
A. ;No, I think we saw them at the same time. 
Q. The road was practically level there, was it not, :Miss 
Harris! 
A. Of course there is a little ditch on each side, not exactly 
a ditch but you know ho'v the road slopes. 
Q. Did you apply your brakes before striking them Y 
A. I applied my brakes as soon as I saw them. 
Q. Do you know 'vhether your brakes took effect or not, 
immediately Y 
A. I really couldn't say. They took effect as soon as they 
could. 
Q. On which side of the road were you traveling, lVIiss 
HelenY 
A. I was traveling, as the road is, probably a little. to the 
right of the way the driver-
Q. As a matter o~ fact, isn't it the tendency of everybody 
going· around that curve, going south to,vard Ebony, to drive 
somewhat to the left? 
A. I wouldn't think so. 
Q. Doesn't the main traveled portion of the high,vay in-
dicate that' 
A. No, I thin~ it is in the center. 
Q. Miss Harris, was there anything to your right at all 1 
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A. Not that I know of. . 
page 84 } Q. This happened almost in front of ~Ir. R. A. 
Wright's residence, did it not! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is the yard level there 1 
A. No, it slopes up to the house a little. 
Q. As a matter of fact, for some distance adjacent to the 
road it is practically level with the road, isn't itY 
A. Well, I wouldn't say it was exactly level. Of course, 
you can drive up in there from the road. 
Q. Any obstructions or anything in the yard Y 
A. What do you mean 1 . 
Q. I mean are there any trees or anything of that nature 
to keep anybody from driving in the yard had they seen fit 
to turn to the right 7 
A. No, there are no trees there . 
. The Court : See fit to do what 1 
Mr. Hannuack: Turn to the right and go into the yard out 
of the road. . 
The Court: In whose yard 7 
Mr. Hammack: R. A. Wright's yard. 
A. No,· there are no trees to the yard. 
By Mr. Hammack: . 
Q. You did not undertake to turn to your right Y 
A. Not to 0'0 up in the yard. Q. You did not undertake to turn to the right 
page 85 } after you had seen the children Y 
A .. All that I did was try to pull a little bit to 
the right, as best I could with the time that I had and the 
children coming into the road. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you cut to the right just about the 
time you struck the wagon, didn't you Y 
A. Just as soon as I could. 
Q. Now, let me ask you this: You were coming this way, 
going south toward Ebony. That indicates that you cut to 
your right just about the time you struck the wagon, doesn't 
itY 
A. I cut to my right? 
The Court: That does not mean anything in the record. 
You said "that indicates''. 
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By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Does not the mark on the wagon indicate that you cut 
to your right just as you struck the wagon¥ 
A. I cut to my right just as I saw the children and as I 
applied my brakes. 
Q. Do you know how far the point of impact on the wagon 
with your car was from the left-hand side of the ditch line 
or do you know about that¥ 
A. Repeat the question. 
Q. flow far from the left-hand ditch line is the point of 
impact between the left-hand wheel of your car 
page -86 ~ and the right-hand side of the wagon Y 
The Court: What is that question¥ 
Mr. Harrison: I don't understand it myself. I sug·gest 
the witness be handed the map and asked to indicate. 
The Court : If the witness can understand the question, I 
will let the question be answered. 
By l\{r. Hammack: 
Q. What I want to know is this: Do you recall the point 
of impact between your car and the wagon on this road? 
A. Yon mean where it struck Y 
By the Court : 
Q. Where the two vehicles came together 1 
A. Not exactly but it was somewhere near this point, I 
think. 
The Court: What point is that? 
Mr., Harrison: Indicating a point approximately 25 to 
30 feet north of a point desig-nated on the map as Y. 
By l\£r. Ha.mmack: 
Q. Do you know how far that was from your left-hand side 
of the road? 
A. At the time that I hit¥ 
page 87 ~ The Court: Was what from the left-hand side 
of the road? 
1\fr. Hammack: The point of impact from the ditch line of 
l1er left-hand side of the road. 
The Court: How far was what from the ditch line 1 
J\!Ir. Hammack: The point of impact between the wagon and 
the left-hand wheel of her car. 
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By. the Court: 
Q. If you can answer that, go ahead. 
A. I don't know the width of the road exactly. 
Mr. Harrison: I suggest the witness be asked with refer-
ence to the center line. 
The Court: You can examine the witness. I don"t tliink 
the questions are improper. 
By Mr. Hammack: · 
Q. J\tiiss Helen, of course, I imagine you were excited after· 
this happened, were you not? · · · 
A. Yes, of course, anyone would under those conditions. 
Q. About how far did your car go after the impact before 
coming to rest Y 0 
A. I should say around thirty feet. 
Q. Around tl1irty feet before coming to rest Y 
A. I think so. 
Q. You made no measurements, of course, at that 
page 88 ~ time or no examina tipn of the road to see just 
· where the point of impact was Y . 
A. No. 
~fr. Harrison: I will examine her on direct examination 
later on. 
HUNTER vVRIGHT, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and being :first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by ~Ir. Hammack: 
Q. Your name is Ifunter Wright? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a brother, I b~lieve, of ~{r. Prince I. Wright? 
A. I am. . 
Q. Where do you live, 1v!r. Wright? 
A. Roanoke R.apids. 
0 Q. Were you at your father's house, R. A. Wright's resi-
dence, on Sunday, May 23rd of this year? · 
0 
A. I was. 
· Q. Were you there at the time a child .of Mr. Prince I. 
Wright was hurt or injured by an ~utomobile operated by 
Miss Helen Harris f 
A. I was. 
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Q. Where were you at that particular time Y 
page 89 ~ .A. At the well, the pump. 
Q. vVill you please come oyer to the Jury and 
point out just where the 'vell is with reference to your father's 
house! 
A. Right along in here. 
The Qourt : Write ''well'' there. 
By ~Ir. Hammack: 
Q. What were you doing there, 1\(r. Wright! 
A. Fixii~g· to water the mules. 
Q. How long had you been home f 
A. About fifteen minutes, I reckon. 
Q. How had you gotten there Y 
A. In a car. 
Q. What did you do with your automobile! 
A. Parked it in the yard. 
Q. In front of the house f 
A. Right by the house. 
Q. Did you, from the well, where you were watering the 
mules, observe the children· playing on the other side of the 
road? 
A. They were coming up the hill from the other side of 
the road, coming toward the house. 
Q. Please point out on the map where the children were 
when you first saw them f _ 
A. The section of the road Y 
Q. Yes. 
page 90 ~ A. About where that tree is. I don't know ex-
actly where that is. 
Q. What does this represent bereT Where does this en-
trance into the road-
The Court: Tell him wh.at that represents on the niap. 
By I\{r. Hammack: 
Q. This space in here represents-
The Court: The driveway up to the ·Sam Wray house. 
By Mr. Hammack: · 
Q. From wl1at direction were the children coming! 
A. From over toward the Sam Wray house. 
Q. What had . they been doing over there! 
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A. Been playing, I think. 
Q. Why did they start back to the house! 
A. I think Mama called them to come to the house. 
Q. Did you hear your mother call them 1 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you see your mother 7 
A. .She was in the front yard. 
Q. What became of your mother thenf 
A. Started to the house, I think. 
Q. Then when did you next see the children Y 
A. I didn't see them any more until one came 
page 91 } off the fender of the car after he was hit. 
· Q." Then you did not actually see the impact of 
the car with the child 7 
A. What is that? 
By the Court: 
Q. You didn't see the collision between the car and the 
child? 
A. No. 
By Mr. Hamntack: 
Q. At what point on the road was the car when you saw 
the child on the fender or bumper? 
A. About the middle of the road. 
Q. At what point did the child get off of the bumper or 
fall from the bumper Y 
The Court: Ho'v do you mean-,vith reference to that 
map or in distance?. I 'viii say this, in fairness to the witness, 
that he hasn't made these measurements here. I don't know 
that he has seen the map. I let him indicate the well with 
refP-rencP. to the house there but ask him as to the distancP. in 
feet or yards, which side of the Sam W ray house, north or 
south, something that he will be able to approximate. He 
can't speak from that map. 
page 92 } By Mr. Hammack: . 
Q. On 'vhich side of the road did Car 1 Allen 
Wright, the child that died, first come to rest after the col-
lision? 
A. The left. 
Q. On the left-hand side Y 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
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Q. Going toward--
A. Toward Ebony. 
Hunter lV right. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Was he in the road or on the ditch line or out of the 
road to the left 1 
A. Olean out of the road in the bank. 
Q. ""\Vas there anything in the road there to indicate to 
you the point where the car struck the child, which striking, 
you say you did not see T 
A. Where the wagon cut into the road and the wagon 
crushed down into the road. 
By the Court: 
Q. What did you say? 
A. Where the car crushed the wagon down into the dirt 
of the road. 
page 93 ~ By :Nir. Hammack: · 
Q. On which side of the road were those places 
in the earth dug up by the 'vagon, would you say? 
A. To the left. 
Q. Did you see anyone else in your presence make any 
. measurements of the distance of that point of collision from 
the extreme left-hand side of the road? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you present when they were made Y 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. Was there anything there to indicate the point where 
the child and car came together other than the dug up places 
in the ground which the wagon made Y · . 
A. No, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you see the dug· up places in the ground 1 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Bv 1\fr. Hammack: 
· Q. How far from the place where the child and car came 
together was it before the child came to rest-what distance, 
do you know? 
A. I didn't measure that. 
Q. You .say yon saw the place, though. Who picked the 
child upf 
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A. I picked him up. 
pag·e 94 } Q. What did you do with him Y 
A. Carried him across to the other side of the 
road and laid him down. 
Q. Then what did you do? 
A. Went for the doctor. 
Q. How were these children coming toward the house when 
you first saw them l 
By the Court: · 
Q. Did you see them coming toward the house' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How were they coming' 
A. Two in the wagon and the little girl pushing. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. How fast were they proceeding at that time Y 
A. They were walking when I saw them. 
By the Court: 
Q. How far 'vere they from the road when you first saw 
them? Look out of this window if you want to? 
A. I think about the distance of this room. 
Q. The length of this room? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. When did you first see the automobile in which Miss 
Harris 'vas? 
A. I first sa'v it when the boy was on the bumper. 
page 95 } Q. You didn't see it before that t 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXA~1INATION. 
By ~fr. Harrison: 
Q. Mr. 'Vright, I understand from your testimony that 
"rhen you looked and saw the children approaching two of 
them were in the wagon and the little girl was pushing and 
that" they were up this entrance or in the Sam Wray road 
_approximately the distance across this room? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you look any more T 
A. Not until I looked across when the boy was on the 
bumper. 
Q. When you looked they were back up this road the dis-
tance of this room up this entrance? . 
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A. Yes, back in here. · 
Q. And the little girl was pushing at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the two of them were riding in there Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't look any more until after the accident hap-
pened? 
A. No. 
. Q. Will you state to the Jury where with refer-
page 96 ~ ence to this entrance and the road did the accident 
happen, that is, ,vhere was the wag·on struck by 
the left wheel of Miss Harris' car! 
The Court: The same trouble there. The witness may ~not 
understand that map. 
Mr. Harrison: I will try to orient it. 
The 1Court: He can orient it but how can he indicate dis-
tances on that map Y 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Mr. vVright, this map made by 1\Ir. Price sho,vs the old 
Sam W ray house to be on the east side of the highway. It 
also shows a large tree desig"Ilated right beside the highway. 
From that point of the tree over to a point opposite No. 50 
here is the entrance into the Sam W ray place. With refer-
ence to this entrance, as you go up into the Sam Wray house, 
and with reference to the highway where were the children 
on the highwayY 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you see them Y 
A. No, sir. ' 
Q. But you saw some places dug up f 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Here is a tree .and with reference to these 
page 97 } marks here will you state where the dug up marks 
you found in the road were t 
-
By the Court: 
Q. Were the dug up marks to the south of this corner of 
the entrance or anywhere in the entrance or to the north? · 
A. They were in the road, along about the rough of the 
road. · 
' 
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Q. You haven't answered the question exactly right yet. 
Were they below, to the south of this entrance or to the nor,th 
of the side of this entrance or were they within the limits of 
that entrance on the side of the road Y 
A. I suppose right there. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Put a pencil mark there. 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you see that X there? Was that the place 7 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Put a mark there. Is that where you think they came 
out? 
A. Yes. 
The Court: Put C there. 
~1:r. Harrison: Witn~ss ii1dicates point where he says chil-
dren came out from entrance into highway by a 
page 98 ~ mark which is designated on the map as H. M. W. 
Q. l'his is the point here that I have designated 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you at home on the ·morning of the 23rd when 
Mr. and ~Irs. Wright left there? Did they go from their 
home? 
A. I think they 'vere at Church that morning. 
Q. Do you know in whose care they entrusted the children 
while they were gone Y 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Do you know who was looking out for the children at 
the time? 
A.. My mother asked my sister to look after them. 
Q. ..Ai; I understand, your mother had called the children 
to come across the road to the house? 
A.. I don't know. 
Q. Did you state on direct examination that she had called-
The Court: He said she was in the front yard. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Had she called the children Y 
A.. I hadn't heard her if she did. 
Q~ Had she spoken to them? 
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.A.. I don't remember no,v. 
Q. Do you know what your mother did? 
A. She might have told them to come to the 
page 99 ~ house. I don't know about that. 
Q. Do you know where she was then¥ · 
.A.. She was in. the front yard when I was getting water 
for the mules. 
By the Court: 
Q. Where was your mother at the time of the accident Y 
.A.. The children's mother, you mean? 
Q. No.· 
.A.. My mother ,y 
Q. Where was she at the time of the accident Y 
.A.. I think she started in the house. 
Q. Did you see her Y 
.A.. No. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Do you kno'v where ~1:rs. Culp was¥ 
.A.. She was upstairs. 
~Ir. Harrison: I would like for the record to show the ap-
proximate distance across this room here that he first saw 
them. 
· The Court: How far is it, 1\-fr. Elmore Y Do you know the 
dimensions of this room? 
~Ir. Elmore: No, sir. 
The Court: Step it off, Sheriff. 
Note: .An officer stepped it off and said: Fourteen paces. 
page 100 ~ The Court: 42 feet. The distance in the court 
room, being stepped off to indicate the length of 
the court room as referred to by the previous witness, is as-
certained to be fourteen steps or approximately 42 feet. 
RE-DIRECT EX4.MINATION. 
By ~fr. Hammack: 
Q. After having seen these children about a distance of 
42 feet from the roadway, you paid no further attention to 
them, but went about your business watering your team Y 
A. I did. 
Q. The next you sa'v of any of the children was the child, 
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Carl .Allen Wright, on the fender or bumper of the Harris 
car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\fr. Harrison asked you in ·whose care Mr. and Mrs. 
Wright left their son, Carl Allen Wright, on this day, to 
which I believe you testified you didn't know 7 
A. I did. . 
Q. Your grandmother was at home, was she not-;,your 
mother, I mean to say, the child's grandmother7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She was there Y 
A.. Yes, sir. 
page 101 } Q. Your sister was there, I believe you said Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. 1\{rs. Esther Culp f 
A. That is right. 
Q. Was your father there, Mr. R. A. Wright? 
A. No, I don't think he was. • · 
Q. He 'vent, I believe, with Mr. Prince Wright and his wife 
to the funeralf · 
A. Yes. 
1\!Ir. Hammack: Your Honor please, the child, Ida Culp, is 
Qnly seven years of age. I think, sir, however, she is compe-
tent to testify for what it is worth. · 
IDA. VALERIA CULP, 
a 'vitness called on behalf of the plaintiff and ]?eing first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Exan1ined by the Court : 
Q. Sit down in that chair and tell me what your name is 7 
A. Ida Valeria Culp. 
Q. Do you go to school? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can yon read and ·write! 
page 102 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Countt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ifave you been to Sunday School 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Church? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do yon know what it is to tell the trnthY 
A. Yes, sir. 
. \ I 
... r· 
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. 1 
Q. Do yon know what it is to tell some things that aren't 
the truth sometimes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are. yon going to tell the truth now, today f. 
A. Yes, sir. . 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q .. Little girl, come over here just a minute. Were you at 
your grandfather's the day your little cousin, Carl Allen 
Wright, was killed Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were yon playing with him at the time Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who else beside yon T 
A. My brother. 
Q. Is your brother younger or older than yon 1 
.A.. He is younger .. 
page 103 ~ Q. How old is heY 
A. He is six. 
Q. And what is his nameY 
A. John Julian Culp. 
Q. Is this the wagon that you children were playing withY 
A. Yes, sir. · 
· Q. Who was riding in the front of the wagon f 
A. Carl. 
Q. You mean by that Carl .Allen '¥"rightY 
A. Yes. 
Q. The little boy that is dead Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. How was he sitting? 
A. He was sitting· with his face to the road. 
Q. How about the tongue to the wagon? 
A. He was holding that. 
Q. Where ·was your little brother, John Culp sittingT 
A.· He was sitting in the back. , 
Q. Which way was his face Y 
A. His face was to Carl's back. 
Q. Then both of them were facing the road Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you doing, Ida Y 
A. Pushing the wagon. 
Q. Where do you go to school, Ida 1 
page 104 } A. Ebony High School. 
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By the Court: . 
Q. Do you know how to look at pictures? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. This, we will say, is your grandfather's house~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which way do you go when you go to school¥ This is 
your grandfather's house. 
A. This way. 
Q. You go this way to,vard Ebony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which way do you go 'vhen you go to Lawrenceville? 
A. This way (indicating). 
Q. Where were you children playing that day Y 
A. Playing at the cow pen. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. How far, if you know, is the cow pen from the road 
over here? 
A. About 100 yards. 
· Q. Whv did you and the other children start to the house Y 
., A. Because grandn1a called us and Maxie sent 
page 105 ~ us. to get the cows. 
Q. Who is Maxie f 
A. 1\iy uncle. 
Q. Maxie is your uncle 1 Maxie is a brother of your 
mother? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vheri you started toward the road you were pushing, 
I believe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How fast were you children going 1 
By the Court: 
Q. "\Vere you walking or running? 
A. We 'vere running at first, but when we got our back 
wheels in the ditch, we started to walk. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. You were running then until you got-
By the Court: 
Q. Your nan1e is Valeria? 
~1:r. Hammack: Her name is Ida, her first name. 
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By the Court: . 
Q. Is there any ditch between the road and the place where 
you all go up to Mr. Sam Wray's house' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you say your ,vheel got in the ditch, what dit~h 
were you talking about Y . 
page ;1.06 r A. In the ditch that comes just out to the road. 
Q. Is that on the side of the road up to Sam 
W ray's house 7 
A. It is just after you get past that hill. 
A Juror: I couldn't catch that. 
The Court: .She said just down here after you pass that 
hill. 
By 1\{r. Hammack: 
Q. After you pass the hill then, and get your wheels-
The Court: Let her answer and I will get Mr. Tilghman to 
repeat the answers to the Jury. 
By Mr. Hammack: . 
Q. After you had gotten your wheels in the ditch of the · 
road you say you stopped? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see anything then, Ida? . 
A. After I got out where I could see, I saw th~ car. 
Q. Which way was the car coming from Y 
A. From Lawrenceville way. 
Q. Where was the car when you first saw it f 
A. It was at the icehouse. 
The Court: You will have to locate the icehouse. 
By Mr. Hammack: ' 
Q. On 'vhich side of the road was the car then 
page 107 r traveling? 
A. On this side. 
Q. That is the side of the road that yon children were on Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Was that on the right-hand or left-hand side o(the car! 
A. Left-hand side of the car. 
Q. What did you children do then f 
A. Tried· to get out of the way. 
Q. You tried to get out of the way f 
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A. Yes. 
Q. What did Carl Allen do, if anything! 
A. He turned the wheels in this way. 
By the Court: 
Q. Which side of the road did he turn the wheels in Y 
A. This side. 
Q. To the left-hand sidef 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Did the car keep coming f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it keep coming on its left-hand side? 
A. Yes. 
The Court: Don't lead her. 
page 108} By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. What happened then 7 
A. The car ran over us. 
- Q. It ran over you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it hurt you any, Ida f 
A. Yes, it hurt. my left foot. 
Q. Did it hurt you anywhere else? 
', 
A. No, it ·hit me up there (indicating forehead) and I did 
have a scar left. 
Q. You did have a scar there one time? -
A. Yes. 
Q. It has gone f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has your foot gotten well? 
A. Yes, but I can't wear this shoe on it much. 
Q. You can't wear the same shoe Y 
A. No, can't wear it much. · 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\Ir. Harrison: 
Q. Do you know whether Carl saw the car coming, too Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he say anything? 
A. No, sir, he didn't have time. 
page 109} Q. He didn't have time to say anything? 
116 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Ida Valeria Gulp. 
A. No. 
Q. Were you all in the road then f 
A. In where¥ 
Q. Where were you then Y 
A. About half way in the road-
Q. And you saw the car-
A~ -where I could see good. 
Q. And that is when you sa'v the car comingT 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether you saw it before he did, or about 
the same time¥ 
A. I expect we saw it about the same time. 
Q. And you say he didn't say anything¥ 
A. No. 
Q. How old was Carl? 
A. ·He was seven. I don't know 'vhether he was just seven. 
Q. Had he been to school one year¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you in the ·same grade with him f 
A. Yes. I was in the first grade last year and he was in 
the .first grade last year. 
Q. Where did Carl go to school¥ 
A. Ebony. 
page 110 ~ Q. Both of you went to Ebony 1 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Did you go on the school bus every day f 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Mrs. Culp and lir. Wright had told you about the cars! 
A. And we always looked up and down the road when 've 
came across. 
Q. Do you know whether . Carl Allen always looked up 
and down the road f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he know it was dangerous to go out in the road in 
front of the automobile¥ 
A. Y""Cs. Grandmother and mamma had told all of us about 
it, and grand-daddy had too. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Prince Wright had told CarlT 
A. I think he had. 
Q. Carl was promoted, wasn't he¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. He would have been in second grade this year Y 
A. Yes. 
Q . .Stoop down and push that wagon. 
A. (Witness does so.) 
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By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Stoop down and push it again. 
page 111 } A. (Witness does so.) 
Mr. Harrison: I would like for the record to show, in 
pushing the wagon that the back of her head and her back 
were in line with the rail, that is immediately in front of the 
jury box, which 'vill be measured accurately sometime during 
·the day for the record. Am I right in that statement 1 
.A Juror : Yes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. You say you and Carl Allen were each seven years old 1 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Which was the older, you or he? 
A. I was. 
Q. When were you seven? 
.A. I was seven the 8th of January . 
.A Juror: Ask her how far was she in the road 1 Was she 
in the road, or coming up the road~ 
By 1\;Ir. Hammack: 
Q." vV as the wagon coming in the road, or headed up the 
road, when it was struck~ · 
A. We were coming toward the house. 
By the Court : 
Q. How do you mean, Ida f 
A. My grandfather's house. 
page 112 ~ Q. Let us look at the picture. I believe they 
told you that was your grandmother's house over 
there. Is it shaped funny like thatf 
.A. ,No. 
Q. Is that where you live? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which part of that house do you live in, or do you know 
-in this wing! 
A. In this part. 
Q. You live in the 'viug·. Is it an old house or a new house? 
A. New house. 
Q. It is a new house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say they have told you this was the road be-
tween those two lines by the side of each other, and they 
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told you this was kind of a driveway up here, up to where 
Mr. Sam Wray lived. What do you call that house over there? 
A. The old house is what we call it. · 
Q. You say somebody had called you f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you started to do what? 
A. Come to the house. 
Q. Which house? 
A. To our grandfather's house. 
page 113 ~ Q. Over here Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you had to cross the road, didn't you Y 
A. Yes. _ 
Q. :One of these gentlemen sitting oyer here listening to us 
wants to know where you were when the automobile struck 
the little wagon you all had. 
A. We were near-about the middle of the road. 
Q. Were you g·oing this way, or were yo~ coming this way? 
A. We were coming right here. 
Q. Had you gotten into the road f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far-
A. Just like this. 
Q. You hadn't gotten very far Y 
A. About two leng-ths of the wagon. 
Q. About two leng-ths of the 'vagon you had gotten into 
the road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 114 ~ W. D. CATES, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Your name is W. D. Cates? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Cates¥ 
A. I live in ]tfeherin District, about three and one-half miles 
from White Plains. 
Q. How long have you been living there? 
A. All my life practically. 
Q. What is your business? 
A. Now? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I am a .State Highway Patrolman. 
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Q. How long have you been in the employ of the State 
Hig·hway Department?. 
A. Five and one-half years. 
Q. What is the number of this road, if you know, Mr. Cates, 
that leads from ·Lawrenceville to Ebony by way of White 
Plains? 
A. The one that goes by White Plains is 644 secondary. 
Q. That is the one I wanted to know. That then is a sec-
ondary road 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Dirt or feeder road? 
page 115 ~ A. It is just a dirt road, just a ordinary kind 
of a road. 
Q. In your duties are you supposed to look after the up-
keep of that particular road? · · 
A. Yes. 
Q. How wide is that road at or near the resid~nce of R. 
A. Wright? 
By the Court: 
Q. From drain to drain t 
A. Something near 22 feet. 
I I 
By :hfr. Hammack: 
Q. Near 22 feet? 
A. Of course it varies. In pulling a road machine if you 
hit an obstruction it will knock the machine back .a little and 
you will find little places that are wider than others and some 
narrower and some a little wider. 
J\!Ir. Hammack: Mr. Cates just said to me that there is 
some rule of the Highway Department that they are not sup-
posed to testify unless directed to do so by the Court. 
The Court: You are to testify then, 1\:fr. Cates. 
A. Your Honor, that is one of the rules and regulations. 
We have to nJake a note of all accidents on the highway and 
turn them into the Highway Department and that informa-
tion is available at the discretion of the Court. 
page 116 ~ The Court: You testify and let the Jury have 
the information. 
By Mr. Hammack: · 
Q. Mr. Cates, do you know about what time on Sunday 
afternoon-
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The Court: That rule means you are not to go around 
volunteering· information and get mixed up in quarrels and 
controversies. You are testifying now as a ·witness in Court 
at the direction of the Court. 
By ~fr. Hammack: 
Q. About what time, if you know, was this child, Carl Allen 
Wright, struck by the Harris automobile on Sunday after-
noon, May 23rd Y 
A. I don't know. 
Q. When did you first appear upon the scene of the ac-
cident¥ . 
A. About six o'clock the n~xt morning. 
Q. That was the time, I suppose, that you were going to 
workY 
A. Well, Mr. Moseley came by home that night and told 
me about the accident and I went a little early the next morn-
ing down there to get up that data for the Highway Depart-
ment. 
Q. 1The road camp also, I believe, is located 
page 117 ~ right close to ~[r. Robert Wright's residence? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A short distance below Y 
A. Yes. We rent the lot from Mr. Wright. 
Q. Was there any evidence there on the road at six o'clock 
on the morning of lVIay 24th to indicate where this child was 
struck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What evidence was there? 
A. There was a place in the road where the little 'vagon 
wheel, when it went over it, cut out a little depression about 
an inch or more deep. 
By the Court: 
Q. Talk louder. 
A. I will say where the little wagon turned over the tires 
cut-
Q. State what you saw? 
A. I saw that depression cut out of the road about, say, 
an inch or 1nore deep. 
By ~fr. Hammack: 
Q. Did you make a marker there at that point! 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What was the nature of the marker that you placed 
there to designate the point of impact? 
page 118 ~ A. I driven a sixty-penny nail in the bed of the 
road. 
Q. Is that nail still there? 
A. I couldn't tell you whether it is there right now, J\!Ir. 
Hammack. 
Q. Was it there three days ago? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. J\!Ir. Cates, will you come over here to the Jury just one 
second. Now, for your benefit I will state, J\tir. Cates, that 
the surveyor who made this map has testified-
The Court: Referring· to the map introduced in evidence 
as Exhibit No. 1 'vith the testimony of W. B. Price. 
Q. (Continuing.) That the point marked Yon this map is 
in the center of the road and at the crest of the hill. Now 
will you please point out on the map just what place this 
collision took place as you gathered from the evidence on the 
ground¥ 
The Court: Where he saw the marks. He didn't see the 
collision. 
By the Court : 
Q. ,Now, 1\{r. Cates, to be fair to you, that mark Y there 
indicates on the plat a space which represents a driveway 
or entrance to the old Sa1n \\7 ray hou~e. You see it there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that X is also in that driveway, a dis-
page 119 ~ tance of-I forget how many feet. This. line here 
represents, referring to the eastern end of the 
shaded line across what has been called the entrance to the 
driveway, the side· of the road. Whereabouts there did you 
notice those marks and tell the J'ury how far they were from 
what you would deem to be the center of the entrance to this 
driveway as you g·o up to the San1 Vvray house? Where-
abouts were they? vV ere they in the road or in the entrance? 
A. In the road. The mark was in the road. 
Q. That is what we are talking about. The mark was in 
the road. \Vhereabouts on either the north or south side of 
the middle of this driveway as it opens into the road were 
those marks, about how many feet from the center? 
A. I don't know about the feet. It seems the markings in 
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the road was more on the east side of the road than they were 
on the west. 
Q. More on the east side than on the west? 
A . .Slightly more to the east than toward the west. 
Q. How far in the road were they? 
A. I didn't make anv measurements but I saw them. 
Q. Could you say approximately how far you think they 
were where you drove your nail? 
A. From the back of the ditch line to the marker? 
Q. From the edg·e of this drain here. Does a drain go down 
all the way by the eastern side of the road Y 
page 120 F A. Yes. 
Q. How far from the drain in the road were 
they? 
A. I would say something about seven and one-half feet. 
Q. In the road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far from the center of the road were they? 
A. They was about eighteen inches, I guess. 
Q. And how far from the line which would split the center 
of the driveway up to the Sam Wray house? 
A. They were just a little on this side. There seemed to 
be two paths that come out from there. One comes across 
here and goes right straight to Mr. Robert Wright's front 
door. Over on this side is the well and different things that 
he usually brings his mules ~o water. 
Q. There are two paths there t 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. One of them- • 
A. One of them goes over here. 
Q. And one of them seems to run from the entrance to the 
Sam Wra:y house across the road to the well Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the other one is where Y 
A. Comes over here a little below that one and comes di-
rectly to Mr. Wright's front door. 
Q. That is on the north of the other one Y 
page 121 ~ 1\{r. Harrison: North of Y. 
The Court: He doesn't know about Y. 
By the Court: . 
Q. As those two paths cross the center of the road, how 
far are they apart? 
A. I imagine around ten feet, I guess. 
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By 1\fr. Hammack: , 
Q. Did you point out to Mr. Hunter Love, a surveyor, sev-
eral days ago the sixty-penny nail which you had placed in 
the ground? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was that nail the same nail and at the same place 
that you drove it the morning after the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far, Mr. Oates, did the Harris car travel from the 
point of impact-
The Court: He didn't see that. 
By Mr. Hammack:. · 
Q. From the marks to where the brakes were applied! 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Were there markings in the road Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of brakes~ 
page 122 ~ A. Yes. It showed from· where the mark in'the 
road was that the rear wheel brakes took hold 
just about where the front wheels was, a distance of about 
the length of the car, which would have made the front of 
the car two lengths from where the mark in the road was. 
You see that went just about the length of the car from the 
place in the road that showed any sign of dragging on the 
ground. · 
By the ·Court: 
Q. Did the signs of dragging appear on the road to the 
north of the nail f 
.... ~. I couldn't see any. 
Q. Did the signs of dragging then g-o to the south of that Y 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Hammack: . 
Q. You saw no signs of the application of the brakes to· the 
north of the point of the sixty-penny nail Y 
A. ~o, sir. · 
Q. Yon saw none then for a distance of about how many 
feet, would you say? 
The Court: From the 'Sixty-penny nail? 
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A. Must have been ele-yen or twelv:e feet anyway. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. When the brakes were applied were there 
page 123 ~ any signs in the road that they took effect 1 
A. Yes, sh•. 
Q. What was the nature of those signs~ 
A. They were just like-you know how brakes will take 
hold on dirt. They show signs from there clean back to where 
it stopped. 
By the Court: 
Q. You don't know where it stopped, do you f Do you 
know where the marks stopped? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't know where the car stopped¥ 
A. I know where the brakes stopped, where they wasn't 
any more signs of brakes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q.. Where did the car come to rest or where was the car 
when you saw no further signs of a brake having been ap-
plied? 
A. It was down th~ road, I reckon, 150 feet maybe. Down 
the road where the signs of the dragging started I placed an-
other sixty-penny nail rig·ht here. 
Q. Is that nail still there '1 
A. It was a few days ago. 
Q. Did you point it out to Mr. J. IIunter Love three days 
ago? 
page 124 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yvas that at the sa1ne point you drove the 
nail on the road 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say tbat was at the point wbere the rear wheels 
of the Harris car no longer showed any sig·ns of the appli-
cation of brakes! 
A. That was at the point-
The Court: He didn't say that. He said where there was 
no longer any sign of any dragging in the road. 
-A. That 'vas the last sig·n of any drag·ging that I sa,v. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. ~Ir. Cates, on the 23rd of last !'Iay was there any shrub-
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bery, vegetation or other growth to any extent that ·would 
obstruct the vie'v of a person coming from the north going 
south for a distance of several hundred feet before you get 
to the point where the driveway from the old Sam Wray place 
intersects Route 644 f 
A. Just on the east bank of the road there is some sweet 
gum trees. Down under this slope of that elevation of the 
bank there is some little sweet gum sprouts that came up, 
you know, and they were sonwthing like probably fifteen or 
eig·hteen inches high. 
page 125 ~ Q. They were probably fifteen or eighteen 
inches high 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. In regard to the sweet gum trees which are there and 
were there, are there any limbs on those trees, on the lower 
part of those trees, that would obstruct the view of a person 
traveling from the north? 
A. I don't think so, Mr. H~llilnack. 
Q. Will you please tell the ,Jury, as far as you can, just 
· how the vegetation and obstructions at that point, on 1\Iay 
23rd of this year, compared with the vegetation and obstruc-
tions there at the present time? 
A. Well, I asked the engineer about work along that part 
of the road and he told me-he said, "You do as little along 
here as you can until it is settled''. I didn't cut those little 
sprouts do·wn and they have g·rown from that time until now 
and are still there and what undergrowth is up on the high 
part of the bank is still there, too. 
Q. You say your Resident Engineer instructed you not to 
cut any shrubbery from this particular place unt~l this case 
had been· tried? 
A. Yes, he told me to do as little as I could there to main-
tain the road until it was settled. 
Q. Have you done anything toward cutting the shrubbery 
there since this collision took place f 
A. No, sir. 
page 126 ~ Q. And do I understand fro1n your evidence 
that there is about a year's growth of vegetation 
there which makes it now more dense than it was on 1\tiay 
23rdf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Bv the Court: 
.. Q. 1\{r. Cates, is that little entrance or driveway up from 
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the road into the Sam Wray house right up on the top of a 
slope or is it in a cut of any kind 1 
A. It is worn down. It is an old place, you know, and it 
is right up on the crest of the hill and naturally going in·and 
out it has worn down to a slope, a long slope there. 
Q. Is there any embankment on the south or any on t~e 
north side of it f 
A. It slopes in on each side. It is a little higher and worn 
out right on the crest of the hill and, of course, it slopes up. 
There is a little elevation going up into the old Sam Wray 
yard. 
Q. ~he entrance is not in a cut then~ 
A. No, sir, not right at the entrance. Well, you might call 
it a cut too because it is a slight elevation on both sides of 
the road. 
Q. Does that interfere with vision of a person co~ng down 
·the road? 
A. No, sir. 
pag·e 127 ~ By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. lVIr. Cates, had the Ifarris car been proceed-
ing on its right side or to the right of the center of the 
road-
Mr. Harrison: Now, if your Honor please. 
The Court: I haven't heard the question. Don't answer 
it until I hear it. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. (Continuing) Would there have been suf:fici,ent space 
for the car to have passed without striking the children? 
Mr. Harrison: I object to the question on the ground that, 
there is no evidence that the car was on the wrong side of 
the road. The only thing this witness knows about it, he 
went there some twelve or eighteen hours after, after it had 
been traveled all night, and found a hole in the ground and 
he drove a nail in that hole and the nail is still there. That 
is the sum and substance of this witness' testimony. 
By the Court : 
. Q. How far was that na~l at the point where you saw these 
marks from the western s1de of the road at that point, that 
is the edge of the drain 1 
A. About thirteen feet. 
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By J\.fr. Hammack: 
Q. If the Harris car had been operated, at the 
page 128 } time of the collision, to the right of the center of 
the road, would the child have been struck¥ 
Mr. Harrison: I object to that question for the reason 
stated. 
The Court: I don't think that is a proper question. 
J\tlr. Hammack: If your Honor please, the Court of Ap-
peals has expressly passed upon the question in a recent 
case. The question was asked if it would have been possible 
to have hit the child if a man had been on his right-hand 
side of the road. Objection was made and the Trial Judge 
required counsel to modify the question so as to ask him would 
there have be.en sufficient space for the car to have passed 
without striking the child had it been on the right-hand side 
of the road. The objection still was made to the question 
but the ·Court of Appeals said it was proper, in the case of 
R. F. Trant Co·mpany v. Upton. 
The Court : The difficulty in this case is the witness doesn't · 
lrnow where the child was struck. He says he knows where 
he found certain marks in the road. I have asked him what 
the distance was between the marks in the road and the 
western side of the road, to the drain. 
Mr. IIammack: I except to the ruling· of the Court and 
will modify the question and ask it in this form: 
page 129} Q. Had the Harris car been driven to the right 
of the center of the road, would it have had suf-
ficient space to have passed between the mark which you have 
designated as a point of impact and the western edge of the 
road! 
1\tir. Harrison: I object to that question on the same 
ground. It is competent for the witness to state that he drove 
a nail in the ground, that that nail was nine feet or seven 
feet or ten feet from the east side and twelve feet or eight 
feet or whatever number of feet he wants to say, from the 
west side. The Jury knows the width of a car. The Jury 
can draw the conclusion as to whether or not a car can go 
between that nail and the left ditch line or that nail and the 
right ditch line. That is the only question it would be proper 
to ask under the circumstances of the case. The question he 
is asking presupposes that the Harris car was on the wrong 
side of the road and there is · no evidence in the record of 
that. 
4 
128 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
1¥. D. Cates. 
The Court: It doesn't presuppose the Harris car was on 
the wrong side of the road but it does presuppose that we 
know exactly the point of the collision and all the witness 
has said is that he saw the road scuffed there or marked at 
a point where he droye a nail. If you show where the col-
lision between the wagon and the automobile took place, your 
question may be 'vithin the rule of that other case 
page 130 ~ you cited but the witness doesn't know where the ~ 
collision took place. I have allowed you to ask 
the distance between that scuff in the road, where he drove 
the sixty-penny nail, and the western edge of the road up to 
the drain. 
1\{r. Hammack: To which he has replied a distance of about 
thirteen feet. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. In addition to the thirteen feet from the point of the 
disturbance of the earth where the sixty-penny nail had been 
driven to the outer edge of the roadway, is there a further 
space to the right in which a person going south might have, 
on that occasion, driven with safety? 
1\{r. Harrison: I object to the question on the ground that 
this witness was not present on that occasion and he doesn't 
know what 'vas there. 
The Court: I think you had better let the witness state 
what the conditions of the locality are. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Pl~ase state the condition of the front yard of 1\fr. Rob-
ert A. Wright leading up to the edge of the highway7 
A. Well, I would say for about 100 feet in front of his 
house you can drive cars in and out from his house at your 
own pleasure there; there is no obstruction to keep you from 
driving. 
page 131 ~ By a Juror : 
Q. Anywhere in a space of 100 feet! 
A. Yes. 
Q. You can go in and out Y 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. IN o trees or obstructions, I believe you said? 
A. No, sir, you can drive right on into the yard. Of 
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course, he had some yard trees out there but they are on a 
level with the yard. 
CROSS EXAl\IINATION. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
. Q. When did you make your examination and investiga-
tion? 
A. The next morning, the 24th at three minutes after six 
o'clock. 
Q. _"\Vho was there at the time? 
A. 1\{r. Wright was there when I first got up there. 
Q. Which Mr. Wright? 
A. Mr. Prince Wright but he left there and went back to 
the store. 
Q. Did Mr. Prince Wright show you where the accident 
happened? 
A. :No, he didn't see it himself. 
page 132 ~ Q. Did he tell you where the marks were? 
A. No. 
Q. Who else was up there, Mr. Cates 7 
A. Mr. Robert Wright was there in a few minutes. 
Q. Who is lVIr. Robert Wright 1 
A. That is his father. 
Q. WhQ else 'vas there' 
A. I don't remember really now. 
Q. Do you know whether any of his brothers were there or 
not? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. And your measurements were made from a scoop in the 
road; is that right 7 ..... · 
A. It was a place in the road that had been scuffed out . 
. Q. l\{ore than one place or just one? 
A. Just one place. 
Q. And how deep was that place? 
A. Well, an inch or maybe a little more. 
Q. Ho'v long was it? 
A. It was about six or seven inches long. 
Q. How wide was it?· 
A. About an inch and a half or two inches. 
Q. About an inch and a half or two inches wide, about six 
inches long and about an inch deep 7 
page 133 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. That was the mark you found Y 
A. Yes. 
130 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
W. D. Oates. 
Q. You don't kno'v what that mark was made by, do you~ 
A.,No. 
Q. You weren't there ; you don't know~ 
A. I don't positively know. . 
Q. But that was a mark you found in the road 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was at that point at which you made your meas-
urements. Will you state to the Jury whether or not there 
is an icehouse to the left as you g·o up to the ·wright house 
on that road? 
A. Pointing this way there is an icehouse. 
Q. Where is that icehouse located with reference to the en-
trance to the Sam W ray house? 
A. I reckon 75 feet, maybe more, from the entrance. 
Q. The icehouse is around 75 feet from the entrance to 
the left. Will you state whether. or not there are any trees 
also to the left around the icehouse and between the icehouse 
and the entrance? 
A. There are son1e sweet gum trees and some small un-
dergrowth. 
Q. Will you state whether or not there are about eight or 
ten pine trees there also T 
page 134 ~ A.. There might be some pine trees. I never 
noticed any. Q. Did you see thosef 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, there are eight or ten small pines 
there, are there not? 
A. I couldn't tell you to save my life. 
Q. In addition to the big sweet g-um bushes, are there some 
other bushes there? 
A. .Some small bushes. 
Q. Are there some weeds there 1 
A. There are usually weeds in the summertime. 
Q. On May 21st it is getting right late 1 That is well on 
into the spring? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q; And will you state whether or not there were some 
bushes or shrubs there that have red balls on them or have 
red balls on them now? 
A. Those coral berries. 
The Court: You are not talking about a persimmon tree? 
lVIr. Harrison: No, I am talking about some kind of red 
berries. · 
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.A. I couldn't tell you at that time. 
page 135 } By 1\Ir. Harrison: 
Q. Are thP.re any there now Y 
A. I couldn't tell you that either. I know coral berries 
grow all around there on that kind of land. 
Q. But there were some shrubs and bushes and under-
growth to the left 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you talk to the engineer about cutting that under-
growth out? 
A. I asked him about the piece of road and he said, "You 
do as little here as you can to keep up maintenance until 
this thing is settled''. 
Q. Did you think that undergrowth should be cut out? 
.A. It wasn't an obstruction to anybody traveling the road. 
Q. Why did you ask him about it? · 
.A. He is my superior. 
Q. I mean if there was no occasion to cut it out why did 
you ask him about the undergrowth T 
A. I didn't particularly ask him about the undergrowth. 
He told n1e to do as little there as I could to keep up main-
tenance. 
Q. Had you planned to do some work on that bank? 
A. No, sir, I had not. I had not in other 'places the same 
nature as this. 
page 136 } RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By 1\Ir. Hammack: , 
· Q. I believe you testified it was the practice for the Resi-
dent Engineer to instruct the men not to change in any way-
The Court: He has been over that. 
By ~fr. Hammack: 
Q. 1\Ir. Cates, on this road at this particular point, at the 
particular place of the accident-
The Court: Nobody knows the particular place of the ac-
cident. 
1\fr. Harrison: I object to that on the ground that the wit-
ness has stated he did not know where the accident was. 
The Court: The only one who testified about the accident · 
is the little girl. 
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By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Cates, from the point marked 8 to the point marked 
Y on the map it appears that there is a curve in the road? 
A. Yes, sir, a slight curve, not a g-reat curve. If you go 
up· there you can see a distance of fifty or more yards all the 
way in front of you. 
Q. Do you have difficulty in keeping people 
page 137 ~ coming from the north from taking that inside 
curveT 
Mr. Har.rison.: I object to that on the ground that it is 
plainly inadmissible. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
At 1:15 P.M. a recess was taken until 2:15 P. J\II. 
AFTERNOON SESSION. 
Lawrenceville, Virginia, December 3, 1937. 
Met at the expiration of the recess. 
Present: Same parties as heretofore noted. 
Mr. Ifarrison: We said we were going to make the meas-
urement from the floor to the rail for the record. 
The Court: Make the measurement, 1\tir·. Sheriff. 
Sheriff: Two feet eight inche.s. , 
The Court: The height of the rail, with reference to which 
the movmnent of the wagon was illustrated by 
page 138 r Ida Culp is ascertained by the Sheriff to be two 
feet eight inches. 
J. HUNTER DOVE, 
a witness . called on behalf of the plaintiff and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Love, where do you live Y 
A. I live in Brunswick County near Danielto,vn. 
Q. What is your business? 
A. Surveying and farming. 
Q. Did you, several days ago, go to a point on R.oute 644, 
near the residence of Mr. R. A. Wright at my requestY . 
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A. I went over in front of 1\fr. R. A. Wright's house at 
your request. I don't remember what the route 'vas. 
Q. That is the road leading from Lawrence·ville to Ebony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Love, please state whether W. D. Cates, an em-
ployee of the Ifighway Department, was present when you 
were there? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did he point out to you a sixty-penny nail which he 
had driven into the road at a place where he said some earth 
had been knocked up the morning after the collision Y . 
A. He pointed me out a sixty-penny nail driven 
page 139 ~ in the road. 
Q. Will you please mark on this map the point 
of that sixty-penny nail as pointed out to you by Mr. W. D. 
CatesY ' 
The Court: What map is that' 
Mr. Hammack: The map we hav:e been using (Exhibit 
No. 1). 
By the Court : 
Q. Put it as accurately as you can, 1\ir. Love. 
A. Yes, sir. This point is 12 feet to the north of a point 
on the map marked Y. It is also 8 feet or 7.9 feet from the 
ditch line-practically 8 feet. 
Q. Mark that in some way. Call it ,N for nail. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Seven feet and nine-tenths inches from which ditch 
line~ 
A. From the east ditch line. 
Q. 1\'Ir. W. B. Price has testified that the point marked Y 
on this map is the crest or peak of a hill at that point. Is 
he correct in that f 
A. I took the crest of the hill to be his point marked Y. 
It is the only definite point that we could really tie it to with 
the crest of the hill. There is nothing else definite there. 
Q. It is your opinion then that he is correct in 
page 140 ~ that? 
A. It is my opinion that Mr. Price is correct. 
Q. Then this point 'vhich you have marked as the point 
of the nail, being 12 feet north of Point Y, please state 
whether or not a person traveling at that point would still be 
going upgrade f 
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A. At that point he would be approaching the crest. The 
crest is right at Y and we are still a little upgrade, yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. ·Cates at that time point out to you on the ground 
there the place where he first saw the signs of the application 
of brakes by the driver of the car the morning after the col-
lision Y 
Mr. Harrison: I objoot to that. I don't think that is ad-
missible¥ 
The Court: Why? 
Mr. Harrison: What Mr. Cates told ~fr. Love. 
The Court: This is referring to Mr. Cates' testimony and 
it is only to identify !1:r. Cates' point on this road. 
!1:r. Harrison: I didn't object to the point with reference 
to the nail because Mr. Cates made a definite marker there, 
but he made no mark where he said the skid marks were. 
The Court: I will let that in over your objection. This is 
all ~oing to the accuracy of Mr. Cates' testimony. 
page 141 ~ He IS going to put a niark on the map, the value 
of which is dependent on 1\:fr. Cates' testimony 
which has already gone to the Jury. 
Mr. Harrison: Exception. 
A. Mr. Cates made a statement to me-
By the Court : 
Q. Did he tell you where the point was? 
A. No, sir, he didu 't tell me definitely where that point 
was. 
Q. Did he give you any distance? 
A. He said about 12 feet. 
Q. Did you mark that on there? 
A. That is just about the pointY. I have got this 12 feet 
from the point Y and that is just about the point Y. 
By Mr. Hammack: . 
Q. Was the place pointed out to you where the child, the 
deceased child, Carl Allen ·wright, was picked up? 
Mr. Harrison: Who made that n1easurement? Mr. Cates 
wasn't there when he was picked up. Somebody would have 
to point it out to !1:r .. Cates who pointed it out to this wit-
ness. 
The Court: 1\:fr. Cates doesn't know where the 
page 142 ~ child was picked up. · 
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By J\tir. Hammack: 
(J. Was that pointed out to you by Mr. Prince Wright, the 
father of the child1 
Mr. Harrison: I object on the ground that he hasn't tes-
tified. 
The Court: He hasn't testified in the case yet. 
Mr. Hammack: I am g·oing to connect that up in a short 
'vhile. 
The Court: You had better do that beforehand and avoid 
confusion. . 
Mr. Hammack: All right, sir, 've will leaxe that for the 
time being. 
By Mr. Hamma-ck: 
Q. Did Mr. Cates ·point out to you another sixty-penny nail, 
marking the point where the car first came to rest or the 
point where there were no further signs of the application of 
brakes? . . 
A. He pointed me out another sixty-penny nail driven in the 
g-round. 
By the Court: 
Q. What did you say? . 
- A. He pointed me out another sixty-penny nail driven in 
the ground which was 128.3 feet to the south of this penny 
nail and about 18 inches outside of it, on the 
page 143 } west side of the ditch line of the road. 
By J\tir. Hammack: 
Q. Can yon point that out on this map or make some no-
tation there ? 
A. That is right at the point. marked 8 here on this map. 
Q. At the point n1arked 8 on the map~ 
A. Yes. 
The Court: You are referring to the map marked Exhibit 
No. 11 
1\fr. Hammack: Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make any measurements as to the width of the 
road at any point immediately at or near the point marked 
Yon the mapf. 
A. Right at the first twenty-penny nail he showed me I 
made a measurement of the road there as 22 feet. 
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Q. About what is the general width of this road all the way 
as shown on this map 7 
A.. The map scales about 23 feet, I think. It scales about 
23 feet. The lines are a little heavy for this small scale. 
Q. Mr. Love, please state whether or not at that time and 
place you made any observations as to the ground or the lay 
of the land iirunediately in front of the R. A.. Wright resi-
dence and adjacent to the point of the first sixty-
page 144 ~ penny nail which you have testified to~ 
A. It just had a very gradual slope to the westt 
nothing material. 
Q. Were there any trees or obstructions of any other nature 
to prevent a person fifteen or twenty feet from the point Y 
turning out of the main traveled portion of the highway into 
the Wright yard Y 
Mr. Harrison: I object to that question on the ground 
that it doesn't state when, where and under what circum ... 
stances. 
By the Court: 
Q. Is it an open space there, l\1:r. LoveY Is there an open 
space from the road up into the Wright yard¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I mean unobstructed f 
A. Unobstructed, yes. 
Q. Any bushes or trees growing· around there, as far as 
any indications Y 
A. Some little hedge standing about twenty or thirty feet 
from the road that looks like recently planted there, just 
very small little bushes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Love, did you n1ake any observations to determine 
how far dovn1 the road north from the point that 
page 145 ~ the sixty-penny nail is driven, up 12 feet north 
of point Y on the map, in order to determine how 
far an object at a distance, say, 30 feet directionally east of 
point Y could be observed? 
Mr. Harris_on: I dislike to continue to object but this wit-
nPss has just testified that the nail was driven in the high-
'vay 12 feet north of Y. The witness is being· asked a ques-
tion with reference to Y, how far a person at a point in thP 
highway there opposite Y-
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The Court: The question is not clear to me. 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you understand the question 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is he asking you' 
A. He is asking me. if I made any observation at a point 
north-from a point 12 feet north of the point Y, how far 
down the road to the north could I see an object 30 feet to 
the east, opposite the point marked Y. 
The Court : I will let you answer that. 
Mr. Harrison: I except for the reasons stated and for the 
further reason that the question is too ambiguous and in-
definite to admit of a definite answer. 
A. We stood a little girl o-yer there at that point oppo-
site Y. 
page 146 ~ By the Court: 
Q. Where' 
A. 33 feet from the center of the road in this driveway 
here. 
Q. That is in the driveway leading up to the old house 7 
A. Old house, yes, sir. · 
Q. The old Wray house? 
A. The old house, yes, sir. 
By Mr. Harrison : 
Q. Not opposite where the nail was driven but opposite Y? 
A. Opposite Y, yes, sir. Mr. Hammack then took me down 
the road in his car and I stopped it where I could see the . 
little girl named Ida, I think. That was 120 feet .from the 
nail. 
By the Court: 
Q. She was standing up 1 
A . .She was standing up, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know her height? 
A. Four feet three inches. 
Q. The girl is four feet three inches tall? 
A. Yes. · 
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By 1\'Ir. Hammack: 
Q. -Now, :Mr. Love, I will ask you this question: 
page 147 ~ An object proceeding toward the road from the 
point where the little girl was stationed, would it 
or would it not become more visible as it ·approached the 
road? 
A. More visible, yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. When did you make this observation T 
A. Day before yesterday in the afternoon. 
Q. Is there any vegetation or shrubbery there along the 
side of that road in the interval that you have mentioned, 
between the little girl and your point of observation, which 
would have been affected by the weather we have had dur-
ing· this fall and recently~l Are there leaves on it, to be plain 
and shortY Is there any shrubbery with leaves on it now or 
do you know what the condition of the shrubbery was before 
you went there, in May? 
A.. The straw and weeds are the main object that caused 
you not to see the little girl in there. The bushes did not ob-
struct at that distance frmn the road, at the distance we were 
down the road. 
By 1\ir. Hammae.k: 
Q. How would you say, if you can answer this, that· the 
height of the straw and the weeds now compares with May 
23rd of this year? 
A. Straw and weeds in the latter part of May 
page 148 ~ until the latter part of June are really at their 
lowest point of obstruction. Leaves are out by 
the middle of l\fay on shrubbery, and so forth, and are just 
about as any season of the year but broomstraw and such 
weeds as grow in an old hedgerow like that do not come up 
until later on and the older ones have fallen down. 
Q. Did you observe a building- that looked something like 
an icehous~ on the eastern side of the road there f . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how far would you say that icehouse is north of 
the point marked Y Y 
A. I couldn't answer that question definitely. I will say 
this, though, that the icehouse will not obstruct any view 
coming up that road on account of the trees that are along 
there will catch you fi~st. The trees cut off the view before 
the icehouse. 
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Q. You are unable to determine at just what point on this 
map the icehouse is located? 
A. Somewhere from 60 to 100 feet. That is about as defin-
ite as I could make it, and about 15 feet to the east of the 
road. 
Q. You made no exact measurement? 
A. No exact measurement. 
page 149 } CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. ~fr. Love, you testified in your tests made with Mr. 
Hammack and the little Culp girl you placed the girl at a 
point directly east of Y, some 30 feet in here 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was the only test you made; is that true¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state why you didn't place the little girl at 
a point directly east of the marker, of the nail, which is 12 
feet north of Y and then make your observation? In other 
'vords, why didn't you place the little girl near the north 
of this little entrance here? 
A. No particular reason for it at all that I know of but 
just n1erely put her out at a point practically east of {hat-
no particular reason that I know of. 
Q. Then you cannot tell the Jury whether or not the girl 
'vould have been visible had you placed her at the point in 
this entrance 12 feet north of Y and 30 feet directly east 
of Y because you didn't make that observation 7 
A. I didn't make that observation. 
Q. When did you make this survey or investigation, Mr. 
Love? 
A. Day before yesterday afternoon. 
Q. Who was present with you at the timeY 
page 150 ~ A. There was a Mr. Cates there. 
Q. The gentleman who testified here todav? 
A. Yes. That is 1\Ir. Cates. . • 
Q. V\7ho else? 
A. There were, I think, a couple of Mr. Wrights and Mr. 
Hammack. 
Q. A couple of Mr. Wrights and ~fr. Hammack? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. And the little Culp girl 'vho has also testified? 
.A. Yes, and a little boy named Earl was out there also. 
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Q. And that observation was made on December 1st; is that 
right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The first was Wednesday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you ever been out there before¥ 
A. I don't think I have. 
Q. Have you ever been on that road before that yon ean 
recall Y , · . 
A. I have been out as far as a ~Ir. 'Vesson that lives on 
that road. 
Q. Anyway, you have never made any survey of that par-
ticular road Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 151 ~ Q. And you never made any survey at that time 
but simply_ some n1easurements Y 
A. Simply some measurements. 
Q. You saw the icehouse there, didn't you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. That icehouse is to the left of the road as you go toward 
Ebony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see many trees around there? 
A. Right many trees there. 
Q. Did you see some little J?ines 1 
A. I didn't particularly notice any little pines. 
Q. Did you see some sweet g·um bushes there Y 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see a big· oak tree that is located directly up 
in this entrance and to the north? 
A. I saw a good many trees in there but I didn't particu-
larize the trees. 
Q. Did you see where there had been son1e shrubs and 
bushes along there with red berries on them 1 I don't know 
what kind they are. Did yon see those·¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any bushes out there with red berries f 
. A. I didn't notice them, no, sir. 
Q. Yon don't tell the Jury that they 'vere not 
page 152 ~ there, do ~ou Y 
A. No, sir, I don't tell them they were not 
there. 
Q. But you didn't see that t 
A. I didn't see those. 
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Q. If you didn't see those red berry bushes out there, did 
you look very closely? . -
A. I didn't look very far out from that road, no, sir. 
Q. There is considerable shrubbery and weeds and bushes 
and trees and an icehouse on the left as yon approach, is 
there not? . 
A. Yes, sir, there is considerable there. The main observa-
tion I took of it 'vas I took this map and I took 1\{r. Prie.e's 
observations that he sat down here and observed them and 
told Mr. Ham1nack-I said, ''That is very good; I think it is 
the actual facts there". 
Q. Mr. Price made a very accurate map. 
A. A very accurate map from the physical facts and fur-
ther than that I didn't particularly observe anything except 
these things J\Ir. Hammack called my .attention to but I con-
sid~red that as a good representation of the physical facts 
that are out there. 
Q. And what you did was to make the measurements as 
shown you by 1\{r. Cates f 
A. By Mr. Cates, yes, sir. 
page 153 ~ R. F. ELLIS, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Ellis, what is your business? 
A. Automobile dealer and filling station operator, and so 
forth. 
Q. How long have you been in the automobile business T 
A. About fourteen vears. 
Q. '¥hat experience ~have you had in the operation of cars? 
.A.. I have had about all of it there i.s to have, I recl{on. 
1\fr. I-Iammack: If your Honor please, Mr. Ellis made 
some tests early this 1norning with a Ford automobile and 
in view of the decision of R. F. -Trant&; Company v. Upton 
it is better for him not to testify as to that. 
Q. Do you know where Mr. R. A. Wright lives? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know where 1\{r. Claude Temple's sto.re is? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know where there is a little side road leading 
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into the road opposite the point of a residence some distance 
up there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you made any tests there today¥ 
page 154 ~ A.. At the point you are speaking of, yes, sir. 
Q. Who was present at the time? 
A. Mr. 1\Ioseley and ~Ir. Wright and :rvrr. Rollins and an-
other gentleman-! don't lmow who he was. 
Q. What kind of automobile were you driving? 
A.. '35 ·Chevrolet Master, four-door sedan. 
Q. What kind of brakes was it equipped with f 
A. Mechanical four-wheel. 
Q. Ho'v far this side of that private driveway that comes 
into the road did you make the tests f 
A. 90 feet. . 
Q. At what rate of speed were you going? 
A. 27 miles. 
1\{r. Harrison: I realize, in view of the Court's ruling this 
morning, you will probably admit this testimony but I desire 
to note an exception for the reasons stated in our discussion 
in the jury room this 1norning; that is, that circumstances 
and conditions of the highway and the conditions existing on 
~lay 23rd, 1937, are not the same as exist today or at the 
time Mr. Ellis made his test and for that reason I ex-cept to 
the question and answer. 
· The Court : Overruled. 
By Mr. Hammack: · 
Q. Proceeding from that point at a speed of 27 
page 155 ~ miles an hour, how far did yon go before bringing 
the car to a stop? 
A. 27 feet. 
Q. How many miles showed on the speedometer of this 
Master Chevrolet that you were driving? 
A. Nineteen thousand something. I don't just recall what 
the thousand was. 
By the Court : 
·Q. When you say you stopped in that distance, under what 
circumstances did you stop? 
A. I applied the brake at an object. 
Q. At a given point' 
A. Yes. 
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· Q. You were driving the car and you had in mind a certain 
point at which you were going to apply the brake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew where you were going to apply the brake be-
fore you applied it¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then applied the brake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't apply it on an unexpected signal from any-
body? 
A. No, sir. 
page 156} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv ~fr. Harrison: 
~ Q. You went out to this scene for the express purpose of 
:applying those brakes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is why you went out there, to make this testY . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. How did you desig'llate the point you were going to be-
gin applying· your brakes? 
A. Put a brush on the side of the road. . 
Q! Then you went down the road and started up the road Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you got opposite that brush you slapped on 
the brakes; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As you approached the brush you knew you w'ere going 
to put on the brakes when you got to the brush? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you put them on at the brush? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you went 27 feet under those ·circumstances 
before you stopped 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. You put on full bra.kes 7 
page 157 } A. Yes. 
Q. The car was in good condition? 
A. Very good. 
Q. At what point on this hill did you make the testf 
A. It was on the right-hand side going south. The starting 
point of applying the brakes was 90 feet from the intersec· 
tion. 
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·Q. You applied your brakes at the ste~pest part of the hill 
as it goes .up? 
A. Just about, I reckon. . 
Q. You didn't apply your brakes at the bPow of the hill, 
did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This was as you approached the brow of the hill that 
you applied your brakes~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make any tests to determine how many feet 
you would have gone if you had applied them on level groundt 
A. No, I didn't. . 
By the Court: 
Q. vVas the road in fairly good condition or 
A. Yes, sir, just a little bit slick on top. 
Q. Did that affect the action of the brakes f 
A. No, sir, the brakes applied very equally and it didn't 
sway at all but all four wheels slided. 
page 158 ~ By 1\Ir. Harrison : 
Q. Mr. ~Jllis, do you lo1ow whether or not the 
Division of Motor Vehicles of the State of Virginia has made· 
certain tests and has certain findings as to what distance a 
car going thirty miles an hour can be stopped? 
The Court: Don't answer that question. 
Mr. Hammack: I object to that line of examination. I ob-
ject to any circular the Motor Vehicle Department has g·otten 
· out, showing 'vithin what distance a car going- at a certain 
·rate of speed on level ground may be stopped. 
The Court: I sustain the objection. 
By the Court: 
Q. You say you have driven and operated an automboile a 
g-reat deal-fourteen years¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Under all sorts of conditions f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You would say you were rather an expert at that'f 
.A. I wouldn't say an expert. 
Q. You wouldn't claim that, however Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever perform any experiments or could you 
indicate, do you think, de:finite~y any difference between 
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stopping· and applying your brakes at a desig-
page 159 ~ nated place known to you beforehand and stopping 
your car on an unexpected signal or unexpected 
emergency? Do you think that would make any difference? 
A. Well, Judge, I would think knowing a thing it would be 
far better than something unexpected. 
Mr. Harrison: Will you permit me to ask the question 
about the ~Iotor Vehicle book? I didn't get through with the 
question. 
Mr. Hammack: 1-:Ie was reading· from a book. 
1\{r. Harrison: I am reading from a book put out by the 
Division of Motor Vehicles. 
The Court: Don't ask that. Disregard any reference to 
any book. 
W. B. MOSELEY, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Moseley, where do you live? 
A. I live about four miles from Ebony. 
Q. What is your business, 1\Ir. :rvioseley? 
A. Farmer. 
Q. I believe you are a merchant too, aren't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 160 ~ Q. Are you· a member of the Board of Super-
visors from l\{eherin District 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state whether or not you were present near the 
residence of 1\{r. R. A. Wright a short while ago? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. WhP.n Mr. R. F. Ellis made a stopping~ test with a 1935 
Master Six Chevrolet? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just at what point on the road did he make that test? 
.A. He made it right in front of Mr. Robert Wright's house. 
Q. Before he got to the crest or the top of that hill? 
.A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. How fast was he traveling at the time? 
.A. .About 27 miles. 
Q. How far did he go after applying his brakes before 
stopping? 
A. He stepped it and said 27 feet, I think. 
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Q. Did you watch· that distance stepped? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. Please state whether or not 1\IIr. Raymond Wright made 
a similar test with a Chevrolet car he had? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 161 ~ Q. vVhat model car is his T 
A. '36, I think. 
Q. Is his car equipped with mechanical or four-wheel 
brakes? 
A. Four-wheel brakes. 
Q. How far did he go before stopping at a speed of 27 
m~les per hour Y 
A. I think Wright stepped his and said he stopped in 18 
feet. 
Q. The car Mr. Ellis was using, I believe, the Chevrolet, 
had mechanical and not four-wheel brakes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: You mean mechanical and not hydraulic 
brakes? Is that what. vou mean Y 
~{r. Hammack: Yes: sir. 
The Court: There may be mechanical four-wheel brakes, 
as far as I know. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Wright then went a distance of 18 feetf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You made certain tests with your carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What make car is yours? 
A. Mine is a '37 Olds. 
page 162 ~ Q. '37 Oldsmobile? 
Mr. Hammack : If your Honor please, I think I had better 
not ask him about that. 
The Court : Don't ask it then. 
Q. Mr. ~ioseley, did you go to the scene of this accident 
near Mr. Wright's residence on the afternoon of May 23rd, 
1937? 
A. Yes, sir, I got down t.here-I don't know-just about 
sunset, I think. 
Q. What did you find when you got there? 
A. We looked. at the road there and saw where the children 
was hit and where it hit the wagon, and so on. That is all 
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I saw. We didn't do any measuring or stepping or any-
thing. 
Q. Did you see any point on the road there that would in-
dicate where the car and the child came into collision Y 
The Court: You are asking the witness to draw .an in-
ference. Ask him what he saw on the road. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. What did you observe on the road there, Mr. Moseley? 
A. 1 saw 'vhere the little wagon 'vheels scraped along in 
the road. That is the only thing. 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you know that? Do you know that a lit-
pag·e 163 ~ tie wagon wheel scraped along in the road Y 
A. No, I don't know it. 
Q. Then just tell what you saw. _ 
A. The little wagon wheel was all I saw. 
Q. vVha t did you see on the surface of the road~ 
A. Nothing but where it scraped. 
Q. Something scraped, you mean? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Was that freshly scraped? 
A. It seemed to be freshly scraped. 
Q. How far was that from the eastern side of the high-
way? 
A. I couldn't tell you about that either. I don't know ex-
actly how far it was but the way I saw it, it wasn't quite in 
the middle of the road. I wouldn't say how far it was from 
the- middle of the road. 
Q. Not quite in the middle of the road? Was it nearer the 
eastern side or the western side? 
A. I couldn't tell you about that. 
Q. You didn't make any measurements? 
A. I didn't make no measurements because I didn't have 
anything to do with it. , 
page 164 t CROSS E·XAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Harrison: 
.. Q. These tests that you made this morning, which side of 
that hill were they made on 7 
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A. They were made con1in~ from this way, going that way. 
Q. From Lawrenceville going toward Ebony Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you go up that hill to the brow of the hill! 
ll. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And your tests were made on an incline, were they not f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did any of you make any measure1nents on level ground 
or after yo~" go over the brow of the hill? 
A. All of Mr. Ellis' measurements were made coming from 
this way. 
Q. Up the hillY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did he decide to stop 1 Did he go opposite a 
certain point and then put his brakes on? 
A.. Yes, sir, he started to stop, I would say, 25 or 30 steps 
from the top of that hill. 
Q. What I mean by that, did he pick out a bush or tree 
beside the road and say, ''I am going to put my 
page 165 ~ brakes on when J get beside that tree" Y 
A. Yes, and he had a little bush there in the 
road. 
Q. And he made up his mind as he approached the bush 
that he was going to put his brakes on at that point. Did you 
make a similar test? 
A. I tested mine up in front of the house. That is where 
I stopped, just about on top of the bill. 
Q. Did you begin the application of your brakes at the san1e 
bush or a little bit beyond? 
A. :Mine was beyond that. Mr. Ellis drove my car. I told 
him I thought that w·ould be a better test, to let him drive 
both cars himself. 
Q. So Mr. Ellis did all of it 1 . 
A. Yes·. I drove my car first but I stopped mine a little 
quicker than he could because I Imew more about stopping 
it~ 
A. B. WRIGHT, 
a witness called on behalf of the plaintiff and being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : · 
Examined by Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. W rig·ht, ,vhere do you live f 
A. Ebony. 
Q. You formerly lived at White Plains, did you not f 
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A. Yes, sir. 
page 166 ~ Q. What relation are you, if any, to Mr. Prince 
I. Wright, the plaintiff here¥ 
A. We are second cousins. 
Q. Were you present a short while ago when certain tests 
WP.re made out near the residence of Mr. R. A. Wright Y 
.A. I went down there directly after the accident occurred. 
Q. (The question was read). 
A. Yes, sure. 
Q. What cars were used in making those tests Y 
A. They used an Oldsmobile and a '36 Chevrolet and a 
V -8 Ford, I think. It looked like a Ford. 
Q. Was 1\tir. Raymond Wright's car one of the cars used 
in making_ that testY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of a car is that¥ 
A. Chevrolet '36, I think. 
Q. What was the result of the tests made? What was the 
result of the stopping test made by that carY 
A. By the Chevrolet 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. He came in running 30 miles an hour from 90 feet dis-
tance and stopped in 18 ·feet, running 30 miles. 
page 167 } By Mr. Harrison:· 
Q. From 90 feet distance Y What do yon mean? 
A. Yon see from 90 feP.t down the road. He put his brakes 
on hut he didn't get far-18 feet. I wonldn 't say it was ex-
actly 18. It was six steps. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Who stepped it? 
A. I stepped it. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Ellis drive a Chevrolet 1935 Master 
Sedan owned by me? 
A. That was the car. I thought it was a Ford. I didn't 
look at it. It come up about the time we got there. 
Q. What were the results of the tests made by that carY 
A. Let's see now. I conldn 't tell von exactlv. Mr. Ellis 
was drivin~ ~:Ir. W. D. l\iosP.ley's car. I think Mr. Ellis 
stopped with that car, the black car, in about 27 feet. 
Q. Yon say you went to the scene of this accident on the 
afternoon of May 23rd Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had the child been moved when yon got there? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where had it been taken Y · 
A. To the hospital. 
Q. Did you make any observations on the roadway there 
just in front of Mr. R. A. Wright's residence! 
page 168 } A.. Yes, sir, we looked at them good. 
Q. Ple&,se state to the tT ury just what observa-
tions you did make there? 
A. Well, Mr. vVright's brother Herman, I believe it was, 
and myself took a flashlight and went out there and looked 
at it good and we saw where the automobile hit the little 
wagon. 
By the Court : 
Q. You saw something on the road f 
A. I saw where the little wagon was hit. 
Q. No, you saw certain marks on the road. You are draw-
ing a conclusion. Yon just tell what you saw. 
A. If anybody came and made that mark-if any person's 
head would have made that mark in the road he wouldn't have 
lived a second. 
Q. I said just tell what you saw in the ro~d. 
A. It wa!f! a hole knocked in there. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. ]\l!r. Wright, did yon see the little wagon? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What 'vas the condition of the wagon? 
A. It was bent up pretty bad. It looked like it was hit on 
the side near the rear 'vheel. 
Q. Was this one of the wheels on ·the wagon? 
page 169 ~ A. I conldn 't tell you. That looked like one. 
It was a little wagon that carried a wheel of that 
type. · . 
Q. How far 'vas that mark from the eastern edge of the 
highway? 
A. The eastern edge T Which way do you mean f 
Q. :Come over here, Mr. Wright. 
A. I mr-mn this way or going toward Ebony. 
Q. This is going toward Ebony. Here is the Wrig·ht resi-
dence on this side. On which side of thH road was that mark? 
A. The mark was on the left-hand side going toward Ebony. 
Q. The left-hand side going· toward Ebony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And that is thP. eastern side of the road and you say it 
'vas about seven feP.t' 
A. I don't know P.xactly about that. It didn't appear to 
be that far but I heard some of them say it was. 
Q. Was there anything on the ground to indicate from 
what course the car had come that struck that object in the 
1·oad therP.! 
The Court: Let him say what was on the road and let the 
'tT ury draw the conclusions. 
Bv the Court: 
·· Q. What marks were on the road, if there were 
page 170 } any marks on the road 1 
A.. We found three blood clots down from this 
lJlace whP.re the wagon was hit, several feet down the road . 
.Apparently one of them was from his month. 
:Nir. Harrison: I object to that. 
The Court: I don't think that is proper, gentlemen. He 
-can say he found blood in the road and say where he found it. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Where did you find blood spots? 
A. Right opposite the big sycamore tree down several feet 
from where the 1vagon ·was struck. 
Bv the Court: 
·Q. From whatf 
.A.. Opposite a big sycamore, further· up from where the 
'vagon was. 
1\Ir. Harrison: I object to that. 
A. Fron1 where the hole was in the ground. 
The Court: That is different. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv ~1: r. Harrison : 
~ Q. Was Mr. Huff Harris there at the time you were mak· 
ing this investigation f 
page 171 } A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he see everything you saw' 
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A. I don't know whether he was out there at the time. 
Q. Did you go with him out there Y 
A. He was out there in the road two or three times. 
Q. Were you with him one of those times Y 
A. Y e_s, him and I went down there together. 
Q. Did you ·show him those marks in the road Y 
A. I don't think so. · 
Q. Why didn't you show him those marks if they were 
there, _Mr. Wright? 
A. I didn't think Mr. Huff wanted to fool with it. 
Bv the Court : 
.. Q. What did you say? 
.A. It was a right sad accident and I didn't think 1\£r. Huff--
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Mr. Harris went out there two or three times to investi-
gate it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew he was interested.? 
A. Yes, sure 
Q. What type of mark was that in the road Y 
A. Mark whereabouts? 
page 172 } By the :Court: 
Q. Describe the mark? 
A. The little hole in the road? It looked like some object · 
had pressed down in the hard road there and knocked the 
dirt out of the ground. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. About how deep? 
A. I wouldn't say over two or three inches deep. 
Q. How Ion~: and how wide Y 
A. .A little bit larger than my two fists. 
Q. How long? 
A. Not much longer than that (indicating). 
Q. This morning that yo'u made those tests you all had 
already decided at what points you were going to apply the 
brakes? 
A. Yes, we got back a certain distance. 
Q. And the tests were made as you went upgrade Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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RE-DIRECT E·XA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Wright, did you see the child, Carl Allen Wright, 
after he had been broug·ht back from ,the hospital Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you observe just on what parts of his 
page 173 , ~ body he 'vas injured 1 
A. The bigg~?.st portion of his body that I saw 
was his head and neck. That was pretty badly bruised up. 
Q. flow about his eyes~ 
A. One eye was practically knocked out and the bone over 
that side looked like it was caved in. 
Q. Were any bones broken about his body? 
A .. I couldn't tell about that. 
Q. It was a corpse then 7 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. You said from the looks of the wagon you thought it 
was hit at the rear wheel? · 
A. Hit next to the rear wheP.l in the side, kind of slant-
wise. 
Q. Between the rear and the front 1 
A. Yes. 
J. HUNTER LOVE, 
recalled on behalf of the plaintiff and testified ·further as 
follows: 
The Court : Don't go over previous ground. 
1\fr. Hammack: I might say to .the Court I am merely call-
ing this 'vitness back to the stand to correct a 
page 17 4· ~ mistake he made. 
Ry 1\{r. Hammack: 
Q. ~Ir. Love, tell the Jury there. 
A. Instead of being at 8 it is back to the north about 35 
feet. 
The Court: Has he· made any designation on that map that 
he "rants to correct? 
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Bv 1\fr. Hammack: 
-Q. 1\iark that, if you will, 8-A. 
Mr. Hammack: He said the car came to rest there. 
The Court: He didn't say the car came to rest there. That 
is where the other nail is. 
By 1\!Ir. Hammack: 
Q. Put ''other nail'' there. 
A. (Witness does so.) 
PRINCE I. WRIGHT, 
the plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
Examined by 1\ir. Hammack: 
· Q. Your name is Prince I. Wright? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the plaintiff in this case f 
page 175 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. HavP. you qualified Y 
The Court: Isn't that admitted Y 
Mr. Harrison: If Mr. Hammack makes the statement-
Mr. Hammack: I alle,Q:P. it in my bill. 
The Court : There is no question as to the qualification of 
Mr. Wright? 
J\.fr. Harrison: If Mr. Hammack says he qualified, I will 
takP. his statt:~ment. I don't know. 
rrhe Court: ·Do you make that statement f 
1\Ir. Hammack: Y P.S, sir. 
The Court: It is admitted that the witness, Prince I. 
Wrig·ht, has qualified as the administrator of Carl Allen 
Wright and Mr. Wright as administrator is the plaintiff in 
the case. 
Bv 1\fr. Hammack: 
·Q. How many children have you or did you havef 
A. I had thrP.e. I have two now. 
0.. How old is your oldest child f 
· A. FourtP.en yP.ars old. 
0. What is it, a boy or a girl? 
A. A boy. 
Q. Then you have another son living whose name is Earl 
Wright? 
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A. Correct. . 
page 176 ~ Q. Earl Wright and Carl Allen Wright, the 
deceased, were twins, I believe Y · 
A. Yes. 
Q. When were these boys born, Mr. Wright Y 
A. Born the 19th of February, I believe. 
Q. What year Y 
A. 1930. 
Q. The 19th of February, 19307 
.Mr. Hammack: Here is a certified copy-
Mr. Harrison: I admit that. 
The Court: Don't concern ourselves with anything that 
is a concessum. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Is your wife living Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is her name~ 
A. Pattie Elizabeth Link Wright. 
Q. She was Pattie Elizabeth Link? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On what day did Carl Allen Wright die? 
A. He died on the 25th of lVIay. 
Q. On what day was he injured, 1\{r. Wright? 
A. On the 23rd day of May. 
Q. Where were you at the time your deceased son received 
his injuries Y 
page 177 ~ A. At my wife's father's funeral. 
Q. Where was your wife's father's funeral 
held? 
A. In Halifax County near .Alston, Virginia. 
Q. Who 'vent with you to the funeral? 
The Court: Is that material Y 
~fr. Hammack: No, sir. 
A. My father and brother'$ wife. 
The Court: I don't object to the question but I think you 
n re making the record longer. 
Ry Mr. Hammack: .. 
Q. What did you do with the children while you were gone t 
. A. Left then1 with my mother. 
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Q. What time did you get back home¥ 
A. Around a half hour of sundown, I reckon-maybe it 
wasn't quite that. . 
Q. What did you find had taken place¥ 
A. One of the children had been hit by a car ~nd carried 
to the hospital. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I went right straight on down there. 
Q. Mr. Wright, when did you first n1ake observations on 
the road there where this accident took place? 
A. The next morning. 
Q. State to the Jury just what you saw theref 
page 178 ~ A. I could see where something had dragged 
out a hole in the road and could see where brakes 
were applied on the car' and that dragged. 
Q. Were you present when lVIr. W. D. Cates drove a sixty-
penny nail in the ground where something had-
A. No, sir, I wasn't there. 
Q. How far from that point where a hole 'vas knocked in the 
gr~und was it before the child came to rest¥ 
The Court : Before what? 
Mr. Hammack: Before the child stopped or was halted. 
The ·Court: Before thP. child was halted Y 
Bv 1\ir. Hammack: 
w Q. How far was the child's body found~ 
Mr. Harrison: Ask the 'vitness if he knows that. 
The Court: Does he know of his own lmowledge where the 
child was found? 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Do you know of your own kno,vledge where the child 
was picked up' 
A. I know what they told me. I know wherP. I found a 
puddle of blood there. 
The Court: He can say what he found on the road. 
I 
page 179} By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. What did you say your age was, Mr. Wright? 
A. I will be 42 in FPbruary. 
Q. ·Your ·wife, Mrs. Wri~ht, is not here today? 
.A. No, sir. 
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Q. Why isn't she here 7 
A. She just didn't want to come. She is just a nervous 
wreck. · 
Q. How has the death of this child affected her Y 
A. Right bad. 
Q. Is her health as g·ood now as it was before Y 
A. I couldn't say that it is. 
CROSS EXA.l.\1INA.TION~ 
Bv Mr. Harrison: 
··Q. How old was Carl? 
A. He was seven years old. 
Q. Had he ever been to school T 
A. I think he went last session. 
Q. He had been to school one year when this accident hap-
pened? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In whose care and custody did you leave the child on 
that day·Y 
A. I left him with my mother. 
page 180 ~ Q. Was she in the habit of keeping him when 
you and Mrs. Wright went away Y 
A. Yes, it is the only place we had to leave him. In other 
words, that was the only time we left him. 
Q. Did 1\tirs. Wright consent to thatT Did she leave him 
· tooT 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was agreeable with her to leave him there? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you all discuss the matter before you left the child? 
A. No, we didn't discuss the matter. 
Q. Did she know that you 'vere going to leave him with your 
mother? 
A. Yes, sir, I told her I was going to leave him. 
Q. Had you ever talked to Carl·about automobiles and the 
highway along there and the danger of it? 
A. We always taught them not to play in the road because 
they would get run over. 
Q. You had always taught them if they got in the road 
they would get run over? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Do you think he understood that? 
A. I don't know. He mig·ht and he might not. 
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Q. Had he been right careful to stay out of the 
page 181 ~ road Y 
A. Yes, he had. 
Q. Had you ever had any troubie about that with him be-
fore? 
A. No, we live on the road anyway. 
Q. He was a bright little fellow? 
A. I reckon he was a normal child. 
By the Court: 
Q. For my own information, where is your home with ref-
erence to White Plains Y 
A. I livP. rig·ht at White Plains, just down about 400 or 
500 yards from my father's. 
Q. Is it on this side of White Plains Y 
A. Yes, on this side of White Plains. 
Q. Not between White Plains and Bowers Corner? 
A. No. sir, this side. 
Q·. What is your mother's name? 
A. Ida Wright . 
. Q. How old is she Y 
A. She is around 65, I reckon. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Hammack: 
~ Q. Mr. Wright, your sister, Mrs. Culp, was also at your · 
mother's house at that time, wasn't she Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
page 182 ~ Q. And she had, I believe the evidence is, two 
children there at the same time Y 
A. Yes, sir .. 
0. You say Carl Allen Wrig-ht was about the average nor-
mal child? 
A. HP. was about a normal child, I reckon. 
Q. He had been to school one year 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. He started then before he was seven 7 He must have, 
didn't he? 
A. I reckon hP. did. 
Q. He didn't become seven, I don't believe, until the 19th 
of February of this year. . 
Mr. Hammack: If your Honor please, the plaintiff rests 
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with the exception of the fact that 've desire to make a mo-
tion for a view of the scene of this accident by the Jury. 
The Court: vVe can arrange that. 
J\!Ir. Harrison : I concur in that. 
The Court: One of the jurors spoke to me this morning 
and I told him that would depend largely on the action of 
counsel and I will be glad for them to do it-not 
page 183 ~ at this time, however. 
Mr. Hammack: This view will take place at 
the close of the evidence. · · 
The Court: We may be able to do it when we are consider-
ing instructions. ' 
(At this point Counsel conferred with the Court at· the 
Bench. The Reporter understood that a motion was made by 
Counsel for defendant to strike the plaintiff's testimony. If 
this transcript is presented to the Court, to be made a part 
of the record for an appeal, this motion, the ruling thereon 
and exception, if any, should be inserted.) 
page 184 ~ W. S. DAMERON, 
a witness called on behalf of the defendant and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Harrison: 
Q. State your name? 
A. W. :S. Dameron 
Q. Are you connected with the State Highway Department f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In what capacity? 
A. State Police Officer. 
Q. Will you state whether or not subsequent to May 23rd, 
1937, you made an investigation of the accident which occurred 
on the Lawrenceville-Ebony road near the residence occupied 
by Mr. Wright, the plaintiff in this caseY 
A. Someone called mP. on Monday which was the· 24th of 
May about an accident that happened at White Plains and 
that was on 1\{onday about twelve o'c1ock, and I had to issue 
drivers' licenses every 1\{onday afternoon, so I didn't have 
time to go over that afternoon. So I did go the next morning 
which was the 25th and I examined the scene but there weren't 
~ny marks or anything. 
Q. You found no marks there at all? . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make your investigation? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
page 185 . } Q·. D~d you make your report Y 
.A,. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you summon any parties to Court~ 
A. No, sir, I didn't. 
Q. Will you state whether or not sontetime during the first 
. of October, 1937, you accompanied me to the scene of this 
.accident? 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. We went in your car, I believe1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state whether or not at this time I took some 
photographs T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you present at the time f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see me take the photographs 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you herewith a photograph of the road at that 
point and ask-
Mr. Hammack: If your Honor please, I object to the in-
troduction of any photographs taken as of October 1st upon 
the ground that they would not reflect the condition of affairs 
existing there as of May 23rd. . 
The Court: Taken in connection with the testimony of 
~fr. Hunter Love who was introduced on behalf of 
page· 186 ~ the plaintiff, who was undertaking to tell. the Jury 
th~ comparison of the condition now existing and 
the condition existing in the latter part of May, I think the 
photographs are proper unless you can show there has been 
some. rna terial alteration in the terrain there. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. I hand you a photograph that I ask to be identified ''W. 
S. D. No. 1'' and a·sk you if that is. a photograph of the high-
way, that is the Lawrenceville-Ebony highway, north of the 
entrance 'vhich is directly opposite the Wright home? 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. How does the road go at that particular point-
meander? 
A. You mean north or south? 
Q. North. 
A. The road curves in here. 
' , 
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Q. Can a person standing at the entrance dir~~tly opposite 
the. W ray house see down the highway? 
A. Standing in this entrance here 7 
Q. y~~. 
A. No, sir, not for any Cl.ista~qe. 
By a Juror: 
page 187 ~ 
Q! ):s this north over her~ 7 
A. Yes,' sir. 
The Court: The Jury wants to understand. That is a 
view with the camera pointing in what direction~ 
A. Pointing north toward Lawrenceville. 
By & J.-qror: . 
Q. How far can you see down th&t road at this point where 
they sa,y that holA or n~U was put there 7 
A. I should say around 60 or 70 feAt from where the nail is. 
Bv the Court: 
.. Q. Do you know where that was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
;By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. I hand you here another photograph which is designated 
"W. S.D. No.2" and ask you to tell the Jury what is shown 
in that picture and if the nail as driven in th~ road is reflected 
in the picture? 
A~ Yes, ~ir, this is a picture taken looking south on that 
road. 
Q~ It is takep ~outh, looking south, from north looking 
south? 
A.. ·This picture is taken sllowing this direction here and 
here is tlie point that the nail is in the road, designated by a 
pocketlt:nife sticking beside the .n~il. 
page 188 ~ . Q. Is this the nail right there7 
nail. 
A. No, that is a pocketknife stuck right by the 
Q. ~hat is stuek at the point where the nail is Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. With referencA to this picture, will you state the con-
dition of thA north side of the entrance into the old Sam 
Wray JJ_o'Q.se w}J.icb is on the east side of the highway, that is, 
at a point nort}l Qf Y, directly opposite the place designated 
011 the map as 50T 
162 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
W. 8. Dameron. 
By the Court : 
Q. Do you know where the figure designated on the map 
as 50 is out in the road T 
A. ·rt is opposite the north edge of the intersection of the 
road that goes off this Route 644. 
The Court: Do you offer this in evidence Y 
Mr. Harrison: Yes, sir. This is ''W. S. D. No. 1". 
I 
By the Court: 
Q. Picture marked W. S.D. No. 2 shows the road looking 
in what direction? 
.A . .South. 
Q. And what is that space over there 'vhich appears to be 
comparatively level with a slight slope, however, to the leftY 
What does that represent! 
A. That is the road that these children were 
page 189 ~ supposed to come out. 
Q. That is the road into the old Sam Wray 
place, is it Y 
A. That is the road. 
Q. That is the old house up here Y 
A. No, that is an automobile. The house is across the road 
here opposite my car. 
Q. Who lives there 7 
A. I don't know who lives there. 
Q. Opposite that road is there a house up here? 
A. If it is, it isn't close to that road. 
Q. Did you see a house up here corresponding to the house 
known as the Sam W ray house on Exhibit No. 1? 
A. It is a housP. back in there but I didn't take any par-
ticular notice of it. 
Q. That is a level place and that is a sloped place without 
any shrubbery on it is what you say? · 
A. That is the. road that this wagon was supposed to come 
out of. 
Q. Never mind about the wagon supposed to come out. It 
goes where? 
A. By the Sam W ray ho~se. I don't lmow the names of 
the houses. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. With reference to the foliage shown in this 
page 190 ~ pictuTe marked W. S. D. No. 2, will you state 
whether or not the foliage is the same at the time 
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this picture was taken in October as it was on ].£ay 23rd when 
the accident happened 1 
A. No, sir, on May 23rd when I visited the scene of the 
accident, as I drove up to that intersection, I drove up to that 
intersection before I even knew it was there. 
By the Court: 
Q. WhatT 
A. I drove up to that intersection-
Q. What did you say about the condition 7 
1\{r. Harrison: He said he drove up to it before he noticed 
~ . 
A. The shrubbery, as I remember, extended to the ditch 
line. In fact, it isn't a ditch. It is more of just a drain. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Do I understand you to say at the time this accident 
took place the shrubbery as shown in the picture, which was 
takAn in October, 1937, on May 25, 1937, extended all the way 
to the ditch line Y 
A. Yes, sir, lots morr. visible the other day when you and 
I were out there than it was in May when I visited there. 
Q. Lots more in Oct. than it was then 7 
page 191 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you .state, ~Ir. Dameron, the height of 
the Al1rubbery in May when you visited the scene as compared 
with it in October when these pictures were taken Y 
A. I can't say about the heig·ht ·but I know there was more 
shrubbery there. It was almost invisible unless you were ex-
lJP.Cting it and knew it was thP.re. I drove up to that intersec-
tion and I was in 25 or 30 feet of it before I saw it. 
Q. Before you saw the intersection Y 
A. YP.s, sir. 
Mr. Harrison: I also offer in evidence the picture marked 
'"'W. S.D. No.3." 
Q. I ask you what that picture shows or reflects with refer-
en~e to the map Y 
A. That is the road entering from the Sam Wray house 
into Route 644. 
Q. Is that the road that g·oes from point Y up into the 
point X? 
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A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state whether or not that picture showa any 
slope or decline into the highway Y 
A. Yes, sir, it does. 
Q. Was this picture taken from the highway7 
A. Yes, standing in the highway, taken looking 
page 192 ~ east toward the Sam W ray house. 
Q. I hand you herewith a picture-
The Court: You are not designating those pictures for 
the record. You refer to a picture but you don't designate 
them for the record. 
Mr. Harrison: I ask that the pictures heretofore presented 
to the ,Jury and about which Mr. Dan1eron has been ques-
tioned, and numpered on the back as W. S.D. 1, 2 and 3, re-
spectively, be introduced in evidence. 
The Court: That is true, but you say ''I hand you here-
with a picture,'' and you don't refer to the picture, 
Mr. Harrison: W. S. D, No.4. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. I hand you herewith another picture which has been 
marked Exhibit W . .S. D. 4 and ask you to state to the Jury 
what that picture reflects and shows f 
A. That is a picture taken looking north· on Route 644, 
standinp: looking north. That shows the intersection of the 
Sam W ray road back to the right <;>f this corner here. 
Q. Mr. Dameron, with reference to this map, will you state 
on here the first point that .a person traveling south from 
Lawrenceville toward Ebony would be able to see up in this 
entrance to the Sam W ray house 1 
A. I haven't made any tests of that, Mr. Har-
page 193 } rison. The only thing is in May when I drove up 
there I didn. 't see the intersection until I got al-
most on it. 
Q. In 1\fay when you drove up there you didn't see any 
intersection until you almost got on it. Will you designate 
on this map, Mr. Dameron, exactly how the shrubbery grew 
in May at the time you went out there and made your investi-
gation! 
A. The shrubbery 'vas all down here like Mr. Price says,. 
only more dense. than the pictures show. 
Q. Did the shrubbery come down to that diteh line, do you 
r.emember, or notY 
A. Yes, sir, as I remember, it did. 
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Q. It came down to the ditch line Y 
A~ ·Yes, 'sh. · 
Q. Will you state whether or not there is a house on the 
~~ft side Qf th~ road as you approach the Sam Wr~y housef 
A.. Yes, an ice-house or some kind of a house. 
Q. Are there any trees 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state how many, approximately, a~p. the type? 
A. Well, it is a big oak tree sitting right here and there 
is sweet gums and a few pine btl-shes and weeds and broom-
-·. -. - . "straw and l' don't know what all. . . .: 
page 194 ~ Q. Is 'there· any visibility at ail, Mr. Dameron, 
through those trees, underbrush ~nd thick~t as 
you approach that entrance to the Sam W r~y house 7 
.. .A. It was very little, if any, in May. . . 
Q~ Is there any difference between the state of the under-
growth out the.re now than it was in May Y 
·· 4. Npw thr- l~aves have shedded off the trees and grass 
is de~d ancl when I was out there the oth~r day it didn ~t look 
~~yt~~~g lik~ as d~nse as it was. · 
By the Oourt: 
· Q. · J c~n ;t · he~r yo-q. Yo~ said nqw the grass is dead anq 
what! 
A. --:-~d t~~ ~e~ves have shedded from the bushes li:{re it 
1va~ whe:q I was out there the pther day a11d the only tlling I 
can· say is it is nothing like as dense as it was in ~lay when 
I was there. It was very dense undergrowth along the road 
then. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. '\Vas it ~s dense i!l Octo·ber when thos~ pictures w~re 
taken as it 'vas· in 1vfay ¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 1\tlr. :pamero:p., have yon :m~de any investigation or tests 
or measurements to determine bow soon a car go~ng 30 miles 
~~ hou~ co~~d stop on ~ concrete ro~q 7 · 
pa~·e 195 ~ Mr. Hammack: I object. 
1\fr. Harris.on: With lawful brakes as defined 
by the statute. · · . · · . · . 
Mr. Hammack: Thr,re is no evidence that this is a concrete road. . .. .. . . .. , . . . . . .... 
· The Co11rt: Let us tal~ abo~t a dirt road. 
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l\fr. Harrison: I will amP.nd my question to read "dirt 
road,'' taking into consideration the reaction time. 
The Court: What sort of carY 
Mr. Harrison: A Chevrolet car with four-wheel lawful 
brakes. 
The Court: Coach f 
"Mr. Harrison: ·Yes. 
The Court: Enclosed car? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
1\fr. Hammack: That is a highly improper question,-a car 
goinp; 30 miles an hour, within what distance it can stop. 
'11he Court: What is thP. objection to it? 
1\fr. Hammack: ThP. objection to it is this: In order for 
a test of this nature to be admissible, it must be made or have 
refe?renr.e to a roadway and conditions existing as of the time 
of the accidP.nt or collision under investigation. 
page 196 } .All of the evidence in this casn is to the effect that 
this road leading up to the crest of the hill had 
something over a 12 foot ascension going up. The question 
should bP qualified with refP.rence to the conditions existing 
at the timP.. 
Mr. Harrison: Applying that test, all the evidence that has 
beAn introduced by the plaintiff in connection with tests this 
morning would go out. 
Mr. Hammack: Made at the very point where it happened. 
ThP. Court: I so understood. You asked first within what 
distnnee a car could be stopped on concrete~ 
Note : The question was read. 
By the Court: 
Q. Have you made a test of that character? 
A. No, sir, I have never tested brakes on a dirt road. 
By 1\f r. Harrison: 
Q. Have you ever tested brakes on a concrete road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I ask you with reference to a concrete ~oad, assuming 
that a car WAre in good condition, with lawful prakes, being 
operated at ~0 miles· an hour, how many feet it would go be-
fore it could be stopped after the brakes were applied 7 
page 197 ~ Mr. Hammack: I object. The question con-
templates a concr.ete road and a level road which 
is not the condition existing at the time of the wreck under 
investigation. 
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Bv the Court: , . 
• Q. Mr. Dameron, from any experience which you have had, 
if you have had any experience, is there any difference in 
thr. effectiveness in the action of brakes on concrete and on. 
dirt? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On which are they more effective f 
..A. On concrete. 
Q. ~I ore effective on concrete? 
A. Yes. 
_ Q. This is on level road where you made this test 7 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you make it 7 
.lt. I made it in Hampton in 1936. 
Q. You say the action of the brakes was more effective on 
concrete than on dirt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: I will let it go in for what it is worth. 
Mr. Hammack: I am forced to r.xcept on the ground that 
the 'vitness is testifying with reference to a level 
l)age 198 } concrete road and the evidence. is that this car 
was proceeding uphill on a dirt road. 
ThA ·Court: All of that can be taken into consideration. 
This is not an absolute final conclusion. It will probably 
shAd some light on the question and, as a matter of fact, the 
tests this morning were made on a moist road, the witnesses 
. said. 
Mr. Harrison: With an Oldsmobile and a Ford car. 
The ·Court: We didn't lr.t the r.vidence in about the Ford 
car. 
A. Do you mean including tl1e reaction time of the driver Y 
Bv ~1:r. Harrison: 
· Q. Take them separately and together. 
A. Assuming the reaction time to be a half second-
·nv Mr. Hammack: 
., Q. Are you testifying from experience, tests made by you, 
or some booklet you have readY 
A. Either one. I have done· it by stop watches and meas-
ured it and also by the information. 
Q .. What tests are you talking about now?· 
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The Court: He said he made a test at Hampton in 1936. . . . .. 
P,age 19.9 ~ By the Court ~ 
'' · · · · · Q. Did. you ~ver make tests ~th a ~r trayeling 
30 miles an hour· in order to ascertain from a given point 
within what time you could stop that car upon the applica-
tion of brakes? · · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'From a given point th~t yqll ¥:n~w you ~~r~ going· to 
put on the brakes beforehand' 
A. How ~o you mr.an, ,Ju¢ig·e-:-li~~ yq~ h~ve a mflrk ancl 
drive up there and tell a person to put on the br~kes 7 
Q. Well. he wouldn't have to tell yq~ to driye .up there 
and put on thP. brakes, but 4er~ is ~ mark; you drtve up to 
a cP.rt~i~ ~ar}r an¢[ then put 9ll the prakes, ¢lriving up to a 
c'ertain inark. running 30 miles an hour, ~nd the:p. put on the 
brakes. You have made a test knowing where that mark would 
be, to see in what distance you could stop, knowing before-
hand where you are going to put the brakes on f 
.A. That ·aoesn 't include the reaction time because you are 
su:eposed to apply your brake. · 
· ·q~ Yqu ·are· explaining that now but have yon ever made 
such a test' . . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You· never have 7 
A. No~ sir. 
· Q. Have you ev~r made a test in w]lich, without 
page 200 ~ knowing where your brakes were 'going to be ap~ 
. plied, :y~u have ~toppe~ in an emergency on a· 
~np:nal? · 
·A. Yes. sir. that is the only way I did. 
Q. To see how far your car would travelin_q aftP.r apply-
ing thP. brakes when t"tte car was proceeding 30 miles an hour, 
a car like this. a 1.936 four-wheel coach, Chevrolet1 . 
A. We made them with both Chevrolet and Ford. 
Q. Let us concern ourselves with the Chevrolet, not a run-
about or ~ :r;9~dster. · · 
By Mr. Harrison: 
9: qo ~h~;:td ~~d an:s~P.r th~ ~nwstion. 
Mr. :f!ammac~ : If your Honpr Pl~~se, all the cases seem 
to "hold that evidence of test$ of this nature have to be made, 
Wt• ith a car of a S~I!lilar typ~'t9 fb~ OD~ thafis Ul14er investig-a~ 
IOD. 
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The· Court: He said a Chevrolet. 
Mr. Hammack: Does he say coupe Y 
By the Court: 
Q. You said not f 
A. We made them with four or five cars. As I remember, 
they WAre coaches and sedans and I have also made tests with 
my Plymouth here at the same time. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Answer the question. 
The Court: I am going to say that it would 
page 201 ~ appear to me that no test could ever b~ made un-
der exactly the same conditions because the brakes 
of onP. car will vary from the brakes of another and the con-
ditions of the tires will vary and the surface of the road 
varies. Even if it is concrete it can be wet or dry. So I don't 
see how y,ou can ever get exactly the same conditions. 
Mr. Hammack: Under substantially the same conditions 
~is what the decisions hold. 
Bv the Court: 
.. Q. Go ahead. I understand you are testifying with refer-
ence to the effect of the brakes on a Chevrolet car, coach or 
sedan, not a roadster or runabout, a car equipped with fo'ur-
wheel brakes, mechanical or hydraulic. 
A. .Some have both. Both are supposed to stop in the same 
distance. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q .. Answer the question. 
A. The average was 56 feet. 
Q. That is a car going 30 miles an hour can be stopped in 
56 feet? · 
A. After the brakes are applied. 
Q. You mean after the brakes start taking effect? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the rP.action time. Mr. Dameron, from the time 
that ~'OU are told to apply the ~brakes to the act:ual 
l)age 202 ~ application of the brakes, that is, the time it takes 
you to react and realize you have got to put 
your brakes on and put your foot on the pedal and begin to 
apply the brakes f 
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A. If it is half a second reaction time it is 22 feet you 
travel. 
Q. What woul~ be the total .reaction time and brake time 
of a car going 30 miles an hour Y 
A. 78 feet. 
Q. That is on a concrete road? 
A. Y'es, sir, reasonably free from loose gravel and dry and 
level. 
Q. What was the condition of this Wright road? What 
kind of road is the La,vrenceville-Ebony road that goes by 
the Wright house 7 
The Court: As you saw it in May. 
A. It is a dirt road and on its surface is loose gravel, little 
gravel about that big (indicating). 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. What would be the effect of applying brakes on this 
particular type of road? 
By the Court: 
Q. What would the effect of the loose gravel· be on the 
brakes as applied? 
. A. In my opinion-
Q. Never mind about your opinion, but from 
page 203 ~ your experience, if you know? 
A. The stopping distance wouldn't be as quick 
by a third as it would on cement. 
By 1\IIr. Harrison: 
Q. You mean it would take a third longer at least to stop a 
car on a loosely graveled road than it would on cement? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. These tests that you have made were made with what 
type of cars? 
A. We used some Chevrolets and some Fords and this 
Plymouth coupe I have now. 
Q. You statPd that the condition of the road at this time 
was covered with loose gravel and dirt 1 
A. At the time I made the tests 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I mP.an at the time you went out and investigated the 
accident? 
A. In May, yes, sir. 
Helen Harris, et al., v: Prince I. Wright, Adm'r. 171 
W. B. Dame1·on. 
CROSS EXA.l\1INATION. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Dameron, have you ever made a test on a concrete 
road traveling 30 miles an hour when that con-
page 204 ~ crete road was going uphill with an elevation of 
12.2 feAt within a distance of only 250 feet 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yon have notY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I-Iave yon ever made a test on a dirt road going uphill 
with an Alevation of 12.2 feet within a distance of 250 feetf 
A. No. 
Q. Yon don't then anything about what distance would be 
required to stop a car under those circumstances? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Dameron, you are with .the Motor Vehicle Depart-
ment and know something about these matters, I assumeY 
· W ou.ld you say that yon could stop quicker on the level or 
going uphill from the application of your brakes Y 
A. On a level. 
Q. Stop quicker on a level Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'Than you can going· up a hillY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You mean then the hill that you are going up-
A. No, yon can stop quicker going up a hill than you can 
on a level. 
Q. I thought so. 
page 205 } A. I thought yon meant going down a hill. 
Q. Now I ask yon again wouldn't it take longer 
to ~top going· down a hill than it would on a level? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you are not prepared to testify with reference to 
the time within which a car equipped with four-wheel brakes 
could have stopped on this hill immediately before the acci-
dent? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. J\fr. Dameron, how long have you been in this county! 
A. I can1e to this county on December 14, 1936. 
Q. Have you ever been out to White Plains before you 
went out there sometime in May Y 
A. I guess so. I have been all over the roads of the county. 
Q. You had not, you say, noticed that driveway from the 
old Sam W ray house inter sooting that road? 
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A. No, sir. If I had, I hadn't· taken particular notice of it. 
Q. It is your duty to investigate automobile accidents and 
collisions in this county, is it notY 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Was any report made to you about the injury to this 
childY . 
page 206 ~ A. No, sir, I heard it at .Cochran. Someone at 
Cochran Service Station told me on Monday fol-
lowing the Sunday the accident happened. · 
Q. ~rhen you went up there Tuesday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which was two days after the accident took place 1 
A. That .is right. 
Q. That was Tuesday morning, was it not 1 
A. Sometime before noon Tuesday morning, yes, sir. 
Q. The child then at that time was dying or was dead; is 
that correct? 
· A. It died sometime the 25th. I was at Roanoke Rapids 
Hospital the night of the 24th. 
Q. The child's peo_ple on the morning of May 25th were 
looking out for the child, I suppose Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You went there to some place where you thought the 
scene of thP. wreck was Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you didn't get any information! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you came back. When is the next time that you 
undertook to investigate this matter? 
·A. I was there that morning, T~esday morning, and I was 
by there that afternoon again. 
page 207 ~ Q. On the same day! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The child still had not been buried Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When was the next time you undertook to investigate 
this rna tter? . 
A. Well, the morning of the 24th I went over to the Ebony 
High School and talked with Miss Harris. I had to get her 
full name and license number of the car, her driver's permit 
nutnber and all the information we had to put on the accident 
report. 
. Q. That was the 24th, but what I am getting at is after 
the 25th. after the date of the child's death, what was the 
next investigation you m·ade of this matterY · 
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. A. I didn 't·make any more investigation of it. 
Q. Until you went with Mr. Harrison over there about the 
first of October of this year; is that correct 7 
A. I didn't go on any investigation that day. 
Q. You went at the request of Mr. Harrison or Mr. Harris, 
didn't you? . 
A. Mr. Harrison asked me to drive over with him, yes, 
sir. 
Q. Was Mr. Harrison then acting in his capacity as Com-
monwealth's Attorney or as attorney for the defense 7 
A. I don't know, sir. I didn't ask him. 
page 208 } Q. You took some pictures for him out there 
that time? ·· 
A. No, sir, I didn't take any pictures. 
Q. You saw the pictures taken? 
A. I saw them when he taken them. 
Q. Nothing has been done and you have said nothing about 
the matter from that day until now? 
A. Not a word, no, sir. 
Q. I have asked you on one or two occasions to go with me 
out there, I believe? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I have asked you on one or two occasions to give me 
such measurements and information as you might have, . 
haven't I? 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. You wouldn't give it to mef 
· .A. I didn't have any measurements or information that I 
woulcTn 't ~i.vA anyone. The fact is I haven't any measure-
ments on anything about it. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. With reference to 1\{r. Hammack's line of questions, 
weren't you willing to g·ive Mr. Hammack any i11-
page 209 } formation you had Y 
, A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you an~wer all the questions he asked you? 
A. He asked me sometime something about going out ther~ 
and I never heard any more about it until today and he asked 
me something about going to the scene of another accident 
and I told him I would and called him up one day and asked, 
hhn a bout go in~ to the scen(l of the accident. 
Q. Did I tell you when I got you to go out there that I was 
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employed by the defense in this case and told you I wanted 
you to g·o out there with mef 
A. Yes, but I don't recall whether you told me that. 
Q. Y uu rncall I did ask you to go out 1 
A. Yc~s. 
Q. And you showed me the place, did you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
R. H. GRIZZAR.D, 
a witness called on behalf of the defendant and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation and residence f 
A. R. H. Grizzard. 
Q. 1\'Ir. Grizzard, will you state whether or not you have 
been to a scene of an accident that took place on 
page 210 ~ May 23, 1937, on the Lawrenceville-Ebony road 
at a point near the residence of Mr. Wright¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With who~ did you go out there1 
A. I went with you and Mr. Hammack. 
Q. We went out there together f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you take this map over to the Jury and show them 
on the map exactly \vhat you found out there the condition 
to be yesterday when you went over it. This is Lawrenceville 
and that is Ebony. 
A.. This is Lawrenceville f 
Q. Yes, this is Lawrenceville and that is Ebony and that 
is Wrig·ht's bouse. 
A. vYe came up here yesterday and I looked the scene over 
and it was the only time I have been there since the accident 
happened. I have been by there before then, of course, and 
along in here before you get to this intersection there are sev-
eral trees, sweet g1.11ns and an oak tree sitting over in here, 
and on the top of this embankment and ditch line there is 
some shrubbery and weeds. Of course, there are no leaves 
on it. 
Q. What is the condition of the shrubbery at this timeY 
A. Well, it has shedded all of its leaves and I 
page 211 ~ would ~ay anywhere from a foot to two and one-
half feet high. 
Q. As it now exists Y 
A.· Yes, sir. 
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Q. Will you state whether or not there is an ice-hous·e to 
the east or left of the road as you approach the entrance to 
the Sam W ray house 7 
.A.. Yes, sir, a couple of tre~s standing almost in front of 
the ice-house. 
Q. Will you state 'vhether or not the road curves to the 
left as you go south toward Ebony from Lawrenceville before 
you reach the entrance Y 
A.. There is a slight curve, left curve there. 
Q. 'Viii you state whether or not the Sam Wray road be-
-comes visible until you reach a point opposite the entrance 
to the Sam Wray house? 
1\fr. Hammack: I object to the form of that question. 
~Ir. Harrison: I will ask him at what point. 
A. I didn't understand that question. 
Bv 1\tir. Harrison: 
~ Q. At what point, 1Ir. Grizzard, as you approach this en-
trance into the .Sam Wray house on the Law~enceville-Ebony 
hig·hway, going south, does it first become visible, that is, to 
a uerson travelin~; south on the highway, where does it first 
become visible-up in the intersection 7 
page 212 } A. That is up in the intersection? 
Q. Yes . 
.A. I couldn't measure it or tell you definitely but yester-
day I was within 25 feet of it before I knew where the inter-
section 'vas. 
Q. ·You were within 25 feet of it before you ~ould realize 
t11ere was an intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A.nd that was with the shrubs and trees in the condi-
tion they arP. now on December 2nd; is that true? 
A. Yes, sir, not knowing where the accident had occurred, 
and I was riding on the front seat of the car and I was within 
approximately 25 feet of it before I knew there was an inter-
section there. 
By a .Turor: 
Q. Is that road level right there? 
A. Is this one here level? 
The Court: The Juror is asking with reference to the con-
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dition of the shaded area on the east side of the road ap-
proaching the entrance that has been mentioned . 
.A ,T uror: I asked whether or not .it is an upgrade. 
By a Juror: . · 
Q. Is it level as you go over the hill and get here (indicat-
ing on map) 1 
page 213 ~ A. I would say at the top of the-hill, at the en-
trance of this intersection, this road here has 
come up on top of the hill. It is upgrade here. . 
Q. As you come up. here and drop over, whether this car 
could see over that hill until it got right up on top of it Y 
A. I couldn't say. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. You heard me ask Mr. Dameron with r.eference to the 
application of brakes. Will you state to the Jury whether or 
not you have ever made similar tests as to how many feet 
it would take to stop an automobile going 30 miles an hour· 
on a concrete road, assuming that the automobile were a 
Chevrolet coach with lawful brakes? 
The Court: Not lawful brakes-four-wheel brakes. 
Mr. Harrison: Four-wheel brakes in good condition. 
Mr. Hammack: And the same objection is made, of course, 
to that question that 'vas made to the one asked Mr. Dameron. 
The Court: I will considP.r the objection you made to this 
tP.~timony a little later on. The theory of the Court in ad-
mitting it at present is simply as enlightening as distinguished 
between stopping- the car on a gravel road and a dirt road and 
a concrete road. and stopping a car on a level and on a 
. grade. 
page 214} .Mr. Hammack: So far as the enlightening ef-
fect it might havP., if your Honor please, I might: 
state that these gentlemen hold examinations and teach peo-
ple how to drive but WP. are in ·Court now trying a case and 
what we want enlightenment on is conditions existing at the 
time of this wrP.ck. 
The Court: No experiment can be absolute. No experi-
ment can do more than approximate conditions. No experi-
ment can be absolute; it is impossible with any human con-
trivance. HowP.ver, these approximate conditions is a ques-
tion I \\-ill consider. Go ahead for the present. 
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By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Answer the question 7 
A. I don't recall ever making any tests with a Chevrolet 
car or coach, with four-wheel brakes especially. We check 
cars and trucks also. 
· Q. You have. checked them7 
A. Yes, but I don't recall ever checking the brakes of a '34 
Chevrolet coach with four-wheel brakes especially. 
Q. Have you ever checked a Chevrolet automobile with 
four-whP.el brakes that are not hydraulic 7 
A. Yes, sir, I have checked Chevrolets but I don't recall 
whether it was a coach, sedan, or coupe. 
Q. State the stopping time of that. 
page 215 ~ The Court: The stopping time of what? 
:1\ir. Harrison: Of the cars he checked. He 
. sa1d hP. checkP.d cars with mechanical brakes. 
The Court: I don't think that will do. The objection is 
sustained. 
Mr. Harrison : Exception. 
Q. Will you state whether or not you have ever checked 
the brakes of an automobile of the type of a Chevrolet coach 
'vhether a Chevrolet, Plymouth or Ford, with mechanical 
brakes, four-wheel mechanical brakes 7 
Mr. Hammack: Ever tested of the type of a Chevrolet Y 
The Court: I don't lmow what that means exactly. The 
objection is sustained. 
Bv Mr. Harrison: 
··Q. Have you ever tested ~ Ford carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever tested a Ford coach with four-wheel me-
chanical brakes as to how soon it could stop, going 30 miles 
an hour on a concrete road7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hammack: If your Honor please, I am taking excep-
tion to this evidence and the Court is admitting it. I ask the 
Court, in view of that, to permit me to rooall Mr. Moseley af-
ter this 'vitness. 
page 216 ~ The Court: I will do that, yes, sir. 
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By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Answer the question . 
. l\ .. . At what distance? 
. Q. Yes. 
A. They will vary. Some of them will stop in less distance 
than others, but when the brakes are sufficient to meet the 
reqnirements of the State law, they will stop, running 30 
miles an hour in 56 feet after the brakes are applied. 
Bv the Court : 
·-Q. What do you mean by the "requirements of the State 
law"? 
A. That is the way they are testP.d at an official inspection 
station. 
By l\!Ir. Harrison: 
Q. Assuming that a car 'vas going 30 miles an hour, Mr. 
Grizzard, what is thP. reaction time before a person could ap-
ply the brakes 1 
A. That would vary, I think, from a half second to a second 
which would bP. 22 to 44 feet. 
Q. The rP.fH~tion 'vould be from 22 to 44 feet before you 
would actually begin applying the brakes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the ~brakes would be applied? 
page 217 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. W11at do you mean? Were these tests that you made 
tests n1ade by you in which you undertook to apply the brakes 
and stop your car at a point which had been previously desig-
nated to you where the brakes should be applied Y 
A. YP.s, sir, WP. have checked them with a place designated 
and withont. · 
Q. Have you ever done it on a signal which you had no rea-
son to expect' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the difference there? That brings into play 
what you call the reaction time? 
A. Yes, sir. If you designate a place-
0. You are watching· for it and you-
A. You are watching for it and you are ready to apply 
your brakes when you arrive at this designated place. Other-
wise you have to get your foot on the brake after you are 
notified to stop .. 
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Q. Doesn't this still further come into play, that when 
you are making a test you know you are going to be called 
upon to apply your brakes somewhere? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then although you don't know the place where' the 
brakes are to be applied, you have some reason 
page 218 ~ to believe they are going to be called for? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Within a certain interval, and you are more or less 
ready? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any difference between that and the reaction 
time when you are driving along the road without any ex-
pectation of itY 
A. I would think so .. 
By :Nir. Harrison: 
Q. Mr. Grizzard, is there any difference between the effec-
tiveness of brakes on a concrete road and on a gravel road, 
that is loose dirt, grit and rocks Y ~ 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Approximately how much longer would it take to stop 
a car going 20 miles an hour on a dirt road than' it would on 
a concrete road going the same speedY 
A.. I think a third more distance to stop. 
Q. It 'vould $:!:o a third more distance? · 
A. I think so. 
1\fr. Hammack: We object to his opinion about the mat .. 
ter. if your Honor please. 
Bv tl1e Court: 
. Q. Do you know! 
A. I don't know what distance but it would take 
lJage 21.9 } more distance to stop. 
The Conrt: Then strike out his testimony about the third. 
Disregard his testimony that it would take a third more time. 
\Vhat was your question? 
Mr. Harrison: I asked him the difference bP.tween e:ffec-
tivr-mesR of brakes on a concrete road and on loose gravel. 
The Cm1rt: Gentlemen. disregard the witness' statement 
that it wonld take a third more time but you can at this time 
consider the fact that it would take more time. He says he 
hasn't made any tests and can't say it was a third. The 
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statement that it was a third is a matter of opinion, but you 
can accept his statement that it would take more time. 
By Mr. Harrison: . 
Q. You have stopped and tried to stop cars on concrete 
roads, have you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·You have tried to stop cars on roads loosely gravel cov-
eredY ·· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And you find there is a difference Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What difference do you find 1 
A. It takes longer to stop on a gravel or dirt 
page 220 } road than it would on a dry concrete road. 
Mr. Harrison: Your Honor still will not permit him to 
s·ay how much more Y 
The Court : He says he doesn't know. 
Mr. Harrison: He said in his opinion a third. 
The Court: He said he didn't know. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. Would it take a longer or shorter period of time to stop 
a car going 30 miles an hour on a concrete road uphill with 
an elevation of 12~2 feet within a distance of only 250 feet 
than it would on the level Y 
A. You could stop in a shorter time, within a shorter time, 
g·oing upgrade than you could on a level. 
Q. '\Vould that also apply to a dirt road, going up a hillY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And likewise you can stop in a shorter period of time 
011 a level than you can when going downhill Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. Yesterday was the first time you had ever been out to 
thia scene of the wreck Y · 
A. SincP. it had occurred, yes, sir. I have been over that 
road a few times but that is the first time since 
page 221 ~ the accident had occurred. 
Q. I believe I asked you yesterday to go with 
me out there and you said you had an appointment with Mr. 
Harrison? 
A. Ye~=;, sir. 
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Q. And you very kindly went along with both of us 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Do you mean to tell this Jury that you didn't observe · 
that roadway leading out from the old Sam W ray house to 
Route 644 until you got within 25 feet of it 1 
A. I don't think I did. 
Q. Were you looking, Mr. Grizzard 7 
A. I was looking down the road, straight down the road, 
but I didn't know where the accident had occurred and I 
didn't know where it was and I didn't notice it. 
Q. ·You were talking and paying no particular attention 
11ntil Mr. Harrison stopped his car and we said that is where 
thP. wreck took place 7 
A. That is the first time I knew where it took place. 
Q. He was driving' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You weren't looking out for traffic? 
A. No, sir, I usually look do,vn the road but I wasn't espe-
cially looking for traffic. 
By Mr. Harrison:. , 
Q. But you drove up to this entrance and ·you 
page 222 ~ were within 25 feet of it before you saw tt on 
yesterday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were looking and observed the condition of the 
road? · 
A. I was looking ahead at ·the .road. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. ·Mr. Grizzard, I was riding in the same car. I don't 
suppose you can account for the fact that I saw it so much 
soonP.r than you did Y 
A. Well, yon might have known about the place you were 
looking for and I didn't. I wasn't looking especially for 
that place. 
Q. How about a person that was accustomed to traveling 
that road? It would be easier for them. to see that intersec-
tion and to see objects there than it would be for a stranger, 
wouldn't it? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
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a witness called o:q behalf of the defendant and being first 
d:oly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by l\1r. Harrison: 
Q. Where~ are you employed? 
A. Wright-Price Motor Company. 
page 223 ~ Q. Mr. Abernathy, I ask you whether or not 
on May 8, 1937, you checked the automobile of 
MiRs Helen Harris, a 1934 Master Chevrolet coach? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you herewith a bill that appears to have been 
paid by Miss Harris on lVIay 8th, 1937, and ask you 
what work ·was done on the car at that time and its condition 
when it left your garage f 
A. It says "Replace front brake flange arms and bush-
ings," that is the brake shoe housing, and inspection. We 
put a sticker and radius rod bushing, and so forth, that goes 
with the brakP. job. 
Q. You made the official inspection then at that timeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And made any corrections that it needed? 
A .. Adjusted the brakes. Of course, we adjusted the brakes 
when we put on those brake arms. 
Q. 'Vere the brakeR in good condition when it left your 
garage? 
A. YeR, sir. 
Q. Was the car in g!ood condition in other respects T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This was on 1\tfay 8. 1937? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
pap:e 224 ~ By the Court: 
Q. Did you notice the· tires Y Were they in 
good condition f 
A. Yes, sir, we havP. to notice the tires on account of in-
spection calls for noticing the tires. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. And you placed the sticker on there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
1\fr. Harrison: I ask that this bill be introduced in evi-
denc~ as Abernathy Exhibit No. 1. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Hammack: 
··Q. The brake bands were properly adjusted on May 8th t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the tires were in good conditionf 
A. Yes, sir. 
R. F. E,LLIS., 
a witness for the plaintiff, being- recalled, further testified as 
follows: 
Examined by 1\tir. Hammack: 
Q. Mr. Ellis. did you drive Mr. W. B. Moseley's Oldsmo-
bile over the roadway where this accident took 
page 225 ~ place during the recess hour in Court today 7 
A. Y P.s, sir. 
Q. How far did you undertake to stop from that roadway 
which leads o11t into the Ebony-La,vrenceville road right in 
front of l\1:r. vVright '~ residence' 
lVIr. Harrison: The question is objected to. All of the 
questio11s had reference to mechanical brakes a11;d the condi-
tions are not the same. 
Mr. Ifammack: I objected to his Ford demonstrations on 
the level 'vhen conditions wer.e not the same. 
Mr. Hnrrison: A Ford has mechanical brakes. 
l\1r. Hammack: Four-wheel brakes, whether mechanical or 
bydraulic. 
The Court: Your theory is that a brake is a brake f 
lVIr. Hammack: tFour-wheel brakes and properly adjusted. 
The !f1ourt: I am not altogether satisfied about this testi-
mony a8 to these tests. 
1\{ r. IIammack : I wanted to introduce this evidence, but 
to keep any possible error out of the record, I refrained from 
doing so. 
The Court: I will let Mr. Ellis stand aside. If Mr. Har-
rison wishes to go further and to make a test of his own, I 
will let him do it with a similar car. 
page 226 } Mr. Hammack: I will ask your Honor to strike 
out all evidP.ncP. that has been introduced by the 
defendant with reference to Ford cars or other cars of about 
the same type as a Chevrolet. 
The Court: I am inclined to sustain that motion. If the 
timP. . is available you can make the tests out there, if you 
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want to, Mr. Harrison. I am inclined to sustain the motion 
and will sustain it. 
Mr. Harrison: Are you going to introduce anything elset 
Mr. Hammack: The Court will not let me. 
The Court: Understand, Mr. Hammack, Mr. Harrison's 
evidence as to tests goes out of the record and I so instruct 
the jury but he is at liberty to make a test of his own out 
there. 
Mr. Hammack: Will ·your Honor let mine come in and 
then strike it out as you did his1 
The Court: No, ~ir. 
Mr. Hammack: You will not? 
The Court: No. sir. I am striking his out on my motion .. 
Do you want me to strike yours out' 
Mr. Hammack: You are strikinp; his out on my motion. 
The Court: I am striking his out on my motion. Do you 
want me to strike on your motion Y Do you want 
page 227 } me to strike yours out on my motion 7 
HELEN HARRlS, 
one of the defendants, recalled in her own behalf, testified as 
follows: 
Examined by Mr. Harrison: 
Q. Where do you live? · 
A. Ebony. 
Q. What is your occupation 7 
A. School teacher. 
Q. How long have yon been teaching school 7 
A. Eleven years. 
Q. How· long have you been operating automobiles? 
A. Eleven years. · 
Q. Do you have a driver'~ permitf 
A. I do. 
Q. Let me have that, please. 
Mr. Harrison: I ask leavA to introduce that in P.vidence. 
The Court: I don't think you want to take her driver's 
permit. 
Mr. Hammack: It is admitted she had one. 
The Court: It is admitted }rfiss Harris has a driver's per-
mit. 
page 228 ~ By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. On the day of this accident what type of au-
tome bile were you driving Y 
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A. Chevrolet coach. 
Q. Had you ever had an accident before Y 
Mr. Hammack: I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By JYir. Harrison: 
Q. You were driving a Chevrolet coach on this dayf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was with you 7 
A. lVIy mother. 
Q. Where had you been 7 
A. To Lawrenceville. 
Q. For what purpose f 
A. To bring my sister who teaches here. 
Q. What time did you leave Lawrenceville! 
A. I couldn't be exact about the time but it was somewhere 
around between 5 :30 and 6 o'clock, I think. 
Q. What was the condition of thP. weather at that timet 
A. It was fair. 
Q. Was the sun shining? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. A fair day 7 
page 229 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You started back toward Ebony on the 
Lawrenceville-Ebony road Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At 'vhat speed were you driving, Miss Harris 7 
A. I was driving about 30 miles an hour. 
Q. Do you know whether you had been driving faster or 
slower than that before the time of the impact! 
A. At thP. time I was out on the .hard surface highway I 
mig·ht have been driving as much as 35 miles an hour but 
not on the dirt road. -
Q. Do you go on any hard surface between here and your 
home! 
A. Yes, from here to the intersection before you get to 
Meherin River. 
Q Is that Route 58 7 You go on the tar road from Lawrence-
villP. to Broadnax? 
A. Until we turn to the left. 
Bv the Court: 
"'Q. You go up the Diamond road and turn there? 
A. Yes, sir. -
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Bv 1\fr. Harrison: 
··Q. And you turn off of the hard surface to the left ancl 
get on the Lawrenceville-Ebony dirt road Y 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
page 230 ~ Q. What was the condition of that road on 
May 23rd? 
A. It was dry. 
Q. What type of road is it? 
A. Dirt road. 
Q. About how 'wide is the road Y 
The Court: She has been all over all of that. You have 
got the specifications. 
Mr. Harrison: I want the witness to answer. 
The Court: Go ahead. 
A. I guess it is 22 or 23 feet wide. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. As you approached the entrance to the old Sam Wray 
house, this house being directly opposite the Wright home, 
will you state what is the condition of the highway imme-
diately to the leftY 
.A. To the lr.ft where this road leads into the old W ray 
home there were bushes and undergrowth there. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. And also some trees. 
Q. Any buildings? 
A. There was an old building. I think they called it an ice-
house over there to the left. 
Q. Will you come over here to the Jury and show this to 
the tTury? Will you trace your course. This is Ebony and 
this is Lawrenceville and this is the Wright house 
pag·e 231 ~ and that is the old Sam W ray house. Will you 
take this pencil and, for the benefit of the Jury, 
trace your course as you came down the road to the point 
of .the accident Y 
A. Of course, w~ were following this road from Lawrence-
ville along here and about this distance down the road I hap-
pened to notice my speedometer and I was going about 30 
miles an hour and, of course, from there I was going upgrade, 
as you can see from the diagram here, and along here to the 
left were these bushes and undergrowth and trees and com-
ing down from this point-it is north of what they designated 
as Y -th~se children emerged from behind those bushes and, 
• 
\ 
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of course, I applied my brakes as quickly as I could to avoid 
them ·but thP.re was no chance in the time that I had and the 
distance I was from them. 
Q. At just about what point in the highway were you when 
you first. saw the children? 
.A. Well, I would say that I was-
Q. This is the point Y right there. With reference to point 
Y, will you state just about where you were? 
A. I guess, according to this diagram, I was about half way -
from this point marked 50 and point ·Y. 
Q. About half way Y 
A. About half way. 
Q. About how close were you to the children when they · 
emerged from behind the bushes Y 
page 232 ~ A. I would think that I was from 10 to 15 feet 
from them at the time. 
Q. And where were they when you first saw them, Miss 
Harris? · 
A. They had just gotten into the road there. 
Q. What was the condition of the undergTowth or brush 
immedi~·ttely to their right as they came out into the road? 
They were headed this way so their right would be over here. 
A. On J\IIay 23rd the underg·rowth and the bushes there 
werP. very thick and it was impossible to see these children 
coming· down there until they were in thP. road. 
Q. Could you see through those bushes, ice-house, and-
.J..\. No, sir, I couldn't. 
Q. When was the first point that you saw them? 
A. I didn't see the children until they 'vere in what we might 
call the drain or the ditch there. 
Q. Could you have seen them prior to that time, Miss Har-
ris? 
A. No, I couldn't. I saw them as soon as they emerged 
from behind these bushes. 
Q. Why couldn't you see them before? 
A. On account of those thick bushes and undergrowth. 
-Q. With reference to this picture which has been introduced 
in evidence and markP.d ''W. S.D. No. 2," will you state to 
the Jury just about where the children were when 
page 233 ~ they emerged from behind the bushes Y 
A. Well, when they emerged from behind these 
bushes-of course, you realize the undergrowth. was not as it 
was in May and they emerged here. 
Q. Did the undergrowth extend to the ditch line in May or 
not? 
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A. It did at that timP.. 
Q. And about what heigh~? Did the undergrowth extend 
down to this .Point which is the ditch lineY 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. And at a·bout what height, Miss Harris Y 
A. I would say at that time those bushes were-of course, 
there is a grade there and those bushes were at least three 
and one-half or four feet tall. 
Q. Down to the ditch line? 
A. Down to the ditch line because it is a grade up from the 
road, up to that road that leads up to the old Wray home,. 
and those bushes were of different heights because those 
· down near the ground were ~oming down nearer the ditch, 
lower, of course. 
Q. You think they were about four feet down to the ditch 
linP., from three and one-half to four feet Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you first saw the children they emerged into the 
ditch line? 
page 234 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. What were they doing at that time? 
.A. They were riding a wagon being pushed by another 
child. 
Q. Did they stop in the ditch line? Did the 'vagon ever 
stop and at what speed, if any, did it come outY 
A. It didn't stop. If it had stopped, I suppose I would 
have had more chance but the wagon did not stop. It just 
came rig·ht down very near to the car. · 
Q. Did it come straight out of this intersection 1 
A. It seemed to havP. comP. down to the north side of this 
marker iudicated on here and it seemed as if they were going 
across to thP. house. It seems as if they w·ere coming right 
across the road there. 
Q. Do you mean that they came down the north side of the 
entrance of the Sam W ray house? 
A.· Yes. 
Q. W onld that be following the line of shrubs 1 By that 
I mean would they be nearest to the shrubs? . 
A. Yes, they were nearest to the shrubs there. 
Q. The witnesses for the plaintiff have designated on the 
map a point about 12 feet from point Y as the place where 
the accident happened. Is that approximately right! 
A. Where is that? 
Q. They say it happened right theref 
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page 235 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. That would place them at the extreme north 
side! 
A. North side of that-
Q. Entrance to the road Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. At about what speed were you driving at this pointY 
A. Well, the last time I looked at my speedometer I was 
going 30 miles an hour and from that on I was going upgrade 
but, of course, my average speed varied and I could easily 
tell, without looking at the speedometer, that it was around 
30 at that time. It may have been less. 
Q. You don't think it was more¥ 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. When you saw the children, ~!iss Harris-you testified 
y()u saw them about 10 or 15 feet away-what did you do 7 
.A.. I applied my brakes as soon as I had a chance and I 
may have pulled to the right just a little bit but in that time, 
as clos.e as the childrAn were, I didn't have much time for any-
. thing. 
Q. Were they steadily coming into the road? 
A. This child was pushing them and they were coming just 
likP. a flash. 
Q. You mean they came down this little grade 
page 236 ~ here which is designated on the picture "W. S. 
D. 3'' into the road Y 
A. Yes, down near that undergrowth. 
Q. About what was the 'position of your car at the time 
you hit them with reference to the center line of the road? 
A. Well, I wo~ld say the car was a little on the right of 
the center, just a little to the right of the center of the road. 
Q. You mean your left front wheel wast 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. The left front wheel of your car was a little on the right 
of the center 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What type of road is it? 
ThP. Court: You have been over that. 
:J3y l\{r. Harrison : 
Q. Are there two well de:finP.d tracks on each side? 
A. No. just the one track like all of these other dirt roads. 
Q. You mean the traveled public road-drivers drive in 
one track and pull out? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. But you were a little to the right of the center of that 
road 
A. Yes. 
pag-e 237 ~ Q. Is that true? 
A. Yes, sir. _ 
Q. How far did you go after the impact f 
A. Well, I would say I went at least-well, between 27 and 
30 fe t. 
Q. Can you designate on that map about where you think 
you rought your car to a rest? 
A. I was just a little beyond that tree. 
M . Harrison: Indica~ing point 7. 
Q. What did you do and what did your mother do after the 
imp tY · 
A. We ·got out of the car and went back to where the chil-
dren were-lying in the road. 
Q. Did you render what help you could? 
A. I was very excited and so was my mother. My mother 
help d remove the Wright child from the road. 
Q. After seeing those children could you bring your car 
to a top, from the time you saw them until the time. you hit 
the could you have stopped your car f 
A. No, I couldn't have. 
Q. Could you swerve to the right f Did you have time to 
swer P. to the right f · 
A. If I had swerved to the right any more I would have 
been over in this yard. I think I pulled a little to 
page 238 ~ the right. 
Q. Did you pull as much as you could? 
A. As much as I could in the time that I had. 
Q. You said they were, I believe, from ten to fifteen feet 
awa ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you do what you could to avoid this accident Y 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. Were you observing the highway as you approached this 
inte1 section Y · 
A. Yes, I was because as you go over this little incline 
ther you can't see a car when you are going from Lawrence-
ville toward Ebony unless you are watching that roadway 
clos ly. I, for that reason, was observing the road, not know-
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ing that anything was coming out from the ~ide until I . 
.glimpsed these children moving. 
Q. Will you state whether or not the condition of the. road 
· right opposite the entrance to the old Sam Wray place-in 
other words, you come up a hill in going to the entrance. 
When you get opposite the entrance is the road level there or 
are you still going uphill. or downhill Y 
A. In front of the house you are going uphill and then it 
is a gradual dooline in the road there. · 
. CROSS E·XAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Hammack: 
~ Q. Miss Helen, I just understood yon to say 
-page 239 ~ that you could have swerved more to your right 
but in doing so yon would have gone into Mr. 
Wright's yard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would have bP.en the objection to going into his 
yard? 
A. Well, for the simple reason that every time I have been 
driving I have always been told to try to stay to the right side 
of the road and, for that reason, I was trying to stay to the 
right Aide and I was swerving as much as I had time to miss 
the children. · : 
"). You figured then that you have always been told to stay 
to the right-hand side of the road and so long as you are on · 
thP. rip;ht-hand side of the road you are within yoUr rights Y 
Nfr. Harrison: She didn't make that statement. 
ThP. Court : She is on cross examination. He is asking 
her for an explanation. 
Mr. Harrison: I object to that statement. That is not the 
natural inference to be drawn. The witness stated she pulled 
to the rig·ht as far as she could. 
Mt'. Hammack: I object to counsel continually getting up· 
and putting words in the witness' mouth. 
The Court: I think the question is proper. 
I 
Note : The question was read. 
page 240 ~ By Mr. Hammack: · 
Q. That is true, is it not, Miss Helen? 
A. Yes, stay in the road and to my right. 
Q. And on the right-hand side? 
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A Yes, on the right-hand side of the road. 
Q. And notwithstanding the fact that children are in the 
pat of :your ~ar you would hold you~~ .Place on the ri~4t-hand 
side of the fQad rather than to turn Into a yard adJaCent to 
the oad? · · · 
4 I would try to stop as qltickly as I coul9. if they were 
on . y right. side at that time. 
· Q (The question was read.) A~ Yes, I would stay in the road. Q You would think then you were complying with the 1a\v 
by eing on your rig·ht-hand side of the road. That is eor-
rect isn't it Y 
A Yes. 
Q And that th~n is the reason why you dicl not drive into 
Mr. Wright's yard? · 
A I would have been off of the highway then. 
Q And you figure that when a person is driving a car he 
oug t to drive it only upon the highway even though an emer-
gen y should occur, don't you Y 
A Well, I was· driving-yes, I would say drive to the right 
. side of the road in preference to leaving the road 
pag 241 }- under those conditions that existed. 
. Q. Absolutely. That is y~r answer to the 
que tion I asked you. Now, you s'ay that when you first saw 
thes children they had just gotten into the ditch on the east-
ern side of the road. That is correct, isn't it~ 
A Yes. 
Q The road at that point you have testified was about 23 
feet wide? · 
AL Yes, I guess it is. 
i Y. ou then were 10 or 15 fee.t, according· to your evidence, fro the children? · At the time that I first saw them. ~Q: "f!~n you first_ saw them in the ditch line f And yo"Q continued to qrive on then, didn't you, to your rig "t-hand side of the road f ~ I applied my brakes too. Did you apply your brakes before you struck the chil-dr T · I think that I applied my brakes as soon as I saw 'vhat wa going to happen . 
. You d~dn't see 'yhat ~as going to happen until a short 
tim before that? · 
. I saw that they were coming to,vard me and my car was 
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going down the road and I applied my brakes as_ 
page 242 ~ quickly as possible. 
Q. Miss Helen, you saw old Mrs. Wright, an 
elderly lady, go.ing from the road into the house, did you 
not? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you see an auto;mobile parked in front of the house? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you see l\Ir.' Hunter Wright there at the pump with 
some team? 
A. ·No, I did not. 
Q. You did not see any of that? 
A. No. 
Q. You testified this morning, I believe, that you were driv-
iug between 25 and ao miles per hour? 
A. I did. 
Q. In other words, you were driving about 30 miles an hour 
until you started this ·upgrade and then you think you drifted 
back to about 25 miles an hour f 
·A. No,· I don't know that I did drift back because I usually 
keep an average speed and I don't know that I did drift back. 
Q. I u~derstood you though when testifying just now over 
in front of the jury to say that as you went up that grade 
your speed was checked up some Y 
A. I said it didn't increase. 
page, 243 ~ Q. You don't know whether it checked some or 
uot7 
RE-DIRE·CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. You did apply your brakes as soon as you could after 
seeing the children 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you did swerve to your right as much e.s you could 
after seeing the children? - · --
A. I did. 
l\1r. Hammack: This is Mr. Harrison's witness and I ob-
ject to him telling her what she did. It is up to her to tell 
'Yhat sh~ did. , 
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By ~ r. Harrison: 
Q. fter you saw the children emerging into the ditch line 
and merging into the road, what did you do Y 
.A. I applied my brakes as quickly as I could. 
Q. id you turn to the right 1 
Mr Hammack: I object to that question. 
By r. Harrison: 
Q. id you make any turn? Did you do anything but apply 
your brakes Y 
Bv t e Court: 
" Q. Did you do anything but apply your brakes? 
page 244 ~ .A. Yes, I did swerve to the right as far as I had 
a chance to in the time. 
MRS. LAVINIA COURTNEY HARRIS, 
a wi ess called on behalf of the defendants and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
M Hammack: Hasn't she been in the Court room all the 
time 
M Harrison: Yes, sir. 
M Hammack: If your Honor please, this witness has 
been ·n the Court room all the time. Mr. Harrison at the be-
ginni g of this trial m.acle a motion that all of the witnesses 
be s orn and excluded. The witnesses for the plaintiff were 
swor and excluded and the 'vitnesses for the defendant were 
f!wor and stayed in the Court room. 
By t e Court: . 
Q. Did you understand, 1\Irs .. Harris, that you were to leave 
the ourt room 1 
.A. No, sir, I did not. 
M . Harrison: I n1oved that the plaintiff's witnesses be 
exclu ed. 
Th Court: Go ahead and examine the witness. 
page 245 ~ By 1\Ir. Harrison: 
Q. You are the wife of Mr. Huff Harris and 
the other of Miss Helen Harris, the defendant in this ac-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Will you state whether or not you, in company with your 
two daughters, came to Lawrenceville on May 23rd Y 
A. I did. - . 
Q. What .day was that T 
A. This 'vas on Sunday. 
Q. I want you to take this map over here, Mrs. Harris, and 
tell the Jury exactly what happened as you were going home 
that day. This is Lawrenceville and this is Ebony, and this 
is Mr. Wright's home and this is the old Sam Wray house 
over here. Will you state which way you were going on this 
highway? 
A. South. 
Q. Toward Ebony 7 
A. Toward Ebony. 
Q. Who was driving the car 7 
A. Helen. 
Q. Your daughter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of car was it? 
A. Chevrolet. 
I ' ! . ' , 
'l 
Q. 'Vhat speed was it going? 
page 246 ~ . ·A. About 30. 
Q. ·Will you tell the Jury exactly what hap-
pened as you approached this hill? 
A. I suppose we were about 15 feet, I should say, from 
there and we saw this little wagon coming down that incline. 
When I first saw it it was right in that ditch line and there 
was no way for \1-S to avoid hitting it. We came together. 
Q. About how far were you from the wagon when you first 
saw it~ 
A. About 15 feet, I think. 
Q. Your estimate is about 15 feet Y 
A. I should think so. 
Q. About what point of this entrance was the wagonf 
A. It was more to this side, more to the north side. 
Q. More to the north side of the entrance to the Sam Wray 
house? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything to the east of the highway, to your 
left as you approached the entrance to obstruct the view of 
your daughter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state to the Jury what that was?· 
A. Lots of foliage along there, trees and bushes all along 
the way there. 
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page ~47 ~ Q~ .f\r~ there any buildings the~e¥ 
A. There is an old house up there. I think 
they say it is an ice-house. 
Q. Do you know whether that ice-house is located down 
the oa4 or up there1 
A. I~ is up there further. 
Q~ Were there any grass and weeds growing along there Y 
A.. Yes, lot~ <>f them~ · · 
Q~ With reference to this photogTaph: marked "W. S~ D. 
No! ", will you st~te to tl;te Jury whether the foli3:ge was 
grea er or less in May than it was at the time this pict~1re 
was aken T This is the way you all were going. · 
.A. It was greater. 
Q. Whether there was more foliage than when the accident 
hap ened? . 
.A. Sure, there was more than there is now. 
Q. Was there more than there was w}l~n thi~ picture was 
take T 
A. When was the picture taken Y 
Q. In Octo her. 
A. Yes, there was :r;nore there then. 
Q. Will you state to what point the foliage grew in May 
whe the accident happened-to what point on the highway Y 
A. Down to the edge of the highway. 
Q. Down to the edge of the highway T 
A. Down to the edge of the ditch line, you might 
say. 
·Q. About what heig·ht wa..s this ~oliage T 
A I couldn't tell. 
Q. .Approximately? 
.A .Anywhere from two or three feet up. Of course~ these 
tree were farther away from the road. 
Q Will you state 'vhether or not the foliage was of such 
heig t as it concealed the chHdren? 
A Sure, it w~s~ 
Q Could your d~ughter s~e these c4ildren behind the 
foli ge? 
1\ r. Hammack; All of those questions are objectionable. 
T e .Court; WhyY · · 
r. Hammack: ''Could your daughter see these children 
beh"nd the foliage?" · · 
By he Co~rt; 
· Q Where were you sitting Y 
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A. 1Qn the front seat. 
Q. Could you see thmn 1 
A. No, sir, I didn't see them. 
Q. You were sitting on the right-hand side, were you not7 
· A. I was on the right-hand side and she was 
pag·e 249 ~ doing· the driving. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. When did you first see the children' 
A. As soon as they came out from those bushes and they 
were just about near the ditch line. 
Q. Could you have seen them before that time? 
A. I don't think so on account of the foliage. 
Q. y·ou could not have seen them 1 
A. No. 
Q. About where in the road did the left front wheel of 
your daughter's car hit the little wagon, Mrs. Harris~ 
A. It was a little bit to the right of the center of the road. 
Q. On which side of the road was your daughter driving? 
A. ~fore to the right. 
Q. And how far did the car go after it hit the children? 
A. I have no idea about the number of feet down there but 
it went nearly to the little road that goes out from ~fr. 
Wright's and I don't know just how far that is, just where 
this little road goes into the main highway. It stopped this 
side of where that road goes into the highway. 
Q. Do you know with reference to this tree, that is to the 
east side of the highway and the south side of the entrance 
to the Vv ray house, where your daughter stopped? 
page 250 ~ A. Somewhere along there, I should think. 
Q. Indicating point 7 on the map. 
A. I am no judg·e of feet. 
Q. What did your daughter do when the children emerged 
frmn behind the bushes at the ditch line1 · 
A. I think she applied the brakes as quick as she possibly 
could. 
Q. Did she do anything else? 
A. She turned, I think, a little to the rig·ht, as much ~s she 
had time to, but it was all so quick she didn't have time to 
go very n1uch to the rig·ht. 
Q . .She didn't have time to go f Do you know whether she 
started turning to the right or not f 
A. Yes, a little bit. 
Q. Do you know whether she applied her brakes or not? 
A. Yes, she did. 
(, 
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Q. o you know whether or not the brakes had time to be-
gin t king effect before she hit the children' 
A. do not know but I know that she applied them as quick 
as sh possibly could. . 
Q. he car did slide either at the time or after it hit the 
child en? 
A. es. 
Q. nd at that time you say she turned to the right as far 
as she could or as far as she had time f 
A. As far as she had time. 
Q. After your daughter brought your car to a 
stop hat did you do'? 
A. I got out of the car as quickly as I could.and went back. 
Q. nd where were the children then 1 · 
A. I got to the little Wright child first. The others were 
just few feet a.way. 
Q. n the road 1 
A. In the road. 
Q. bout where in the road 'vere they? 
A. The little \Vright child was something· to the right of 
the c nter of the road and its grandmother suggested that 
we. t ke it out of the road, so she and I moved it out on the 
gras and then I took the child up after that and took it to 
the h use myself. 
Q. But you and the child's grandmother, Cad's grand-
moth r, moved the child off the road? 
A. She suggested we n1ove it out of the road. 
Q. Do I understand at the tin1e you picked him up he was 
lying a little to the right of the center 1 
A. Yes, a little to the right of the eenter of the road. 
Q. That was after the accident and you brought 
page 252 ~ your car to a stop? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \:Vhere . were the other children Y 
A. They were just a fe'v feet up there this way from the 
little Wright child. I got to the little Wright child and com-
ing b ck from the car I got to the little Wright child first. 
Q. Mrs. IIarris, as this little 'vagon came down the incline 
into he ditch line on the road did it ever stop or pause? 
A. No, it did not. It "ras moving "rhen I saw it. It didn't 
stop oving at all. 
Q. At what speed was it moving? I don't mean hy that 
in n1'les, but was it g·oing slow or fast? 
A. It was going fast. 
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Q. Was it going of its own momentum or was the little girl 
pushing it? · 
A. The little girl was pushing it. 
Q. The little children were riding in it' 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say it had come down an incline into the road1 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAl\IIINATION. 
By Mr. Hammack: 
Q. lVIrs. Harris, you say that car came to a 
page '253 ~ stop at a little roadway down the road! 
A. Just this side. 
Q. Just this side Y 
A. A road that goes out from Mr. Wright's house. I don't 
know how far that is. 
Q. And that roadway is just this side or just north 'of a 
road camp, isn't itY -
A. Yes, but I have no idea how many feet. 
Q. Did you see Mrs. Wright, the grandmother of the child, 
in the yard of the home there or going in the house y-
A. Did I see her Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, I didn't see 1\!Irs. Wright. We all got there pretty 
niuch about the same time. That was the first time I had seen 
Mrs. Wright; in fact, the first time I had ever met her. 
Q. Did you see a-car parked in the Wright yard thereY 
A. No, I did not. . 
Q. Did you see a boy there at the pump Y 
A. No. 
Q. Any team Y · 
A. No, the first one of the l\f.r. Wrights I saw was out there 
-,vhere the children were. I don't know where he came from 
. but anyhow he was one of the Wright boys. 
Q. That \vas Mr. Ifunter Wright, I expect? 
page 254 } A. I suppose so. I don't know one from the 
other. 
liUFF HARRIS, 
one of the defendants, being first duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
Exa1nined by 1\tfr. Harrison: 
Q. You are lVIr. Huff Harris? 
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Q. Where do you live, :Thir. Ha1~risY 
A. Ebony. 
Q. What is your oceupation ~ 
A Farming. 
"l 
Q. Are you the father of }fiss Helen Harris Y 
A Yes,.sir. 
Q. And this la¢ly who has just testified is your 'vife and 
also the mother of your daughter1 
A Yes. -
Q. It has been testified that a 1934 Chevrolet coach was 
the utomobile involved in the accident on ~iay 23rd ~ 
A Yes. 
Ql Was that your automobile? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Will you state where the auto1nobile had been driven 
that day? 
pag 255 ~ A. It had been to La,vrenceville to bring my 
daughter, teaching school over here. 
Q You 'vere not present in the car~ 
A No. 
Q Did you go to the scene of the accident? 
A As soon as my people got home, I did. 
Q Will you tell the Jury what investigation you made 
the e and what marks, if any, you found and what the condi-
tio of the highway is at that point? 
The highway was dry all right. It was fair weather 
and when I got there I looked around the first thing to see 
abo t where the car was and right over the crest of the hill, 
you know, right in front of the old "\Vray place is right on 
the crest. of the hill as you co1ne out of that gate. One side 
goe one way and one the other. Just over the crest the 
bra es were applied and I noticed where those brakes slided 
but that was the only marks that I sa\v. I went out there 
thr e or four different 'times with other parties with flash- . 
lig s and they wanted to find this thing or the other thing 
but I never s_a,v any marks whatever but where those brakes 
wer .. 
. Mr. Harris, ~ir. A. B. Wright and two or three other 
Wr ghts and 1\Ir. Cates have testifi~d that a n1ark was scooped 
. out of the road there. Did you see that? 
A. I didn't see it. 
256 ~ Q. Did you go out there with Mr. A. B. Wright? 
A. Yes, sir, I "rent out there with Mr. A: B. 
Wr ght. 
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Q. And he testified he found ·the mark out there with a 
flashlight f · 
.A. He didn't find it when I was there. If he did, he didn't 
mention it. 
Q. Did he show it to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you all examine the highway carefully at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many people were there 1 
.A. I reckon twenty-five or thirty. 
Q. Did anybody call your attention, or in your presence,. to 
a mark in the highway 1 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. When did you first hear about this mark? 
A. I didn't hear anything about the mark until today. 
Q. Is today the first time you heard of a mark being 
scooped up in the highway¥ 
A. The first time. 
Q. How many times did you go out there in the road that 
night, looking·' 
A. Well, we didn't go in the house. We stayed right out 
on the side and every now and then some body 
pag-e 257 ~ would come and want a flashlight to go out and 
look and, of course, I was up walking about and 
I would go too. 
Q. And you never saw the mark 1 
.A. I never saw the 1nark. Understand, I don't say it 
wasn't there but I say nobody didn't see it when I was there; 
if they did, they didn't mention it. 
Q. Did you look closely for it? 
A. I did, as closely as you could look with a flashlight. 
Q. Did the people who 'vere there with you look closely 
for it? 
.A. They did. 
Q. And it wasn't seen? 
.A. Understand, it was dark, and they were using a flash-
light. 
Q. With reference to the center line of the highway, could 
you tell on which side of the highway your daughter was 
when the brakes were applied? 
A. A little bit to the right. 
Q. ·To the right of the highway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you take this map, ~fr. Harris, and show the Jury 
the condition of the highway as it existed during lVIay of 
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Huff Harris. 
A. Not one-fourth as much as it was then because the leaves 
are on those gum bushes and the leaves are on those weeds 
and the weeds are standing up and there are 'veeds down in 
the ditch. 
Q. That condition doesn't exist there today Y 
A. It doesn't exist there today. · 
page 260 } By a Juror : 
Q. How deep was the incline Y 
A. About two and one-half feet. 
By Mr. Harrison: 
Q. You mean about hvo and one-half feet from the east 
edge of the hig-hway up in the incline at the point X? 
A. In other words, this is ·not a road. 
Q. It wasn't? 
A. Mr. Wright's stables are over here and they go in and 
out to that stable. That is as far as that road goes. 
Q. Is it a public or private road? 
A. Good gracious, it is just 1\IIr. Wright's road where he 
goes into his stable. He lives on this side. 
Q. In other words, to answer the question one juror asked, 
'vhat is the condition of the road after you leave a point which 
is approximately north at the intersection here, that is north 
of the old Sam 'Vray house f What is the condition of the 
road from point 50 on the map to a point known as point 7-Y 
A. This is right on the crest of the hill right here. 
Q. Are you· going upgrade there or downgrade or level Y 
A. You are going upgrade here and downgTade there. 
Q. You reach the crest of the hill then opposite the W rig·ht 
house? · 
A. Right opposite the old Wray house where 
page 261 } that road comes out, don't you see? I think this 
house here-it looks to n1e like it is a little bit 
farther this way than it ought to be. They may have meas-
ured it and it ought to be correct. 
Q. ~1r. Harris, what was the condition of your car at that 
time? 
A. The condition was good. 
Q. Had it been recently inspected~ 
A. Inspected ~fay 8th. · 
Q. How long has your daughter been driving? 
A. I reckon ten or eleven years. 
Q. Does she drive for you sometimes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Huff Harris. 
Q. Does she drive for her mother f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where does she teach school? 
A. At Ebony. 
Q. Does she drive to and from school or notf 
A. On bad days she does and oh g-ood days she walks. 
Q. She walks to school on good days~ 
A. It !s not very far. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By · r. Hammack: · 
Q. You say you saw where the brakes of your car had been 
applied, which was some distance south of the 
page 262 } crest of the hill? 
A. Just over the crest of the hill. 
Q. You say at that time your car was slightly to the right t 
A . .Slightly to the right. 
Q. You are not prepared to say on 'vhat part of the road 
your car was at the time it came in contact with the child f 
A. No, because I didn't see it. I didn't see anything that 
woul tell me where it came in contact with him. 
Q. And after the brakes had been applied over the crest 
of t e hill, it was slightly to the right' 
A. Slightly to the right. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By ~ r.- Harrison: 
Q. What type of road is· itf 
A. Dirt road. · 
Q. I mean with referencA to the traveled portion of it. Are 
ther two well defined lanes of travel 1 
A. No, sir, you very seldom see but one and I noticed this 
mor ing ninety per cent of the way from E'bony to the river 
the raffle is right in the middle of the road, just one track, 
you understand, except where you meet somebody 
pag 263 ~ and turn. 
Q. Was that the condition of the road in 1\fay OZ 
A That is the condition of the road all the time. 
Q. The condition of the road all the time 1 
A Yes. 
Q Everybody travels the same· portion of the road~ 
A Yes. You know when a road is raised up some, where 
ther is not much traffic, you are g·oing to drive up on top .. 
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H~tll Hctrris. 
You are not going to drive with a car leaning to one side un-
less you meet somebody. 
Q. Or there is some occasion ol 
A. Or somebody is passing. 
Q. Mr. Ha1-ris, I hand you herewith a picture 'vhich has 
been introduced in evidence as "W. S. D. No. 2" and ask 
you whether or not the shrubs as portrayed there-this pic-
ture was taken in October-·were the same as they were in 
May? 
A. No, of course not. At that time those weeds came down 
to the ditch line, don't you see. 
Q. By that did you mean-
A. And they were a whole lot heavier than they were in 
October. 
Q. Do you mean that the shrubs came down to this point 
here? 
A. To the ditch line, if you can show me where that is. That 
is where it came down. · 
page 264 ~ Q. The shrubs came all the way to the ditch 
line' 
A. Yes. 
Q. At about what height f 
A. vV ell, you take some of those weeds, they were up thi~ 
high (indicating) and gum bushes over there from that high 
up to this, full of leaves. 
R.E-CROSS EXAMTNATION. 
By ~{r. Hammack: 
Q. Do you nwan to say on the 23rd day of :.May weeds and 
broomstraw-
A. Yes, that old broon1straw, of course, wasn't up that 
high. I didn't say the broomstraw but the weeds and bushes. 
Q. New 'veeds that had come up~ 
A. Have you been out there1 
Q. I didn't go out there on the 23rd of May, no, sir. 
The Court: We are not getting anywhere. 
By 1vir. Hammack: 
Q. Weeds were there that hig·h that had grown up on the 
23rd day Qf May Y 
A. Yes, l have cut down weeds that high many a time in 
~fay. 
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Prince I. Wright. 
pag-e 265 r lVIr. Harrison: That is the defendants' case. 
The Court: Testimony was introduced by J\IIr. 
Harrison, on behalf of the defendants, with reference to the 
dist ce within ·which automobiles might be stopped on a con-
cret highway and on a lP.vel. I have to ma,ke these decisions 
righ quickly sometimes in the course of a trial. i think now 
that hat testimonv is inadmissible for the reason that while 
tl!eo etically it mig·ht shed some light on the case, yet it might 
be isleading. It is true that no conditions of experiment 
bsolutely reproduce the original conditions. We all 
kno that. They can only be reproduced approximately but 
they must be reproduced substantially, and I think that to 
test ars on a level and on a dirt road or even on concrete 
is n t reproducing the condition of a car that is proceeding 
up a acclivity and on a dirt road. So I instruct you g-entle-
men to disregard the testin1ony on that point introduced by 
the itness Dameron and so1ne other witnesses here on be-
half of 1\!Ir. Harrison. Any other evidence reproducing the 
exac conditions, of course, is a horse of another color. 
M . Harrison : vV e except to the action of the Court for 
the easons stated heretofore. 
page 266 ~ PRINCE I. WRIGHT, 
the plaintiff, recalled in rebuttal, testified as fol-
lows 
Exa ined by ~ir. Han1mack: 
Q. Mr. Wright, something has been said in evidence about 
an i e-house located down here which is not sho'vn on this 
map. vVill you please say about how far that ice-house is from 
this oa~way leading out from the old Sam Wray place¥ 
A. tit IS around 35 or 40 yards. Q. The ice-house is there to show for itse~f? 
A. Yes. _ 
T Court: Is that all? 
lVI . Hammack: That is the case. 
T Court: You say you g·entlem<~n want a view? 
MI. Harrison: I think it would be very good to let the 
Sher ff take the Jury out there and l\fr. Hammack and I can 
argu instructions. 
T Court: If you gentlemen will come into Cou.rt at half 
past nine o'clock I will have the Sheriff take you .out there 
to h e a view of the premises. Yon are not to.hear any wit-
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nesses testify out there. You are not to ask ques-
page 267 ~ tio~s of anybody. Neither Mr. Wright, Mr. Har~ 
ris nor anybody connected with it will be there. 
You are to go out there and make your own observations, in 
Qrder that you n1ay understand the .evidence which has been 
introduced before you here today. The Sheriff will not talk 
to you and he will not permit anybody else to talk to you. You 
can talk among yourselves and you are not to ask any qu~s­
tions. He will take you out th'ere and sho'v you the place 
and let you walk around. It is just a view. It is not a ses~ 
sion of the Court out there. You must simply make your 
own observations and not talk to anybody and not permit 
anybody to talk to you. Counsel say they are not going out 
there with you and you will be in the custody of the Sheriff. 
}feet here at half past nine. Court will convene a little earlier, 
and after Court convenes I ,viii let the . Sheriff take you out 
there and bring you back. 1\tieanwhile, do not discuss this case 
with anybody or permit anybody to discuss it with you or 
mention it in yonr presence, and the Court will take a recess 
for today. 
-At 5:30 P. l\L Court adjourned until 9:30A.M., December 
4, 1937. 
page 268 ~ The following were the instructions, and all the 
instructions, that \vere granted by the Court on the 
trial of this case, which said instructions numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, and 9, were g-ranted at the request of the plaintiff; Num-
bers A, B, c, D, E, F, G, I, 1{ 1\1:, and Nat. the request of the 
defendants ; and numbers X, Y, and Q by the Court of its own 
motion, to-wit: 
1. 
The Court instructs the jury that the infant child, for whose 
death dan1ages are asked in this case, was seven years and 
three months of age at the time he received the injuries from 
which he died. Therefore, the Court tells the jury that there 
is a presumption of law that the child was not capable of be-
ing· guilty of neg·ligence, ... on his part, that contributed to his 
injury and death; And the Court, therefore, instructs the 
jury that if they believe from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant, Helen Harris, was guilty of any 
negligence, as defined or mentioned in other instructions in 
the casP., that proximately caused the injuries and death of 
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the · ant child, and that the plaintiff's intestate was without 
cont ·ibutory negligence on his part, if it appears that the 
pres ption of his incapability of such negligence has been 
repe led, the jury must find a verdict for the plaintiff. 
G anted: p. p .. 
l\L R. P. 
D cember 4, 1937 .. 
4. 
T e Court instructs the jury that the law expressly pro-
hibi s any person from driving an automobile in such man-
ner s not to have the same under proper control at all times,. 
and declares that driving a car under such conditions will 
be eemed reckless driving. 
If the jury, therefore, believe that at the time of the ac.ci-
den or immediately before, the defendant, Helen Harris, was 
driv ng· her car in such manner as not to have the same under 
pro er control, then she was guilty of negligence, as a matter 
of I ,v. And, if the jury believe that this neg-ligence was the 
proximate cause of the ·injury and death of the infant child, 
'vit out any contributory negligence on the part of the de-
ceas d, if the jury should find him under the evidence to be 
cap ble of contributory negligence, they should find a verdict 
in f vor of the plaintiff. 
M. R. P. 
, 
270 ~ 5. 
e Court instructs the jury that the law provides that 
the river of an automobile shall drive his car upon the right 
half of the highway upon which he is proceeding; And, if 
the defendant, Helen Harris, in driving south on highway 
No. 644, did not drive her car to the west of the center of 
sai hig·hway, then she was negligent in not so doing. 
I the jury, therefore, believe that the defendant, Helen 
Har is, at the time of, or immediately before, the happening· 
oft e accident, was driving her car, or any part thereof, to 
the eft of the center line of the highway, on the eastern in-
stea of the western half thereof, and that her negligence in 
thu operating ber automobile was of itself, or in cooperation 
witl any other negligence on the part of the defendant, if 
sue there were, without any contributory negligence on the 
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part of the child, the proximate cause of the injury and death 
of the infant child, then they should find a verdict for the 
plaintiff. 
Granted: p. p. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 271 ~ 
~1. R. P. 
6. 
· The Court instructs the jury that there is no evidence of 
contributory negligence on the part of the child's father or 
mother. 
Granted: p. p. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 272 }- 7. 
M. R·. P. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you find for the plain-
tiff, then you are the sole judges of the amount of the dam-
ages to be awarded; and, in determining that amount, you 
mav fix the damages at such sum as under the evidence n1ay 
apl)ear to you fair and just, not to exceed the sum demanded 
in the declaration; in determining this amount, you may take 
into consideration the sorrow, suffering, and mental anguish 
occasioned to the father and n1other by the death of their 
child, and the loss to the father and mother of the solace, 
comfort, and society of their child, and .the loss to the father 
of the services of his child during- his probable life, and the 
probable life of the father, until the child should become 
twenty-one years of age, if he had not been killed. And you 
may direct in what proportion the sum a'varded shall be di-
vided bet,veen the father and mother. 
Granted: p. p. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 273 ~ 8. 
M. R.P. 
The Court instructs the jury that, even though they believe 
from the evidence in this case that the child, Ida Valeria Culp, 
was negligent in pushing the wagon ou which the said Carl 
Allen 'Vrig·ht, deceased, was riding, into the road, neverthe-
less, this in no wise relieves the defendant, Helen Harris, 
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from liability, should the ·jury believe from all of the evi-
denc that the said defendant, Helen Harris, was guilty of 
negli ence. 
1\II. R. P. 
9. 
Th Court instructs the jury that, should they believe from 
thee idence that the defendant, Helen Harris, was negligent, 
and t at the deceased child, Carl Allen Wright, was also neg-
ligen , nevertheless, if the jury should further believe from 
the e idence that the said Helen I-Iarris saw, or should in 
the e ercise of ordinary care, have seen, the deceased child, 
Carl Allen Wright,. in sufficient time to have given her an 
oppo tunity to have stopped her car, or turned to her right, 
so as not to have struck the child, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, then the jury are instructed that the said defendant, 
Hele Harris, had a last clear chance to avoid striking and 
killin · the child, and the jury should find for the plaintiff. 
p. p. 
~I. R. p 
A. 
Th Court further instructs the jury that the burden is on 
the p aintiff to prove every material allegation necessary to 
entitl him to recover in this case by a. preponderance of the 
evide ce; and, unless the jury shall believe that the plaintiff 
has et this test, and has proved every necessary allegation 
by st h preponderance of testimony, then they must find for 
the d fen dan t. '' Preponder~nce of the Evidence," does not 
neces arily mean the greater nun1ber of witnesses who may 
have esti:fied with reference to any particular point in ques-
tion. It denotes the gTeater 'veight of testimony upon con-
sider t.ion of all the evidence introduced before the jury. In 
deter 1ining accordingly what the greater weight of testimony 
mav e, when the testimony is in conflict, it is incumbent upon 
the. j ry to determine the credibility of the witnesses whose 
testi ony may be involved in the solution of this question; and 
in we· g·hin·g the credibility of the witnesses, the jury should 
take nto consideration the interest, or lack of interest, of 
such ~itnesses, in the outcome of the case; the intelligence, 
or Ia of intellig·ence, of such witnesses, their candor, or lack 
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of candor; their means or opportunity of observation, or their 
lack of means or opportunity of observation, the relationship 
of any witness to either party to the case as well as to other 
witnesses who may have testified; and thereupon 
pag-e 276 ~ to detern1ine the degree of credit to be accorded 
to the testimony of such witnesses, or the extent 
to which such witnesses should be discredited by them, in their 
discretion. 
Granted: p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 277} B. 
M. R. P. 
The Court instructs the jury that the fact that the plaintiff's 
intestate was killed will not justify a verdict for the plaintiff· 
unless the jury further believes from the preponderance of 
the .evidence that the injury was proximately c~used by the 
negligence of the defendant. 
Granted: p. d. 
~L R. P 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
pag-e 278 } c. 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, neglig-ence on the part of the defendant, which was 
the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff's intestate, 
and, unless the jury believes that the plaintiff has met this 
test, they should find for the defendant. 
Granted: p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 279} 
M. R. P. 
D. 
The Court instructs the jury that negligence is the failure 
to exercise such care as is ordinarily exercised by careful 
and prudent persons under the same or similar circumstances, 
and that it devolves upon the plaintiff in the instant case to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence a failure of the 
defendant, Helen Harris,, to exercise such reasonable care, 
and to further prove an injury or damage to the plaintiff's 
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inte tate in the natural and continuous sequence of events re-
sulti g from, or uninterruptedly connected with, the breach 
of t at duty; and if the jury find that the defendant, Helen 
Har is, exercised such care as a reasonable or prudent per-
son ould ordinarily have done, under the circumstances of 
the ituation, then they must find for the defendants. 
1\L R. P . 
. 4, 1937. 
pag E. 
T e court instructs the jury that the law considers every 
inju .. as the consequence or result of the proxin1ate cause 
of s ch injury, and not as the consequence or result of a 
mor ren1ote cause ; 
B t proximate cause does not, as a legal term, mean close-
ness or nearness in point of time, or the physical sequence 
of e ents, but closeness or nearness, in point of casual con-
nect on. And if the jury belieye from the evidence that the 
inju of the plaintiff was not the natural and probable re-
sult f some negligent act or omission of the defendant, Helen 
Har · s, then they must find for the defendants. 
Gtanted: p. d. 
1\L R. P. 
D . 4, 1937. 
paao- 281 r F. 
e court instructs the jury that if the defendant, Heh~h 
Ha is, through no fault of her own, was suddenly con-
fro ed by an emergency and was compelled to act instantly 
in a effort to avoid the accident, she was not guilty of neg-
lige ce if she made such a choice as a person of ·ordinary 
pru ence, placed in such a position, might have made, even 
tho gh the said defendant did not n1ake the wisest choice; 
and whether she used reasonable care under all the circum-
sta es, is a question for the jury. , 
1\I. R. P. 
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page 282 ~ G. 
The Court instructs the ·jury that, while an infant under 
the age of seven years is presumed to be incapable of con-
tributory negligence, nevertheless, the actions of an infant 
may be the sole cause of an accident resulting in injury to 
such infant; 
And the court further instructs the jury that, if you find 
in the instant case that the defendant, Helen Harris, was op-
erating her automobile, at the time of the accident, in a care-
ful and proper manner, under the circumstances, and that 
the accident 'vas caused solely by the sudden intrusion of 
the plaintiff's intestate into the hig·hway, in which the defend-
ant was driving, under circ1,1mstances under which such in-
trusion, could not have been anticipated by the said defend-
ant in the exercise of ordinary care, you shall find your ver-
dict for the defendants. 
Granted : p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 283 ~ I. 
~L R. P. 
The court instructs the jury that, in their consideration of 
the evidence of this case, and the actions of the defendant, 
Helen flarris, in the n1anagenwnt of her automobile after 
seeing plaintiff's intestate and his companions, they may take 
into consideration the condition of the high,vay as it existed 
on the day of the accident, the type of the highway, the grade, 
level, or slope of the hig·hway, and any other circumstances 
or conditions then and there existing that would affect the 
operation of such vehicle, and n1ay also take into considera-
tion the fact. that a driver of an automobile, unless fore-
warned of the danger, cannot apply the brakes of such au-
tomobile co-instantaneously with his seeing the necessity for 
doing so. 
Granted: p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 284 ~ K. 
M.R.P. 
The court instructs the jury that infants between the age 
of 7 and the age of 14 years are presumed to be incapable 
of contributory negligence. 
' 
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Ho ever, the court further tells the jury that this is a 
rebu :al presumption, and that, although you may believe 
from the evidence that defendant; Helen Harris, was guilty 
of ne ·ligence in the operation of her car, still if you further 
belie e that plaintiff's intestate, Carl Allen Wright, was 
warn d of the danger of playing in or crossing highways, and 
was f sufficient age, intelligence, experience and discretion 
to u derstand, comprehend, and appre~iate the danger in-
ciden to doing so, and that Carl Allen Wright, at the time 
of th accident involved in this case, failed to exercise that 
degr e of care and caution which a ehild of his age, intelli-
genc , experience, and discretion may reasonably be expected 
to or inarily use in the sanw situation, and under like cir-
cums ances, and that, but for his. failure to use such care and 
cauti n, the accident would not have occurred, then the said 
Carl lien Wright was guilty of contributory negligence,-and 
you hould find your verdict for the defendants. 
].L R. P. 
M. 
Th court instructs the jury that the purpose of the jury 
in vi wing the pren1ises as permitted to them by the court was 
to en ble the jury better to understand and construe the tes-
timo y of the witnesses touching the circumstances of this 
case nd more iutellig·ently to consider such evidence in reach-
ing a verdict upon the issues before them. 
To what extent the circu1nstances and conditions of the 
scene of the accident at the time of the vie'v corresponded 
with the circumstances and conditions of the scene of the 
· accid nt at the time of the occurrence of the accident on May 
23, 1 37, is a question which the jury n1ust determine from the 
evide ce in the case. 
M.R.P. 
N. 
Th court further instructs the jury that, in passing- upon 
this ase, and arriving at a verdict, yoti will be governed 
solei by the law as defined in these instructions, and the 
evide ce that has been' introduced hi the case, and find your 
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verdict accordingly; That sympathy has no place in the trial 
of a lawsuit, and, in making up your minds as to what your 
verdict shall be, you shall not permit any element -of sym-
pathy to enter into or influence your deliberations. 
Granted: p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
page 287} X. 
1\II. R. P~ 
The Court further instructs the jury that the defendant, 
Helen Harris, in operating her car on the highway mentioned· 
in the evidence, was charged with the duty to exercise rea-
sonable care and vigilance at all times, in order to discover 
the presence of children on the highway, or in such proximity 
to the highway, as might cause her to apprehend, in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, that such child, in obedience to the 
natural impulse characteristic of children, might suddenly 
enter the highway in advance of the approaching automobile, 
.and thus subject itself to peril and danger; and if you be-
lieve from a preponderance of the evidence that the said de-
fendant failed to use ordinary care reasonably to discover 
.and avoid injury to the child, if the decedent were, in fact, 
on the highway as the defendant's car approached, or, if the 
child were not upon the highway as the car approached the 
point of collision, but was in such proximity to the highway 
as that its probable appearance on the highway might have 
been reasonably anticipated by the defendant in the exercise 
of ordinary care, that the said defendant failed to provide 
for the safety of such child, should it enter the highway, then 
if the failure of the defendant, Helen Harris, in her duty in 
either of these particulars, operated as the proximate cause 
of the child's injury, and the child itself were without con-
tributory negligence on its part, you should find 
page 288 ~ for the plaintiff. 
The court further instructs the jury that the 
term ''ordinary care'' as used in these instructions means 
sueh care as is conm1ensurate with the circumstances dis-
closed in the evidence, taking· into consideration the apparent 
age of the child itself. 
· Granted: PeT cu:ria·m in lieu of Instructions 3 & 2. p. p. 
M. R. P~ 
December 4, 1937. 
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T e court :£urther instructs the jury that the driver of an 
aut mobile owes the duty of reasonable care to children on 
the highway, and that this obligation signifies such care as 
is c mmensurate with the danger and probability of the in-
jur to such children. The conduct of a child on its part j s 
not to be measured by the sarne rules which govern that of 
adu ts, since the child is presumed to lack the knowledge and 
exp rience to know or estimate correctly the probable conse-
que ce of his acts, or the essential dang·er in a given in-
sta ce. The reasonable care required of an aut01nobile driver 
tow rds children dernands that the driver of an automobile 
shp ld consider the age, maturity, and intelligence of the 
chil whenever the operation of such aut01nobile involves 
the afety of such a child, as the age of such child n1ay be ap-
par nt to, or discoverable by, the operator of the automobile 
in t e exercise of ordinary care. 
u are further instructed that children of tender years 
are entitled to a degree of care front other proportioned to 
the pparent ability of such children to foresee and avoid the 
per ls which they may encounter, if those perils are such as 
hav become apparent to, or might have been discovered by, 
the operator of an automobile in the exercise of ordinary 
car under the circumstances. The driver of an automobile, 
according·ly, must not assume that an infant of 
pab 290 r the age of 7 years and 3 months will exercise 
proper care for his own protection. If, there-
for , you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in 
this case that the defendant, Helen Harris, failed to use such 
car , and that, in consequence of such failure, operating as 
the proximate cause, the child was killed, without any con-
tri tory negligence on the part of the decedent, were he 
cap ble of contributory negligence in the opinion of the jnry 
un er the evidence, then you should find for the plaintiff and 
ass ss darnages not to exceed the amount clairned in th~ 
dec ara tion in this case. 
·ranted: per c·uriam in lieu of Instructions 2 & 3. p. d. 
1\L R. P. 
ecember 4, 1937. 
291 ~ Q. 
he court further instructs the jury that all the instruc-
s granted in this case are to be taken and read by the 
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jury in connection with one another, and in connection with 
the evidence that has been introduced on the trial of this case. 
~I. R. P. 
Dec. 4, 1937. Per C~tria1n. 
page 292 ~ The following· instructious, desig·nated as num-
bers 2 and 3, were requested by the plaintiff, and 
were denied by the Court, to-wit: 
2. 
The Court instructs the jury that the driver of an automo-
bile owes the duty of reasonable care to children on the high-
way, but this means care commensurate with the danger and 
the probability of injury, and the conduct of a child, not to 
be measured by the sarne rules which govern that of adults, 
because a child does not have the kno\vledge and experience 
to know or estimate correctly the probable consequence of 
l1is acts in a given instance, and the reasonable care required 
of an automobile driver towards children demands that the 
driver consider the apparent age, n1aturity and intelligence 
of the child. .And you are further instructed that children 
of tender years are entitled to a degree of care from others 
proportioned to their apparent ability to foresee and avoid 
the perils which they may encounter, and the driver must 
not assun1e that an infant seven years old will exercise proper 
care for his own protection. And, if you believe from the 
evidence that the defendant, Helen Harris, failed to use such 
care, and that as a proximate result thereof the child \Vas 
killed, then you should find for the plaintiff, and assess danl-
ages not to P.xceed the amount claimed in the declaration. 
Refused : p. p. page 293 ~ 
Covered by Instruction ''X'' per curia1n. 
1\'I. R. P. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
3. 
The Court instructs the jury that the defendant, Helen 
Harris, from the time that she saw the child, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have seen him in or near th(\ 
Highway, is charged in law with knowledge of the fact that a 
child might act under a childish. impulse, and with this knowl-
edge she should have proceeded with her car under such con-
/ 
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trol s to have been able to bring it to a stop, if necessary, 
to a oid running into the child. And, if you believe from 
the e idence that she failed to use such care, and that as a 
pro xi ate result thereof the child was killed, then you should 
:find . or the plaintiff. 
Re used : p. p. 
Co ered by Instructions "X'' & "Y" per curiam. 
M. R. P. 
De!. 4, 1937. 
page 294 ~ The following instructions, designated as num-
bers H, J, and L, were requested by the defend-
ants, and were denieu by the Court, to-wit: 
H. 
Th Court instructs the jury that if you believe from all 
the e idence in this case, that the accident, as detailed by 
the e idence, was solely caused by the sudden intrusion of 
Carl fllen Wright, who was riding in a wagon being pushed 
at th tin1e by another infant, from the· east side of the La,v-
rence ille-Ebony highway, into the said higlnvay, and in front 
of th defendant's automobile, you shall find for the defend-
ants. 
R.e used as covered sufficiently by Instruction·" G". p. d. 
M.R.P. 
De . 4, 1937. 
J. 
Court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the 
ce that ~Irs. Robert Wright, g-randmother, and the cus-
todia of the infant, Carl Allen Wright, on May 23, 1937, 
the s id infant having been placed under the care of his said 
gran mother by Prince I. Wrig·ht, fatherof said infant, was 
guilty of neg·ligence in permitting the said infant 
page 295 ~ to play irl or near the said Lawrenceville-Ebony 
high,vay, and in calling the said infant and his 
comp nions, 'vho were then and there playing- on the east 
side f said hig·h"ray, at a point approximately 42 feet from 
~aid "ghway, to corne from that point, a.cross said highway, 
to th premises of their said grandmother, which were lo-
cated directly across from said infants on the west side of 
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said highway, and in failing· to look and see that the said 
children could cross said highway in safety, .which negligence 
contributed to the death of said infant, then the negligence 
of such custodia11 is a bar to any recovery in this case by 
Prince I. vVright, and said Prince I. Wright should be de-
nied any share of the recovery by the plaintiff_ against the de-
fendants, if ·the jury find for the plaintiff. 
Refused : p. d. 
M.R.P. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
L. 
The Court instructs the jury that the law of this state re-
quires every motor vehicle, when operated upon a highway, 
to be equipped with brakes adequate to control the move-
ments of, and to stop such vehicle, and such brakes shall be 
tnaintained in good working order. 
· And in this connect~on the court further instructs the jury 
that on a dry, hard, approximately level, stretch 
page 296 ~ of higlnvay, free from loose material, the service 
(foot) brake shall be capable of stopping the mo-
tion vehicle at a speed of 20 miles per hour within a dis-
tance of 25 feet, with four-wheel brakes, or 45 feet with two-
wheel brakes ; 
And in considering whether or not the defendant, Helen 
Harris, upon a proper application of her brakes, could have 
stopped her automobile in time to avoid hitting the 'vagon 
occupied by plaintiff's intestate, you shall consider not only 
the above provisions of the law, but also the conditions of 
the highway, and other conditions then existing, and sha11 
also take into consideration the "reaction time", that is, the 
distance in 'vhich an automobile travels from the time the 
driver realizes the necessity of applying the brakes, and the 
point where the brakes actually begin to take effect. 
Refused : p. d. 
Dec. 4, 1937. 
M.R.P. 
page 297 ~ Whereupon the plaintiff and the defendants, 
respectively, by counsel, noted and tendered the 
following objections and exceptions to the action of the Court 
in granting·, and refusing certain instructions hereinafter par-
tirularly mentioned, being instructions hereinabove set forth, 
as having been granted and instructions hereinabove set forth 
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as h ving been refused, as tendered by the parties, plaintiff 
or P.fendants, r~spectively, as hereinabove indicated, in the 
foil :ving particulars, to-wit: 
1. 
C unsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the action 
of t e court in refusing- to grant Instruction No. 2 offered 
by t e plaintiff, upon the ground that the instruction properly 
stat s the law as applicable to the facts of this case. This 
inst ction has been approved by the Court of Appeals of 
Vir "nia in its verbathu form in the case of R. F. Trant, Inc., 
v. U ton, 165 S. E., p. 404. 
2. 
C unsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the action 
of t e court in refusing to grant Instruction No. 3 offered 
by t e plaintiff, upon the ground that the instruction prop-
erly states the law as applicable to the facts of this case. 
Thi instruction has been approved by the Court of Appeals 
of irginia in its verbatim form· in the case of R. F. Tt·ant, 
Inc., v. Upton, 165 S. E., p. 404. 
3. 
C nnsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the action 
of the court in granting Instruction X, per curiam 
pag 298 ~ in lieu of Instruction 2, as offered by the plain-
tiff. Instruction X is objectionable in that the 
cour undertakes to deal with contributory negligence on thP 
part of the plaintiff's intestate, when, as a matter of fact, it 
is a resumption of law· that the child was incapable of being 
guil y of contributory negligence, and this presumption has 
not een overcome by the evidence of the defendants. Fur-
ther ore, there is no evidence of contributory neglig-ence on 
the~art of the child in the instant case. All of the evidence 
sho · s that th.e deceased child was riding upon a wagon, 'vhich 
was being pushed by another child, to-wit: Ida Valeria Oulp, 
and the negligence on the }Jart of said Ida Valeria Culp, is 
not J"mputable to the plaintiff's i!ltestate. 
4. 
C unsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the action 
oft e court in granting Instruction Y, per c-uria-1n, in lieu of 
Inst uction 3 as offered by the plaintiff. 
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Instruction Y, in effect, tells the jury that after the de-
fendant, Helen Harris, had seen the child, or that the children 
had become apparent to her, then she owed to such children 
only a duty of reasonable and ordinary care. This instruc-
tion contemplates that the· duty of the operator of an auto-
mobile to children after having been seen or discovered by 
such operator of a car is the same as the duty owing· to adults 
under such circumstances. This is not the law. Under the 
law, when the operator of a car sees children play-
page 299 ~ ing on or near the highway; then from that time 
on, the law exacts of the operator of such auto-
mobile a hig·h degree of care and vigilance; a degree of care 
and vigilance hig·her than that which would be due and owing 
to adults, under similar circumstances. 
5. 
Counsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the action 
of the court in granting Instruction F on behalf of the de-
fend~ants, commonly known as the ''sudden emergency in-
struction''. There is no evidence in this case upon which to 
base such an instruction. The evidence does not sho·w that 
IIelen Harris was placed in a sudden emergency. Even 
- though the evidence should tend to show such, nevertheless, 
it abundantly appears from the evidence that the defendant, 
llelen Harris, through her own negligence in not keeping a 
proper lookout, and in driving to her left-hand side of th«? 
road brought this emergency upon herself. The law is that a 
person who takes a part in bringing about such an emergency 
is not entitled to an instruction based upon the same. At 
any rate, the instruction at least, if granted should be modi-
fied by telling the jury that in order for the defendant, Helen 
Harris, to avail herself of a ''sudden emergency instruction''-
that she should herself have been guilty of no negligence what-
soever. 
6. 
Counsel for the plaintiff objects and excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in gTanting· Instruction G on be-
page 300 ~ half of the defendant upon the ground that the1·e 
is no evidence of contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff's intestate. There is no evidence that 
the plaintiff's intestate made a sudden intrusion into the 
road. 
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7 •. 
Co nsel for the plaintiff objects to the action of the court 
in g anting Instruetion I on behalf of the defendants. There 
is no evidence in this case that the operator of the automobile 
cann t stop his car as instantly without any warning as he 
can o by having first been forewarned of an approaching 
dang r or en1ergency. · 
8. 
Co nsel for plaintiff objects and excepts to the action of 
the ·urt in granting Instruction K on behalf of the defend-
ants. There is no evidence in this case that plaintiff's in-
testa e was capable of being guilty of contributory negligence. 
Ther was a presumption of law to the effect that he was 
not s capable. It was necessary for the defendants to over-
come this presumption by evidence going to show that plain-
tiff' intestate 'vas above the average child in intelligence 
for · s age. Whereas, all of the evidence sho,vs that plain-
tiff's intestate was only a normal child of 7 years and 3 
mon hs of age, having only the intelligence and foresight of 
the verage child of such an age. 
1. 
C 1nsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action of 
the ourt in grantinp; Instruction 1 for the plaintiff upon 
the Tounds: That there is no evidence in the record upon 
whic to base or predicatP. such an instruction; that there is 
no e idence of any negligent act of omission or commission 
on t e part of thP. dcfP.ndant, Helen Harris, that caused or 
cont ibuted to thP. death of plaintiff's intestate; that the in-
stru tion doP.s not take into consideration ''the doctrine of 
sudd n emergency'_' the undisputed evidence in the case be-
ing hat plaintiff's intestate ·and his companions suddenly 
erne ged from behind tall bushes and immediately in front of 
defe dant 's automobile. 
2. 
C . nsel for dP.fendants objects and excepts to the action 
of t le court in p,-ranting Instruction X for the plaintiff of its 
own otion upon the grounds: That there is no evidence in 
the ecord upon which to base or prP.dicate such an instruc-
tion; that the instruction is ambiguous, involved, and mislead-
ing, nd tends to confuse the jury; that the court in this in-
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struction uses thP. expression "in order to .discover the pres-
ence of children", which places a greater duty upon the op-
erator of a ear than the law places upon him; ~hat 
page 302 ~ the duty of the operator of a car is not to seek out 
o1· discover persons near a highway, but, in the 
exercise of. ordinary care, to see them, if they are in a place 
wherP. they can be seen; that that part of the instruction 
which dP.als with infants' proximity to the highway, and the 
duty of the defendant to have reasonably anticipated infants' 
appearance on the highway, is objectionable for the reason 
that there is no evidence that plaintiff's intestate or his com-
panions WP.re visible, or any reason why plaintiff's intestate, 
or other children, should have been suspected of being on the 
highway at the place of the accident; that that part of said in-
struction X that provides ''that the said defendant failed to 
provide for the safety of such child" is objectionable when 
read and considered with the other provisions of the instruc-
tion, for the reason that it makes the operator of an automo-
hilP. an insurer of a child-it doesn't consider the possibility 
of the child's darting in front of the car,-it makes it the 
duty of such operator to seek out and discover children near 
high,vays, and says. as a matter of law, that he must operate 
his car so that he can at all times stop or take such other 
action as will provide for the safety of the child; the law 
does not hnpose such duty upon drivers of automobiles. It 
does not make them insurers of children. It does not say 
that the ·driver on the hig·hway must constantly expect the 
road to bP. blockP.d by 'infants or other obstructions; 
Upon the further gTound that there is no casual 
page 303 ~ connection between any act of the defendant Hel~n 
liarris, in the operation of her car on the date of 
the accidP.nt. and the death of plaintiff's intestate. 
THE COURT: 
'~ehe court observes with reference to the objection taken to 
this instruction that as a practical matter, it is of opinion 
that when a person is ddving on an open road in the country, 
l1e is charg-ed witl1 no particular duty to discover who might 
intrude upon thP. road from the side of the highway, unless 
there is some premonition in the attitude of such person, be 
hP. child or adult, to indicate that such an event might occur, 
but the court is satisfied that the law of Virginia is otherwise, 
and in this observation speaks only of the subject as one of 
n1erely practical concern. 
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3. 
C unsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of t e court in granting· Instruction Y for the plaintiff, of 
its o motion, upon the grounds; That there is no evidence 
in t e record upon which to base or predicate such an instruc-
tion that the expression ''might have been discovered by 
the perator of an auton1obile" is objectionable for the rea-
sons stated in counsel's objection to Instruction X, the duty 
of s ch operator bei11g, in the exercise of ordinary care, to 
see, not to seek out or discover; that the instruc-
304 ~ tion is vague, indefinite and uncertain; that it is 
an incorrect statement of an abstract proposition 
and does not point out to the jury any act of negligence 
P. part of the defendant. 
4. 
C unsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of t e court in granting· Instrt1ction 4 for the plaintiff upon 
the Tounds: That there is no evidence in the record upon 
whi to base or predicate such an instruction; that there is 
no e~vidence th.at defendant was not properly driving her an-
tom bile at the time of the accident; that the statute rP.gard-
ing eckless driving· has no place in the instant case, and an 
insbuction should not be given based thereon; that there is 
no c sual connection between the manner in which defendant 
was operating her automobile at the time of the accident and 
the eath of plaintiff's intestate; that the violation of a stat-
ute oes not of itself, make the violator guilty of actionable 
negl gence as a n1atter of law; 
5. 
C unsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of t e court in ~'ranting Instruction 5 for the plaintiff upon 
thP. . Tounds : That there is no evidence in the record upon 
whi 1 to base or predicate such an instruction; that there is 
no vidence that defendant, Helen Harris, was operating 
her automobile on the left side of the highway; 
pag 305 ·~ that the instructions does not correctly quote 
from the statute in question, or set forth the la-w 
appl cable in such cases. The statute does not 1nake it the 
dnt of the operator of a car to drive on the right half of the 
high ray at all times; that the violation of this statute does 
not ake the violator guilty of actionable negligence as a 
mat er of law; that the instruction should have bee11 qualified 
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by telling the jury that the defendant's duty to observe cer-
tain statutory provisions relative to driving on the highway, 
only became applicable if she saw the children, or the chil-
dren could have been seen, in tin1e for her to have avoided 
striking them, by exercising ordinary care under the circum-
stances. 
6. 
Counsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of the court in granting Instruction 6 for the plaintiff upon 
the grounds; that the negligence of 1\IIrs. Robert Wright, 
grandmother and custodian of "said infant, and in whose care 
the said infant was· placed by Prince I. Wright, bars Prince 
I. Wright from any part of the verdict, if there be such a ver..: 
diet in the case: that the said custodian was the agent and 
representative of Prin~e I. Wright in the management and 
~ontrol of the plaintiff's intestate, on the date of the accident, 
and that the said Prince I. v..rright was responsible for -the 
negligence of such custodian; that the said c·ustodian of said 
infant was guilty of gross negligence for the rea-
page 306 ~ sons stated in a motion heretofore made by coun-
sel for defendants at the con~lusion of the testi-
mony in the case, and to which reference is expressly made. 
7. 
Counsel for the defendants objects and excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in granting Instruction 7 for the plaintiff on 
the grounds : That there is no evidence in the record upon 
'vhich to base or predicatP such an instruction. This is not 
a case in which the plaintiff should recover of the defendants, 
or. eithPr of them; that the measure of damages set forth in 
said instruction is not the true and accurate measure of dam-
ages in the premises. 
8. 
Counsel for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of the court in .~ranting Instruction 8 for the plaintiff on the 
grounds: That therP is no evidence in the record upon which 
to base or predicate such an instruction; There is no evidence 
that defendant Helen Harris, was guilty of any negligence 
that caused or contributed to the death of plaintiff's intestate; 
that tbe instruction, while admitting by implication, that Ida 
Valeria Oulp, who was of the same size, age, mental and physi-
cal development as plaintiff's intestate, was capable of co~-
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tribu ory negligence, nevertheless excludes from the jury any 
·consideration of contributory negligence on the 
page 307 ~ part of plaintiff's intestate; that the evidence in 
the case is that of plaintiff's intestate, Ida Valeria 
Culp and one othP.r child were playing together immediately 
prio to thP. accidP.nt, and that each was neglig·ent in its ac-
tions immediately prior to, and up to the time of the accideht, 
in w ich phiintiff's intP.state was killed; that the instruction 
e, ambiguous, and tends to confuse the jury. 
9. 
nsP.l for defendants objects and excepts to the action 
of th court in granting Instruction H for the plaintiff upon 
the o ounds: That there is no evidence in the rP.cord upon 
whicl to base or predicate an instruction on "the doctrine of 
last .lear chance;'' that there is no evidence that the de-
fend· nt, Helen Harris, was negligent in any particular; that 
there is no P.vidence that the peril of plaintiff's intestate was, 
or be arne apparent to defP.ndant in sufficient time to stop 
or tu n her automobile to the right, to avoid striking plain-
tiff's intestate; that the instruction is vaguP., indefinite, am-
biguo s, and tends to c.onfuse the jury; that the instruction is 
not c nsistt~·nt with other instructions ~iven by the court for 
the lJ aintiff or with the instruction given by the court on be-
half f the defP.ndant on the ''doctrine of sudden emergency.'' 
10. 
Co nsel for defendants objects, and excepts to the action 
of th court in rP.fusing Instruction L, offered on behalf of 
the d fendant, the grounds of objection being, that the court 
admi .ted. over objection, testimony on behalf of the plaintiff 
as to certain braking tests that were made by witnesses who 
testi eel for tl1e plaintiff, the purpose of this evidence being 
to R]J w th~t 1:hP. Harris car was not adequately equipped with 
lawf brakP.s; that the said witnesses in making said tests 
did n t take into considP.ration the "reaction time", that is, 
the d stancP. in which an automobile travels from the time the 
drive · realizP.s the necessity of applying· brakes and the point 
whP.r the brakes actually begin to take effect; that the jury 
mav ave inferrP.d from the evidence admitted on behalf of 
the. p 'a in tiff, and the court's action in striking out the evidence 
of o cers Dameron and Grizzard. with rAference to "reac-
tion ime'' ancl the timP. in which a car with lawful brakes 
could be stopped, that the said Harris car was not equipped 
with awful brakes; that the purposP. of Instruction L is to 
Helen Harris, et al., v. Prince I. Wright, Adm'r. 227 
dA:fine what shall be deemed lawful brakes, and is in accord-
ance with the statute of Virginia in such cases made and pro-
vided; that the further purpose of Instruction L is to tell 
the jury what is meant by ''reaction time'' which the jury 
has a rig·ht to consider in determining whether or 
page 309 ~ not the Harris automobile was properly stopped, 
or the brakes thereon properly applied. 
11. 
Co1msel for defendants objActs, and excepts to the action 
of the court in refusing to grant Instruction J offered on 
behalf of tlw defendar1ts, on the gTound that the grandmother, 
'vho was the custodian of the plaintiff's intestate on the date 
of the accident, and in whosA care the infant was placed by 
Prince I. Wright, was guilty of gross negligence in calling 
the infant, and permitting the infant to cross the highway 
unaccompanied, the said Harris car having been in the plain, 
unobstructed view of the custodian at the time she called said 
infant; that the said father, Prince I. Wright, was represented 
at the time by the custodian of said infant, and was responsi-
blP. for the actions and omissions of said custodian; that the 
said father cannot recover damages for the said infant's 
death upon the fundamental p1·i'l~cipal that no one can ac-
tluire a right of action by his own negligence, or the negli-
g·ence of his agent or representative. 
page 310 ~ The undersigned, M. R. Peterson, Judge of the 
1Circuit Court aforesaid, for the County of Bruns-
·wick, aforesaid, do certify, after due and legal notice to the 
parties by their attorneys, that, as aforesaid, the foregoin~ 
is a true and correct copy and report of the testimony and 
other incidents of the trial of the action of trespass on the 
case. wherein Prince I. W riQ.·ht, as Administrator of Carl 
Allen Wrig·ht, deceased, is thA plaintiff, and Helen Harris 
and Huff Harris are the defendants, including the instruc-
tions granted on the trial of the said casA in said Court, and . 
the instructions dAnied by the Court, as tendered by the par-
ties, respectively, and also including the motions made by 
the respective parties, during· the course of the trial aforesaid, 
and including· the Axceptions of the parties, respectively, to 
the instructions denied. as prayed for by the respective par-
ties to thA case, and of the objP.ctions of the parties, respec-
tively, to the instructions :~ranted by the Court, or amended 
by thP Court. as hereinafter denoted, which said trial occurred 
in the Circuit Court for the County of Brunswick, Virginia, 
on the 3rd and 4t11 days of DP.cember, 1937, at the October 
228 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Ter , 1937, of the said Court; a final judgment being entered 
ther in on the 23rd day of February, 1938, at the ~,ebruary 
Ter , 1938, of the said Court. Witness my hand this the 
19th day qf '~larch, 1938. 
1\ti. R. PETERSON, 
Judge of the ·Circuit Court for the 
County of Brunswick, Virginia. 
page 311 ~ I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy 
of the record in the case of Prince I. Wright, Ad-
mini trator of the Estate of Carl Allen Wright, deceased v. 
Hele Harris and Huff Harris, and that notice required by 
Sect on 6339 of the Code of Virginia was duly given before 
said record was copied. 
Gi e1 1 under my hand this 29th day of March, 1938. 
W. E. E·LMORE, 'Clerk. 
F A for Copy of Record $48.20. 
Test~: 
W. E. ELMORE, rCierk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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